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  Abstract 
In its struggle to realize Sharia in a democratic system, the PKS is fully aware that the 
majority of Indonesian Muslims do not support the Islamist agenda, especially the ideals to 
implement Sharia and to Islamize the state and the constitution. Some degree of compromise 
between the party’s principles and general public demand cannot be avoided if the party is 
to win the mass support. Consequently, the party downplays its Sharia agenda by promoting 
issues which are appealing to a broader constituency. The party describes this approach as 
being intrinsic to its da’wa (dakwah) strategy and was intended to bring the party closer to 
its potential constituents and sympathizers. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A.   Background of the study 
Initially launched as an Islamist party modeled on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and named Partai Keadilan (PK the Justice Party)1 defined its mission as 
striving for the enforcement of Islamic law and the creation of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS – the Prosperous Justice Party), as it is now 
known, presents itself as a moderate party whose political manifesto states that the 
party is focused on promoting religious piety – da’wa.2 In its platform, PKS no longer 
aspires to achieve an Islamic state in Indonesia but rather seeks to restore the influence 
of Islam in the country. According to its platform, the Republic Indonesia cannot be 
separated from Islam. Rather than working to achieve an Islamic State, PKS now says 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Islamism applies to discourses and projects that conceive of Islam not merely as religion, but 
also as a comprehensive political ideology that provides both a template and a means of changing the 
entirety of society from the ‘top down’ via legislation that requires people to conform with ‘Sharia’, or 
‘Islamic law’, as interpreted and applied by contempory Islamist thinkers. From the Islamist perspective, 
politics should aim to establish a complete comprehensive system of government that is regulated by 
Sharia. In scholarly work, Islamism is often used interchangeably with “political Islam,” and PKS 
represents the strongest political Islam in the country’s political landscape. It should be noted, however, 
that many political parties, particularly in Indonesia, drawing on mass-based Islamic support are not 
Islamist parties, even if their political rhetoric used appears to superficially resonate with Islamist 
rhetoric. In Indonesia, for example, parties such as PKB and PAN – appealing to the masses of Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively – are not Islamist parties. True Islamist parties, by definition, 
hold to a radical agenda in that they aspire to the complete transformation of the political system from 
‘root to branch’. PKB and PAN, in contrast, are clear in the position in supporting Pancasila-based 
pluralist political in the Republic, and contest any attempt at replacing the current constitutional 
arrangement with one that forces, top-down, piety upon Indonesians. Importantly, however, today’s 
PKS, unlike under its founding generation of Islamists, has embarked on a new approach to Islamism 
with a much longer-term vision of social and political reform. Tactically, it supports a democratic 
government and pragmatic approach, that advocates taking part in electoral, power-sharing politics. In 
this way, the party is open to collaborate with other political force and non-Muslims as equal partners 
in advancing the national interest, at least in the short to medium term. As this dissertation will argue, it 
justifies this by arguing that the priority must be the implementation of Sharia and that to achieve this a 
gradualist approach is a sure and more effective approach.  
2 Najwa Shihaband Yanuar Nugroho, “The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)”, in Asian Law, Vol. 10, 2008, p. 239. 
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that its goal is “the creation of a just and civil society that is blessed by God the 
Almighty within the framework of the Republic Indonesia.”3 
However, with this new platform, PKS is still supportive of the gradual 
implementation of Sharia, saying that it would not make any sense for a party with a 
strong background of Islamist cadres to abandon the desire of incorporating Sharia into 
the legal system of the country. The party’s support to the gradual introduction of 
Sharia is clearly observed from its position in parliament to amend and propose 
legislation that uphold the Islamic values. For PKS, Sharia is not limited to the legal 
injunction and framework; it is a divine value that regulates all aspects of life. By this 
approach, proposing and supporting the promulgation of the Bill of Pornography and 
Pornographic Acts (Rancangan Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi), and 
anti-Alcoholic Beverage is a part of the struggle to introduce Sharianorms through the 
legislative body of the state. Even though PKS has rarely directly initiated the 
application of Perda Syariah (Sharia Regional Regulation) itself, the party is 
undeniably a staunch supporter to the application of the Perda Sharia. When some 
members of parliament from different parties proposed a petition to annul the Perda 
Syariah, PKS legislators are quick to launch a counter petition against its removal.4 
PKS believes that the practice of Sharia within the community must be 
supported by political structures. Any effort to influence the state must be carried out 
by an involvement in political activities. In this context, Rofi Munawar, the Chairman 
of PKS in East Java, said: 
“…we know that all policies are decided through political process, not through 
sermons. We cannot expect good policies if people who claim themselves clean 
just speak out in sermons or in raising criticism.”5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Memperjuangkan Masyrakat Madani: Falsafah Dasar dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan 
PK Sejahtera, Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008, p. 4-5. 
4 Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, “The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)”, in Asian Law, Vol. 10, 2008, p. 242. 
5 Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006, p. 204. 
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Regarding the stance of PKS on Sharia, the book entitled, Yang Nyata dari PK 
Sejahtera (What is obvious from PK Sejahtera) by a PKS activist, reads: 
“Shariah is mercy for all creatures and the proper implementation of Sharia will 
not bring discrimination. PKS believes that its implementation in Indonesia will 
provide the solution for the current multi-dimensional crisis. However, it must 
be done in a peaceful and constitutional way, not through violence or 
compulsion.”6 
The same notion on Sharia is also voiced by Hidayat Nurwahid, former 
president of PKS as he said that: 
“The problem is that too many people talk about Sharia and what they mean is 
cutting off hands and wearing scarves. Our main program is how to make 
people better off and how to get justice. In order to make Indonesians 
comprehend the concept and essence of Sharia, I suggest three steps in 
socializing Sharia, namely educating Muslims, providing examples and 
creating dialogue.”7 
According to Yon Machmudi, the attitude of PKS towards the formalization of 
Sharia in Indonesia is still ambivalent. This is because the party formally has no clear 
direction on Sharia and its core members have varied in their responses to the 
issues.8He argues that within the party, there are two distinct streams regarding this 
particular issue: the moderate-substantialist and the conservative-legal formalist. The 
alleged existence of these two camps with PKS elite, he concludes, has made the 
attitude of PKS towards Sharia indecisive. Having said that, what is clear from PKS is 
that to win the mass support, during its political campaign, Sharia has been 
reformulated by incorporating the spirit of Islam into secular issues, such as clean 
government and anti-corruption movement. In this way, Sharia has been secularized, 
i.e. secular issues are being framed within new paradigm to reveal their Islamic nature. 
In other words, every attempt is made to relate Sharia norms to secular issues in order 
to bring the party closer to popular aspirations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Satria Hadi Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK Sejahtera, Jakarta: Miskat Publication, 2003, p. 20. 
7  Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, Jakarta: Al-
Jannah Pustaka, 2004, p. 150-151. 
8 Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, p. 204. 
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Even though no plain-language statements from PKS have been made on the 
issue of formalizing Sharia, it does not necessarily mean that the party has given up its 
desire to introduce Sharia into the state legal system. This seemingly indecisive attitude 
is partly due to the fact that the party needs to balance their agenda between Islamist 
constituents and the public at large. This attitude has resulted in tension between 
cadres’ support for the further promotion of Sharia and a fear among party elites of 
losing votes from middle ground supporters. Its apparently ambiguous stand on issues 
of Sharia also raised suspicions that should it have a chance to govern, the party will 
establish an Islamic state and impose Sharia upon Muslim population.9 
The seemingly ambiguous attitude of the party toward the implementation of 
Sharia is merely an immediate effect of democracy on religious political parties. By 
participating in the electoral democratic governance, religious political parties are 
compelled to moderate their platform and goals. In order to be successful in gaining 
votes and enter governing coalition, the religious parties need to go beyond their 
exclusive issues normally invoked by Islamist parties, such as the formalization of 
Sharia in the state constitution and its enforcement upon the Muslim subjects. By 
focusing on non-religious issues such as clean governance, anti-corruption and social 
justice, PKS has translated Islamist ideology into a language of universal values. This 
approach proves to serve as a political strategy to win a larger constituency.  
Participating in the democratic electoral process will involve political 
bargaining; this includes political alliances with secular-based party and even the 
Christian party in many regional elections. Political interaction with other figures of 
different political background also contributes to the process of moderation within PKS 
party elites. Negotiation and compromise must become the political language of the 
party in maintaining its position as potential coalition partner and mainstream political 
party attractive to the middle ground of the electorate.  
I argue that socio-political reality of the country has deeply influenced the PKS 
stance on the implementation of Sharia. As a subsystem much influenced by politics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 205. 
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if Shariais to be integrated into the legal system of the country, it has to undergo a law-
making process that involves extensive political negotiation. Consequently, in relation 
to PKS’ stance on the implementation of Sharia, the art of compromise has to be 
learned by PKS in order to maintain the loyalty of its core constituents, on the one 
hand, many of whom are now unhappy with the party’s political gesture that is 
submitting to more secular, instead of Islamic, values, and to win the vast middle 
ground electorate, on the other hand, which tend to support “secular” politics. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that for PKS the issue of implementing Sharia in democratic 
Indonesia is more a matter of politics as the art of the possible than it is a matter arguing 
about ideology. 
The participation of any party in politics necessitates the process of negotiating 
the ideals and interests, and even a religiously inspired ‘da’wa party’ needs to strike a 
balance in steering its way through politics. Some degree of compromise between the 
party’s principles and general public demand cannot be avoided if the party is to win 
the mass support. Consequently, the PKS leadership has long acknowledged that the 
struggle for implementation of Sharia needs to be presented in secular terms, such as 
striving for clean government and fighting corruption. With this in mind, PKS adopted 
a deliberate strategy of not making direct reference to Sharia. It described this approach 
as being intrinsic to its da’wa strategy and was intended to bring the party closer to its 
potential constituents and sympathizers.  
Nevertheless, this strategy of downplaying Sharia is not without drawbacks; in 
fact, it presents PKS with a dilemma. Due to this seemingly ambivalent attitude 
towards Sharia, PKS is accused by radical and fundamentalist groups as not being 
committed to the struggle for Sharia. And due to its implicit support for Sharia, PKS 
is categorized by the mainstream parties, including non-Islamist Muslim mass-based 
parties like PKB and PAN as being an extremist group aspiring to change the 
ideological and political system of the country.  
Given the central importance of these issues, a careful study of PKS thinking 
about da’wa and Sharia is needed to shed the light on the party’s strategy of 
implementing Sharia within the system of democracy. This is what this dissertation 
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sets out to do. It takes the approach that da’wa in its wider dimension represents the 
key element to understand the attitude of the party on the implementation of Sharia in 
democratic Indonesia. How Sharia is understood by the party and how da’wa is used 
as a strategy and approach to realize the party’s ultimate goal of Sharia implementation 
will be the focus of the study. 
 
B.   Literature Review 
The Pew Global Attitude Survey of 2011 revealed that the majority of 
respondents in Muslim countries prefer democracy to any other systems of 
government, and that they believe that Islam’s influence in politics is positive. Implicit 
in these findings is the insight that the yearning for stronger Islamic value does not 
necessarily translate into the support for an Islamic state. With this in mind, it is not 
surprising that Islamist political current in the Muslim world is now a prominent 
feature. Especially when the ruling regimes open a political channel, moderate 
Islamists will participate in the political process by forming political parties. More than 
often, “they represent the only means of expressing popular opposition to regimes 
generally regarded as corrupt and inefficient.”10 
The participation of Islamist parties in democratic politics has drawn great 
attention from many scholars. In her analysis on Islamist parties in political process, 
Ann-Kristin Jonasson qualifies them as a democratic dilemma. 11  It becomes 
dilemmatic because allowing them to join the democratic process is tantamount to 
democratic suicide; they will democratically capture power, only to cancel democracy 
afterward. Yet, it would be undemocratic to deny them a political participation in a 
democratic system that guarantee and protect the equal right for all citizens to express 
their political aspiration. In her study of Islamist parties’ political linkage, Jonasson 
compares Islamist parties in Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan which she perceives as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  L. Guazzone, The Islamist Dilemma. The Political Role of Islamist Movement in the 
Contemporary Arab World, Reading: Ithaca Press,1995, p. 17.  
11 Ann-Kristin Jonasson, At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties, 
Sweden: Goteborg University, 2004, p. 9. 
	  	  
	  
7 
operating in different social context yet presenting a similar behavior. Islamist ideology 
is something they have in common; accordingly, it is their ideology that is 
overwhelmingly instrumental in overcoming their institutional constraints. In other 
words, political behavior of Islamist parties is under the spell of their ideology, making 
them ideological by default and considering their participation in democratic process 
as merely a camouflage. In addition, the context in which the parties operate lead us to 
a conviction of her problematic conclusion that she put too much emphasis on the 
encompassing role of ideology on the party behavior. As Mainwaring and Scully 
describe it, the degree of institutionalization of a political system is instrumental in 
measuring the degree of democracy of a given state.12 Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan 
exhibit a low degree of institutionalization in their political system, which is 
characterized by authoritarianism, paternalism and clientelism. This implies that 
countries with a better institution in term of their political system will have a different 
impact upon the performance and behavior of the Islamist party.  
Julie Chernov Hwang’s study of post-New Order Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Turkey concurs with this conclusion. Hwang’s work reveals that, despite some 
variation, political participation coupled with state capacity is influential in the process 
of peaceful mobilization the Islamist groups choose. The most notable result of her 
study could be summed up in twofold. First, a participatory state with effective 
capacity will encourage Islamist groups to exert peaceful mobilization, whereas states 
that lack both elements will have no effective impact. Second, authoritarian states with 
limited participation will put impediment to the mobilization process, which most 
likely leads to alienation, isolation or even radicalization of Islamist groups.13 
In the case of Indonesia, the suspicion toward the participation of Islamist 
parties in democratic process is also found in the statement of Sadanand Dhume that a 
ballot for PKS is more or less a bullet for the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) organization. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Schully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party System 
in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
13 Julie Chernov Hwang, Peaceful Islamist Mobilization in the Muslim World. What When 
Right, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 174. 
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According to Dhume, PKS shares similar ideology with JI, thus it is likely to present a 
serious threat to democracy in Indonesia. The only difference between them lies in the 
approach; while the latter readily uses revolutionary and violent action to achieve their 
goal of establishing Islamic system of government, the first uses evolutionary and 
peaceful approaches. 14  This sort of analysis on the incompatibility of Islam and 
democracy results from the lack of insight to the dynamic of Islamism in Indonesia. 
This view puts too much emphasis on the fundamentalist nature of political Islam and 
overlooks its contribution in the democratization process in Indonesia.  
A more nuanced and sympathetic view on the Islamist current in Indonesian 
political landscape is presented by Dirk Tomsa stating that PKS participation in 
democratic political process leads PKS to a more moderate stance. However, this 
moderation leads to some serious challenges to the party’s organizational coherence. 
By softening the party’s ideological viewpoint in order to reach out to broader electoral 
base, PKS has put at stake its credibility among its original constituents. Tomsa also 
adds that inclusion and moderation of PKS could increase the risk of PKS being co-
opted into Indonesia’s traditional power politics, a prospect that will serve neither the 
party nor Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. In order to play a vital role in the 
consolidation of Indonesia’s young democracy, PKS needs to transform itself into a 
moderate party, yet remain reform-oriented.15 
Nevertheless, inclusion-moderation thesis is not without its critics. Based on 
her research on women’s participation in Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen, 
Schwedler, for example, is of opinion that moderation is often a highly complex and 
multidimensional process, and its effect to democracy can be both positive and 
negative. Schwedler defines moderation as the “movement from a relatively closed and 
rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives.” According 
to her, this shift can be identified by what she calls “boundaries of justifiable action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Sadanand Dhume, “Radical March on Indonesia’s Future,” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 168, No. 5 (May 2005), p. 11-19. 
15 Dirk Tomsa, “Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the 
Prosperous Justice Party, in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 63 (3) 2012, p. 488-489. 
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made by political actors about what is possible, who are friends and adversaries, and 
which of the available options are justifiable in terms of one’s worldview.”16 While 
this concept is crucial in analyzing the discourse and debates within the party’s 
leadership, it is likely overlooking the possible discontent at the grassroots that might 
not follow the highly elitist views. Since ideational change could in fact be easily 
considered as a lip service unless it is followed by moderate action beyond merely 
participation in competitive election, it is essential to put equal weight on the analysis 
of both ideas and action.  
Wickham study of Egypt’s Wasat Party attempts to capture these two 
dimensions. She contends that ideational change is of crucial ingredient for the 
moderation defined as the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals 
that enable a movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of normal 
competitive politics.17 Ideational change is then a prerequisite for a genuine behavioral 
change. 
C.   Research Objectives and Questions 
With this background in mind, the study aims to scrutiny the attitude of PKS 
on the implementation of Sharia in democratic Indonesia, and to gain insight into the 
dual strategy of PKS da’wa in pursuing the party’s ultimate goal of Islamizing society 
and state. The relevant questions in this thesis are: As the most important vehicle in 
achieving the party’s agenda, how is da’wa understood by the party? And how it is 
used in achieving its political goals? How do the party elites understand Shariah? What 
are the party program, strategy and action to support the introduction of Shariah in 
democratic Indonesia? In term of its secular agenda, is it simply a political expediency 
or will the party readily revert to Islamist agenda when it gains power?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Schwedler, Faith in Moderation. Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,2006, p. 151. 
17 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation 
of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, 2004, p. 206. 
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D.   Methodology 
To investigate the issue above, I use data mainly derived from field research. 
In-depth interview with PKS leaders and other elite-figures within the partyis 
conducted to provide the critical information of the party program, strategies and 
activities relating to their attitude on the implementation of Sharia in the country. Semi-
structured interviews are used to scrutinize the semantic context of statements by both 
the activists and leaders of PKS. This approach also allows the scrutiny of meaning, 
both how activists regard their participation and how they understand their social 
world.  
Investigating the issue of PKS attitude on Sharia necessitates a lengthy, in-
depth discussions and interviews with the party leaders at district, regency and national 
level. During interviews over 8 weeks of field work I managed to garner crucial 
information about the topic under study. During the field research, 25 PKS leaders 
made themselves available to me for interviews and spoke openly about their position, 
experience and stories about the issues related to da’wa and Sharia politics of the party.  
Before embarking on the fieldwork, contact was made by email and phones to 
staff at the national PKS office in Jakarta, from which I was given a written permission 
to conduct interview with relevant sources within PKS leaders. During the first week, 
I have to familiarize myself with the party bureaucracy and set up appointments for 
interviews. During the fieldwork, I rented a room in a local boarding house located five 
minutes’ walk from the PKS headquarters in order to allow me frequent visits to the 
PKS office to meet with interviewees. It is common practice for some PKS leaders to 
come to the office for regular meeting or just visiting the cadres, during their working 
trip to Jakarta. Consequently, during my visit to the party headquarters that I have a 
chance to meet important figures of PKS, Ahmad Heryawan and Irwan Prayitno, who 
are now governor of West Java and West Sumatera respectively.  
From Ahmad Heryawan, I managed to gather first-hand information about, but 
not limited to, the meaning of Sharia, the common misunderstandings about it, from 
their perspective, and Heryawan’s personal experience in implementing Sharia norms 
in Bandung, West Java. Information I got from the staff members, such as the names 
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and phone number of PKS leaders in Jakarta and surrounding areas, enabled me to 
establish set up appointments for further interviews.  
A key opportunity to meet and interview numerous PKS leaders came when I 
was given access to the annual meeting of the party in Hotel Sahid, Jakarta, on 20-21 
September 2015. This event brought together more than 1000 PKS cadres from Sabang 
to Merauke (i.e. from Indonesia’s western-most town to its eastern-most city), who 
were newly elected members of district, provincial and national consultative assembly. 
During this two-day event, 13 interviews were conducted from which I garnered 
important information regarding the main issue of Sharia and politics in Indonesia. 
From the interview, I collated stories and experiences of the PKS leaders in their effort 
to implement Sharia norms in their municipalities and provinces. Semi-structure 
interviews allowed me to be open to lively discussion about various subjects relating 
closely to the main topics of interview.  
From the interviews, I was able to document PKS perspectives on recurrent 
themes relating to da’wa (often transliterated as dakwah in Indonesian), such as the 
da’wa strategy of the party, the interplay between da’wa and politics, ‘democracy as a 
tool for da’wa’, ‘conspiracies against da’wa’, and the result of recent election as a tool 
for da’wa evaluation. Similarly, I learnt about PKS views on Sharia, such as 
‘misunderstandings about Sharia’, the ‘universalistic nature of Sharia’, shift in 
understanding and practicing Sharia, Sharia politics of the party, and Perda Sharia 
(local bylaws of Sharia). PKS views on the political situation in other parts of the 
Muslim world, such as in Turkey and Egypt, and the issue of notorious terrorist group 
ISIS also emerged during some interviews which helped giving nuance to the 
discussion of Sharia and politics. With this approach, I was able to identify themes that 
are considered central to PKS’ struggle in negotiating its dual role as a political and 
da’wa party.  
To garner further insights into the efforts of PKS in advancing the application 
of Sharia in society, I conducted interviews with the heads and members of the Sharia 
Council of the party at national, provincial and district levels. Some PKS leaders who 
are also directors/senior teachers of their own Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) 
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were among the subjects of interview. From them, I collected information about the 
challenge of playing a dual role as a politician and an Islamic missionary. I also 
travelled to visit leaders of PKS in Padang, West Sumatera, and Solo, Central Java. I 
considered these places to be of vital importance for several reasons. While Padang is 
known to be a bastion of Islamist party, Solo is the home of a nationalist Muslim 
elements. The very different political landscape of Padang and Solo represents 
different challenges for the party in its efforts to plan and execute the agenda of 
Islamizing society. From these two places, I could compare the strategy of PKS leaders 
in dealing with the issue of Shariatization in their respective cities.  
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Table 1.  List of PKS leaders interviewed 
Name 
Date of 
Interview 
Position 
Party Government Others 
Ahmad 
Heryawan 
17 September 
2014 
Member of Dewan 
Syuro 
Governor of West 
Java 
 
Thohari 
20 September 
2014 
 
DPRD (Provincial 
Parliament) of 
Purworejo 
Director of 
Pesantren 
Nurul Wahid 
Hilmi Fuad 
20 September 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Office of Tangerang 
DPRD Tangerang  
Sudarmo 
21 September 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Office of Maluku 
DPRD Maluku  
Yusuf 
21 September 
2014 
 DPRD Maluku  
Irawan Abdullah 
21 September 
2014 
Head of District 
Office of Aceh 
Besar 
  
Ibnu Sina 
21 September 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Office of South 
Kalimantan 
DPRD South 
Kalimantan 
 
Ledia Hanifa 
21 September 
2014 
 DPR RI  
Sholihul Hadi 
21 September 
2014 
Head of District 
Office of Waykanan 
Lampung 
DPRD Lampung  
Aflan Zulfadli 
21 September 
2014 
 DPRD Bombana  
Surahman 
Hidayat 
24 September 
2014 
Head of Central 
Sharia Council 
DPR RI  
Muhammad Asro 
Mulyono 
25 September 
2014 
Head of District 
Office of Cilegon 
  
Erfan Septian 
Fahmi 
25 September 
2014 
Head of District 
Office (DPD PKS) 
of Anyar 
  
Najamuddin 
26 September 
2014 
 DPRD Bogor  
Jajat Sudrajat 
26 September 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Office (DPW PKS) 
of Bogor 
DPRD Bogor  
Muhammad 
Rubiul Yatim 
27 September 
2014 
Member of Sharia 
Council (DS of DKI 
Jakarta 
  
Muhammad 
Nadir Umar 
1 October 
2014 
Head of District 
Office of Pasuruan 
DPRD Pasuruan 
Director of 
Amal Sholeh 
Foundation of 
Bangil 
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Sugeng Riyanto 
8 October 
2014 
Head of District 
Office of Solo 
DPRD Solo  
Abdul Ghofar 
Ismail 
8 October 
2014 
Vice of District 
Office of Solo 
DPRD Solo  
Arif Ramdani 
 
12 October 
2014 
Member of District 
Sharia Council of 
Bandung 
DPRD Bandung  
Marfendi 
15 October 
2014 
Vice of Provincial 
Office of West 
Sumatera 
  
Mahyeldi 
16 October 
2014 
Member of Dewan 
Syuro 
Mayor of Padang, 
West Sumatera 
 
Mohammad 
Yasin 
16 October 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Sharia Council of 
West Sumatera 
 
Director of 
Pesantren Ar 
Risalah 
Irsyad Syafar 
16 October 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Office of West 
Sumatera 
DPRD West 
Sumatera 
 
Mochlasin 
16 October 
2014 
Head of Provincial 
Consultative 
Council of West 
Sumatera 
DPRD West 
Sumatera 
 
 
E.   Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight substantive chapters and a brief concluding chapter. 
As an introduction, Chapter One describes the background of the study, followed by 
literature review, research objectives and questions, and methodology.  
In Chapter Two, the theory and the concept of ideology arediscussed in order 
to understand PKS’ political behavior and its attitude toward the implementation of 
Sharia in democratic Indonesia. This chapter also discusses thetheory of social 
movement in scrutinizing the emergence and development of the party.  
Chapter Three explores a party’s fundamental shared values, and how these 
values are implemented, and influence the behavior and attitude of the party.  
Chapter Four investigates the strategy of the da’wa party with Islamist 
credentials to survive against declining popularity and electoral backdrop of political 
Islam. It elaborates the ideological adjustment and party institutionalization that 
accounts for its politically moderate behavior.  
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Chapter Five addresses the interplay between da’wa and politics in democratic 
Indonesia. Based on interviews with numerous PKS elites of national and municipal 
levels, this chapter discusses the issues such the importance of da’wa for the political 
goal of the party, as well as the meaning and the nature of da’wa and its relation to the 
implementation of Sharia.  
Chapter Six analyzes the issue of Sharia legislation and the party’s struggle to 
negotiate Sharia within the political system of the state. This chapter examines related 
issues such as the dynamic understandings of Sharia of PKS cadres as well as the 
party’s political rhetoric, approach, and strategy in implementing Sharia both in 
national and regional level. Data for this chapter is derived mainly from the interviews 
with PKS leaders of different regions in Indonesia.  
Chapter Seven addresses the political history of Islamic law and its institution 
during the New Order. This chapter also examines the party’s stance on Sharia during 
the constitutional debate on Sharia and Jakarta Charter in the early of Reformasi era.  
Chapter Eight analyzes the PKS attitude toward Sharia in a democratic 
Indonesia, and discusses the Sharia politics of the party and its strategy to cope with 
internal and external challenges in the implementation of Sharia. The concluding 
chapter brings together the major findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), rebranded the Prosperous Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was born out of a populist religious outreach 
(da’wa/dakwah) movement of the 1980s, inspired, in large part, by Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood movement. It was transformed into political party to contest the 1999 
election in the aftermath of the May 1998 collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime. 
PK/PKS became the principle vehicle of the da’wa movement first started by 
Muhammad Natsir, Indonesia’s fifth prime minister and leader of the Masyumi party 
which gained 21 percent of the popular vote in the 1955 election, the last free and fair 
election before the 1999 election. Under the leadership of Natsir, the pioneer of 
Islamism in Indonesia, the da’wa movement aspired to Islamize Indonesian society 
from below. PK/PKS describes itself as being unswervingly faithful to the raison d’être 
of its existence, namely the call for the establishment of umma governed by Sharia in 
every aspect of its life. In the wake of disappointing results in the April 2014 legislative 
elections, the leadership of PKS found solace in affirming that da’wa, rather than 
electoral success, was always the primary means of the party in realizing its ultimate 
goal.  
The participation of any party in politics necessitates the process of negotiating 
the ideals and interests and even a religiously inspired ‘da’wa party’ needs to strike a 
balance in steering its way through politics. Some degree of compromise between the 
party’s principles and general public demand cannot be avoided if the party is to win 
the mass support. Consequently, the PKS leadership has long acknowledged that the 
struggle for implementation of Sharia needs to be presented in secular terms, such as 
striving for clean government and fighting corruption. With this in mind, PKS adopted 
a deliberate strategy of not making direct reference to Sharia. It described this approach 
as being intrinsic to its da’wa strategy and was intended to bring the party closer to its 
potential constituents and sympathizers.  
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Nevertheless, this strategy of downplaying Sharia is not without drawbacks; in 
fact, it presents PKS with a dilemma. Due to this seemingly ambivalent attitude 
towards Sharia, PKS is accused by radical and fundamentalist groups as not being fully 
committed to the struggle for Sharia. And due to its implicit support for Sharia, PKS 
is categorized by the mainstream parties, including non-Islamist Muslim mass-based 
parties like PKB and PAN as being an extremist group aspiring to change the 
ideological and political system of the country.  
Given the central importance of these issues, a careful study of PKS thinking 
about da’wa and Sharia is needed to shed the light on the party’s strategy of 
implementing Sharia within the system of democracy. This is what this dissertation 
sets out to do. It takes the approach that da’wa in its wider dimension represents the 
key element to understand the attitude of the party on the implementation of Sharia in 
democratic Indonesia. How Sharia is understood by the party and how da’wa is used 
as a strategy and approach to realize the party’s ultimate goal of Sharia implementation 
will be the focus of the study. 
In realizing its goals, PKS has to operate within a democratic system. 
Democratization has enabled the party to behave rationally and pragmatically. In its 
first involvement in national democratic election of 1999, for instance, the party 
struggled to represent the political preferences of the most conservative segments of 
the Muslim community - the far right of the ideological spectrum. This ideological 
self-placement changes following the increasing stability of Indonesian democracy. 
The necessity to gain political opportunity or to survive the political threat leads the 
party to be open to the new experience.  
The changing attitude of the party warrants a discussion of the nature of 
ideology as a “belief system” that lends the party actors legitimacy to actions and 
beliefs. The section below is devoted to the discussion of political ideology and 
followed by the theory of social movement. While the first provides the framework for 
the soft-content of the party, the later describe the strategic steps to translate the 
ideology into social movement. As a party of conviction, PKS maintains that it holds 
tight to the raison d’êtreof the party, which is to deliver da’wa (calling to the truth of 
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Islam). If the core of da’wa is implementing Sharia, then the former serves as a vehicle 
for the latter. As long as the destination is set, any means to achieve it from any 
direction will suffice, and it could change over the time and from place to place. While 
da’wa could vary according to the situational demand, Sharia is a fixed discursive 
superstructure which inspires the ideology of the party.    
A.   Political Ideology 
The concept of ideology can be traced back to the late 18th century, when it was 
mainly used to refer to the science of ideas, a discipline known today as the sociology 
of knowledge. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels adopted and utilized this 
concept in two different meanings. They used ideology in a neutral sense as a reference 
to any symbolic meaning system used to explain or justify socio-economic and political 
reality, and in a pejorative sense to denote a web of ideas that are distorted, contrary to 
the reality, and subject to false consciousness.18 Later, Converse defined ideology, or 
“belief system”, as a configuration of ideas and attitude in which the elements are 
bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.” 19 
Following Converse, most political scientists have treated ideology as a relatively 
stable and coherent belief system within the mind of an individual.  
Below are some famous definitions of ideology that give emphasis on the 
stability and organization as key features of ideological belief systems.  
The term ideology is used … to stand for an organization of opinions, attitudes, 
and values—a way of thinking about man and society. We may speak of an 
individual’s total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of 
social life: politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 John T. Jost, “The End of the End of Ideology,” in American Psychologist, October 2006, 
Vol. 61, No. 7, p. 652. 
19 Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Critical Review, 
1964, Vol. 18, No. 1-3, p. 3 (Originally published in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Its Discontents, 
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, p. 206-261.) 
20 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and Nevitt R. Stanford, 
The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Row, 1950, p. 2. 
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An ideology is an organization of beliefs and attitudes—religious, political, or 
philosophical in nature—that is more or less institutionalized or shared with 
others, deriving from external authority.21 
Ideologies are broad and general, pervade wide areas of belief and behavior, 
and give core meaning to many issues of human concern. They unify thought 
and action.22 
The term “political ideology” is normally defined as an interrelated set of 
attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be 
achieved. An ideology has two distinct and at least analytically separate 
components—affect and cognition.23 
 
All of these definitions conceptualize ideology as an internally consistent belief 
system that will make it less likely that common people would satisfy the stringent 
criteria for demonstrating ideological capacity. Defining ideology in even narrow way, 
Shils listed nine criteria of ideology, namely: (a) explicitness of formulation, (b) 
intended systemic integration around a particular moral or cognitive belief, (c) 
acknowledged affinity with other past and contemporaneous patterns, (d) closure to 
novel elements or variations, (e) imperativeness of manifestation in conduct, (f) 
accompanying effect, (g) consensus demanded of those who accept them, (h) 
authoritativeness of promulgation, and (i) association with a corporate body intended 
to realize pattern of beliefs.24 With all these criteria, the majority of ordinary citizens 
find it difficult to meet the challenge of adhering to certain ideology. One would only 
be considered ideological as long as he or she could satisfy the criteria of stable, logical, 
coherent, consistent and knowledgeable attitudes.25 Thus the question about whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change, San 
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1968, p. 123-124. 
22  Fred N. Kerlinger, Liberalism and Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of Social 
Attitudes. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum,1984, p. 13. 
23 Kent L. Tedin, “Political Ideology and the Vote,” in Research in Micropolitics, Vol. 2, 1987, 
p. 65. 
24  Edward A. Shils, “The Concept of Ideology?” in David Sills (ed.), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan & Free Press,1968, p. 66. 
25 Philip E. Converse, “Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates,” in Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 3, 2000, p. 331-352; Stanley Feldman, “Structure and Consistency in Public 
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or not common population possesses ideology is then becoming a part of a question 
about whether they meet the criteria proposed by the social and political scientists.26 
Despite its broadness, the abovementioned definitions give room for the 
ideological expression of both ordinary citizens and individuals with high level of 
awareness and knowledge in politics. Kerlinger puts the point well regarding an 
empirical possibility that ideology has a meaning and significance in people’s everyday 
lives: 
Whether conservatism and liberalism are typical conceptual tools for the man-
in-the-street is not the central point. For the scientist, too, liberalism and 
conservatism are abstractions like any other abstract concepts he works with: 
introversion, intelligence, radicalism, achievement, political development and 
the like. To be sure, most people don’t recognize their abstract nature and 
certainly don’t use them as social scientists do. Nevertheless, they are quite 
familiar with their behavioral and environmental manifestations.27 
I also adopt Tedin’s definition of political ideology as an interrelated set of 
moral and political attitudes that possess cognitive, affective and motivational 
components.28 Implicit in this definition is that ideology helps to explain why people 
do what they do, and how they organize their values and beliefs, and how ideology 
leads to political behavior. Similar definition with an additional highlight to the role of 
social groups is proposed by Denzau and North, who suggest that “ideologies are the 
shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide 
both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment 
should be structured.”29This definition suggests that ideology is shared and utilized to 
interpret the social realities, and specifies proper ways of countering problems in life. 
By communicating widely shared beliefs and values of certain groups, class, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values,” in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, 1988, 
p. 416-440. 
26 John T. Jost, “The End of the End of Ideology,” p. 653. 
27 Fred M. Kerlinger, Liberalism and Conservatism, p. 217. 
28 Kent L. Tedin, “Political Ideology and the Vote”, 1987.  
29  Arthur D. Denzau and Dauglass C. North, “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions,” in Arthur Lupia, Mathew C. McCubbins, Samuel.L. Popkin (eds.), Elements of Reason: 
Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 24. 
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constituency or community, an ideology functions not only to interpret the world as it 
is but also to envision it as it should be.30 In this way, ideology has the capacity of 
instigating actions. As a life-change driving force, ideology informs its adherents about 
how they should live and govern the society. It is therefore reasonable to stand that 
different ideologies express different social, cognitive, and motivational tendencies of 
their adherents.31 
Ideological attitudes and opinions are often described in terms of a single left-
right wing dimension. Political use of the spatial metaphor of left and right goes back 
to 18th century seating arrangement in the French parliament, where proponents of the 
status quo sat on the right side of the French Assembly hall and its contenders sat on 
the left.32  The term left-right wing is then widely known in the United States as 
“liberal-conservative” divide. This bipartite division represents the long-lasting 
ideological cleavage between preferences for change versus stability. 
Social scientists generally consider the left-right distinction to be the most 
powerful way of classifying political attitudes.33 This bipartite division of ideology has 
found resonance in almost every cultural context. However, given that the issues and 
contents of liberal-left and conservative-right wing are in constant change in different 
time and places, core or stable aspects of ideology should be distinguished from the 
peripheral or malleable ones. In an attempt to distill the core components of this 
bipartite definition of ideology, Jost identifies two core dimensions, namely resistance 
to change and acceptance of inequality. These two ideological dimensions capture the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Michael Freeden (ed.), Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent, London: 
Routledge, 2001; Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth 
Century, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, 2006, p. 619-629. 
31 John T. Jost, “The End of the End of Ideology,” p. 654. 
32 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, Cambridge, 
UK: Polity,1996. 
33 Stanley Feldman, “Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes,” in David O. 
Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2003, p. 
477-508; Dieter Fusch and Hans-Dieter Klingenmann, “The Left-Right Schema,” in M. Kent Jennings 
and Jan V. van Deth, et al. (eds.), Continuities in Political Action, Berlin, Germany: deGruyter, 1990, 
p. 203-234; John T. Jost, “The End of the End of Ideology,” 2006; Kathleen Knight, “Liberalism and 
Conservatism,” in John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver and Lawrence S. Wrightman, (eds.), Measures 
of Political Attitude, San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999, p. 59-158. 
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most meaningful and enduring differences between left-wing and right-wing ideology. 
The following statements treat the liberalism-conservatism distinction in the same 
vein: 
Politicians and the policies they espouse … are usually described as liberal if 
they seek to advance such ideas as equality, aid to the disadvantaged, tolerance 
of dissenters, and social reform; and as conservative if they place particular 
emphasis on order, stability, the need of business, differential economic 
rewards, and defense of the status quo.34 
Conservatives consider people to be inherently unequal and due unequal 
rewards; liberal are equalitarian. Conservatives venerate tradition and—most 
of all—order and authority; liberals believe planned change brings the 
possibility of improvement.35 
This bipartite definition accords with numerous characterizations of the left and 
right offered by political scientists.36 Fuchs and Klingemann associate the left with 
attitudes and values such as system change, progressive, equality, solidarity, protest, 
opposition, radical, socialism and communism, and associate the right with the 
inclination towards advocating system maintenance, conservatism, order, 
individualism, capitalism, nationalism and fascism.37 
Social scientists often stress resistance to change or traditionalism as a stable 
key feature of right-wing conservatism.38 Wilson, for example, defines conservatism 
as “resistance to change and the tendency for prefer safe, traditional, and conventional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 H. McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and 
Democracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 189. 
35 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its 
Origins, Content and Impact, New York: Macmillan,1988, p. 75. 
36 Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in 
America, 1790-1977, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 19; H. McClosky and John Zaller, 
The American Ethos, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 189; Brian C. Rathbun, “Hierarchy 
and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Beliefs in American Elites,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 51, 2007, p. 379-407. 
37 Dieter Fuchs and Hans D. Klingemann, “The Left-Right Schema,” in M. Kent Jennings and 
Jan W. van Deth (eds.), Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations 
in Three Western Democracies, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990, p. 213-214. 
38 Robert S. Erikson et al., American Public Opinion, 1988; McClosky and John Zaller, The 
American Ethos; Jerry Z. Muller, “Conservatism: Historical Aspects,” in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. 
Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
2001, p. 2624-2628. 
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forms of institutions and behavior.”39 Some researches on voting preference reveal 
high correlation between the attitude of resistance to change and the vote for 
conservative and right-wing parties.40 The idea that resistance to change is a stable key 
feature of right-wing ideology is challenged by Greenberg and Jonas, who argue that 
conservative parties in Europe are quick to call for political change when the left-of-
center parties are in power.41 In response to this challenge, Jost argues that some right-
wing conservative might have demand for change, but most of their proposed change 
are retrograde in nature and often involve a return to traditional cultural values, such 
as religious tradition and traditional family values.42 As the second core of right-wing 
conservatism, acceptance of inequality captures the notion that the political left tends 
to value equality while the right perceives society as inevitably hierarchical. Since 
social scientists in general share the idea that right-wing conservatives embrace social 
and economic inequality, 43  it is expected that acceptance of inequality, like 
traditionalism, is positively linked to right-wing political orientation.  
Different inclination toward dimensional aspects of ideology between 
adherents of the left-wing and the right-wing indicates that psychological motives 
underlie political orientation. This statement is consistent with Adorno assumption that 
“ideologies have for different individuals, different degree of appeal, a matter that 
depends upon the individual’s needs and the degree to which these needs are being 
satisfied or frustrated.”44 It is implicit from this statement that dispositional variables 
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are capable of influencing one’s psychological needs and therefore one’s political 
orientation.  
Jost also proposes that the attitudinal contents of left-right wing stem from basic 
social psychological orientation concerning uncertainty and threat.45 Based on meta-
analytical review of 88 studies conducted in 12 countries between 1958 and 2002, he 
confirms that death anxiety, system instability, fear of threat and lost, dogmatism, 
intolerance of ambiguity, and personal needs for order, structure and closure are 
positively associated with conservatism. 46  To the contrary, openness to new 
experiences, cognitive complexity, tolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem are 
affirmatively related to liberalism. Further research findings show that when compared 
with conservatives, liberals exhibit stronger preference for social change and equality, 
progress and flexibility, over tradition and stability.47 Based on these findings, it is safe 
to say that both situational and dispositional variables associated with the management 
of threat and uncertainty are empirically linked to political orientation. 
Most scholars in social and political science believe that ideology represents a 
learned knowledge structure consisting of an interrelated set of attitudes, values and 
beliefs.48 Implicit in this acknowledgement is that ideologies can be analyzed both in 
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terms of their contents and functions.49 In this way, ideology can be perceived as 
having both a discursive superstructure which is socially constructed and functional 
substructure which is motivational. Discursive superstructure is to be construed as a 
social representation that guides political judgment in a top-down schematic fashion 
and transmitted from political elites to the public at large, 50  while functional 
substructure relates to social needs and motives that drive political interest of common 
people in a bottom-up fashion and are served by the discursive content of ideology.51 
Dissemination of discursive superstructure is conducted by political elites in 
top-down fashion, by simplifying the political environment and influencing the 
specific contents of a political ideology.52Leadership of Lyndon Johnson and his 
successors is an excellent reference of the elite construction of discursive 
superstructure, in which he urged supporters of his party to embrace liberal civil rights 
legislation by supporting racial and ethnic minorities.53 Another example of strong 
influences of the political elites from among politicians, journalists, academicians or 
media representatives in (re)constructing discursive superstructure is demonstrated in 
the degree of public acceptance of government policy during the war.54 Citizen’s 
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exposure to the elite discourse is apparently responsible to their support for the 
discourse.55 
In order for the ideological contents to be socially shared, that is becoming 
discursive superstructure, communicative and strategic forms of interaction between 
political elites and their followers should be established. The communication process 
will likely allow small and unrepresentative political elites to gain a disproportionate 
amount of influence,56 hence, ideas of the ruling class become the ruling ideas.57 The 
main factor that is responsible for the mass acquisition of ideological contents relates 
to the awareness and understanding of the message delivered by the political elites.58 
Individuals with a high level of engagement and relatively well-developed 
understanding in politics will be most likely to receive, discern and use the information 
flowing from the political elites. 
In many different societies, political elites are capable of (re)shaping the 
discursive superstructure. Socially constructed by political elites, discursive 
superstructure can be seen as “anchoring” both ends of the left-right spectrum, thereby 
giving common citizen diverse options of ideological contents to choose from.59 Even 
though some citizens are capable and willing to learn the content of the discursive 
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superstructures defined by political elites, the majority of the population is 
characterized by a relatively low level of knowledge about specific discursive contents 
of both liberal and conservative ideologies.60 Ordinary citizens are also relatively 
incapable or reluctant to understand political issue in rigidly liberal-conservative 
idioms. Due to their lack of interest and knowledge about the discursive content of 
ideology, general population’s attitude toward many political issues shows a relatively 
low level of ideological consistency.61 However, the fact that most citizens are not 
knowledgeable about the contents of ideology does not necessarily mean that they are 
utterly devoid of ideological commitment.62 According to Lane, the common people 
have rationalizations of interests that serve as moral justification for daily acts and 
beliefs.63 In this sense, as Jost put it, most people possess latent ideology.64 Even more 
specifically, numerous scholars suggest that those who are relatively uninformed about 
politics show some understanding about the core aspect of liberal-conservative 
differences.65 
B.   PKS as A Social Movement 
There is an agreement among scholars of social movement regarding the 
significance of three theories that propelled social movements: political opportunity, 
mobilizing structure or resource mobilization, and framing process. In the tradition of 
social movement research, these theories aim to understand the emergence of social 
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movement, including the origin, process, and organization of the movement. 66 
However, these theories only emphasize one aspect of the social movement; the 
proponents of resource mobilization theory only focus on the importance of 
organizational dynamics of a collective action, and those of political opportunity theory 
play down the significance of social construction of the ideas behind the movement. 
To give a broader perspective in scrutinizing a particular social movement, this study 
will merge and integrate all three theories. Relevant to this integrative approach is the 
theory by Lichbach that social movement can be best studied using three main 
perspectives, i.e. condition, norms and means of collective actions.67 Condition of the 
movement should be examined in order to understand the dynamics of a movement in 
developing and advancing their claims, mobilizing their supporters and disseminating 
their ideas and influences. In this respect, the study of social movement focuses on 
external factors that contribute to ability of the movement to create changes. This 
external factor is described as political opportunity structure that gives rise to the social 
movement.  
However, political opportunity structure will not suffice to generate a social 
movement; it is only a prerequisite for the potential structure of the emergence of the 
movement. 68  Organizational capacity and network should be in place before the 
movement come into being, since social movement needs means or relational 
mechanism to pursue a collective action. At least, there are three infrastructural means 
required for a collective action: membership basis, communication network and 
leadership. 69  These three means of social movement are collectively known as a 
mobilizing structure.  
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Social movement study also necessitates the examination of cognitive 
mechanisms and norms shared by the members of the movement. This mechanism is 
described by the scholars of social movement as collective action frame. Framing is an 
interpretation scheme that enables the supporters of the social movement to “locate, 
perceive and label occurrence.”70 In other words, the framing process indicates “what 
to look at and what is important, and thereby indicate what is going on.”71 Therefore, 
examining ideas underlining certain social movement should also be taken into 
consideration to understand the emergence of a collective action. 
The paragraphs that follow will discuss the application of this integrative 
approach to the emergence and development of PKS as a social movement. Some 
theories of political opportunity structure will be delineated and put it in the context of 
international and domestic of political opportunity that facilitate the rise of PKS.  
a.   Political Opportunity Structure 
Since its inception in the end of 1970s, the concept of political opportunity 
structure has drawn much attention from social and political students and triggered 
many studies on social movement; many dimensions of it has been explained and 
emphasized. Tarrow, for instance, put stress on the openness and closeness of political 
system, while Kriese focused more on structure of formal institution. Tarrow defines 
political opportunity structure as consistent—but not necessarily formal or 
permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people 
to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.72 
In order to form a synthesis of many diverse interpretations on political 
opportunity, Mc Adam enumerates some dimensions of political opportunity structure: 
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(1) relativity of the openness and closeness of political system, (2) stability or 
instability of network, (3) availability of alliances, and (4) capacity or competency of 
state to take a repressive measure.73 According to McAdam, the openness or closeness 
of the political system is a dominant factor in facilitating the rise of social movement. 
Dyke is of the same opinion stating that a group of societies is prone to conduct 
mobilization when the political system is relatively open. Vice versa, the more rigid 
and tight the political system, the smaller the opportunity to launch a collective 
action.74 However, Eisinger maintains that protest is more likely to emerge in the 
political system characterized by interplay between openness and closeness.75 
In other words, Eisinger’s model indicates that collective action will be likely 
less frequent in authoritarian political system or democratic system. Repression in the 
first system will effectively nip in the bud all the potentials towards collective actions 
by coercion or intimidation. Repressive action by the authoritarian establishment will 
disconnect the interaction among actors and participants of the movement. In latter 
system, due to its democratic character, protest and demonstration will be channeled 
through political institution, so that public aspiration and participation are properly 
heard. According to Eisinger, a semi-open system of polity is most likely susceptible 
to mass protest and demonstration. In the period of transition to democracy, the 
capacity of a regime to control the public sphere is still weak, and the public euphoria 
to claim their political right is at its height.76  This unlikely combination between 
incompetence of the government to channel the public aspiration and the high 
confidence of the people to voice their social and political demand will widely open 
the opportunity for collective action.  
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Political opportunity structure is useful to explain the emergence of Jamaah 
Tarbiyah in the context of authoritarian regime of Soeharto’s new order and the 
establishment of Justice and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) after 
the collapse of the regime. In order to examine the external situation that facilitates or 
inhibits the emergence of PKS, the double-tract of political opportunity structures of 
international and domestic factor will be utilized. International context of political 
opportunity structure help to delineate the socio-political dynamics of establishment 
and development of the party under study. International context of political opportunity 
structure is offered to challenge the over-emphasis of students of social movement on 
the state-centered perspective. In the case of PKS, both domestic and international 
factor have contributed a lot to the emergence of Jamaah Tarbiyah. 
The first international factor that generates the emergence of Islamic revivalism 
in Indonesia is the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. The revivalism of Islam is 
understood as an Islamic assertiveness against cultural and political domination of the 
West.77 Revivalist group perceives the influence of western culture and politics as an 
imperialist encroachment and invasion that undermine socio-cultural identity of Islam 
and Muslim communities. Islamic Iranian revolution is looked upon as an inspiration 
for revivalist groups in many Muslim countries to make a step further for the 
establishment of a community based on Islamic norms with Shariah as the source of 
guidance.  
The globalized phenomenon of Indonesian Islam, which has become steadily 
more apparent since the 1980s, is the result more of a direct imitation of international 
orientations than a reliance on local tradition. Due to this global influence, socio-
political events in the Middle East, including religious conflicts and scholarly schisms, 
have had a large impact upon Indonesian Muslims. One example of this impact is the 
mushrooming of the Middle-East-replicated movements, which have attracted the 
younger generation of Indonesia Muslims. Trans-national movements, such as Muslim 
Brothers (Egypt), the Salafi group (Saudi Arabia), Hizbut Tahrir (Jordan), and Jamaah 
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Tabligh (Indo-Pakistan), because of their “original” and “authentic” cachet and their 
image of not being co-opted or manipulated by the governing regime, has been so 
popular among the Muslim youth. Thus, it is not surprising that Jamaah Tarbiyah has 
adopted new models in carrying out its predication activities (da’wa/dakwah) derived 
from the Muslim Brothers of Egypt.78 
Another important international influence upon Indonesian Muslims is 
apparent in the establishment of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 
Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) under the leadership of Natsir who earned 
a high reputation in Middle East Muslim countries and had a good relation with their 
leaders. To balance the government program of sending young scholars to Canada, the 
United States and Europe, during 1980s, DDII sent many students to Middle East 
universities. With the donors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan, hundreds of 
Indonesian students have obtained scholarship to study oversees, the graduate of which 
have obtained international degrees and in turn helped DDII to maintain cadres who 
are committed to global awareness.79 
Interaction between these Middle Eastern graduates with the younger 
generation of Indonesian Muslims in various campuses of Indonesia made possible the 
introduction of the new model of Islamic movements and thought.80 This new type of 
devout Muslim, the santri, differed from their parents in terms of political orientation, 
religious ideology and attitude toward inherited traditions. This new santri is not only 
influenced by the local and changing dynamics of Indonesian politics, but also subject 
to international influences in Islam. The Middle Eastern graduates became actively 
involved in predication, either by setting up their own Islamic institutions, called 
ma’had, or forming religious circle in many campuses of Indonesia and providing 
informal religious instructions to the university students.81 
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While international events have facilitated the emergence of Jamaah Tarbiyah, 
domestic affairs have also given big impetus. The New Order regime’s repression of 
political Islam and the extension of religious education in public school are held 
responsible for the changing nature of Islamic activism. The two-pronged policy of the 
New Order toward Islam in Indonesia contributed to the decline of political Islam. The 
regime repressed political Islam and encouraged Islamic representation that was non-
political in nature. It exercised the policy of excluding politicized Muslims because of 
the threat they might have to the stability of the regime, should they increase their 
influence in society and government affairs. 82  Repression of New Order towards 
political Islam led some Muslims to adopt a more pragmatic approach, by avoiding 
formal political struggle and turning instead to cultural and social activities.83 
Despite its policy towards politically organized Islam, the New Order regime 
served to expand the social role of Islam in other ways. The Soeharto government 
offered considerable support to religious education and ensure that the students in 
public schools and universities receive religious education from teachers of their own 
religion.84 The teaching of religion in the universities was more open and might well 
accommodate both traditionalist and modernist views of Islam. Through their religion 
classes, university students were no longer so concerned with sectarian differences and 
tended to share traditionalist and modernist practices equally. Since the campuses also 
provide many extra-curricular Islamic training courses and activities, students are at an 
increased risk of being diverted from mainstream Islam. Jamaah Tarbiyah proved itself 
able to channel enthusiastic Muslim students by providing religious training and 
predication programs.  
Since the 1990s, the activists of Jamaah Tarbiyah have succeeded in gaining 
control of intra campus student organizations. They have organized Islamic programs 
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and activities for students based in small campus praying rooms and founded a Forum 
for Islamic Studies in many faculties. In order to organize and coordinate Islamic 
activities among universities of Indonesia, they set up Forum for Coordinating Campus 
Predication. They are subsequently able to take over the central leadership of student 
senate organizations at the faculty and university level.85 It was during this repression 
of political Islam that the Muslim activists conducted informal religious instruction in 
many campuses of Indonesia utilizing the method of non-confrontation approach. In 
this context, the introduction of Islamic predication movement in campuses was 
perceived as a silent confrontation against the regime. In order to avoid being repressed 
or controlled by the state apparatus, campus predication determined to establish what 
Wictorowicz called “the network of shared meaning” with a secretive organizational 
structure in achieving their goal.86 
b.   Resource Mobilization 
Scholars of social movements define resource mobilization as a means or 
collective vehicle, both formally or informally, in which people are mobilized and 
actively involved in collective action.87 This theory is related closely to the variety of 
resources used to propel collective action, the dependency of the movement upon 
external force and the strategic anticipation of the regime to control and co-opt 
collective action.88 In order to understand resource mobilization theory, one should be 
clear about the meaning of resources for a collective action. Charles Tilly emphasizes 
that one of the most important resources in social movement are formal and informal 
networks that connect individuals and organizations. 89  Networks refer to social 
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structure that facilitate or inhibit behavior, attitude or likeliness of one’s action.90 
Klandermans emphasizes the importance of leadership in creating mobilization 
resource for participants of the collective action.91 Maguire differentiates resources 
into two categories: the tangible resource which include, among other, money, tools 
and space, and the intangible one which includes leader capacity, management, 
ideological justification, and tactics. 92  In the case of Jamaah Tarbiyah which 
metamorphosed into Justice and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), 
their resource mobilization includes aspects of (1) formal and informal organizations, 
(2) network, (3) financial source, and (4) leadership. 
Compared to other resources, organization is the most important aspect to 
achieve goals without which collective actions will fail to accumulate. However, one 
equates social movement with that of formal organization and thus excludes informal 
collective action. Meanwhile, Islamic social movements tend to utilize a means of 
informal organizations, individual network and cultural associations to start and 
conduct their movement. 93  Moreover, utilization of informal social network is a 
common phenomenon within an authoritarian political system that does not allow any 
open protest, even if it is channeled through formal institutions.94 
The chief organizational resources of Jamaah Tarbiyah lay in the university-
based mosques or small praying rooms in campuses. Many Muslim activists considered 
campuses to be the safest means for their struggle for Islamization, because da’wa 
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conducted through the Friday prayers and public sermons was closely monitored and 
restricted by the Soeharto regime. In most cases, all social and religious activities had 
to be endorsed by stamped letters from authorized agents of the regime.95 For that same 
reason, instead of large gathering and public oration, study clubsand small circles 
become a viable means to deliver da’wa. Well known as halaqah, this tarbiyah model 
of the Muslim Brothers became an alternative for students in conducting da’wa as well 
as preserving idealism within the campuses.96 Not only providing the students with 
informal religious instruction, as a gathering place for students, university based 
mosques also became a potential catalyst for the emergence of collective actions.  
From 1990 onwards, the influence of Jamaah Tarbiyah expanded and they 
managed to penetrate and control formal Muslim student activities within campuses. 
After winning control of student senates, they established the Forum for Islamic 
Studies within the faculties under the supervision of the deans of faculty. 97  The 
existence of faculty-based organizations has attracted great numbers of new students 
to join their programs. Similar forums under generic names of Forum for Islamic 
Studies were founded in almost all faculties of state-owned universities. Since then, 
religious activities have developed and won wide influence among students.98 The 
mushrooming of these forums in the faculties has necessitated the establishment of a 
broader organization to manage and coordinate all Islamic organizations under the 
umbrella of one body at university level, namely Campus Predication Institute 
(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK). Activists of Jamaah Tarbiyah who organized 
themselves in LDK have begun to participate in a broader network of intercampus 
predication, namely the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication (Forum 
Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, FSLDK).99 This forum became an important 
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organ through which Muslim activists could disseminate their ideas,100 which in turn 
become a new resource mobilization for the members of Jamaah Tarbiyah. 
Another set of important campus organization which functions as a vehicle for 
Jamaah Tarbiyah to infuse Muslim students with their Islamist ideas is the Student 
Senate. This body isnot only the central leadership of students that organize and 
manage activities at the campus level, but also very much influenced by the dynamics 
of national politics, since it leads students to be directly involved in political actions.101 
The success of members of Jamaah Tarbiyah in securing positions in the student 
senates at the level of faculty and university in certain prestigious universities has 
provided them with leadership experience and broader network with many important 
persons in national level.102 It is not surprising that the leadership in the student senate 
brings opportunity for Jamaah Tarbiyah elites to follow a political path that might lead 
them to occupy position of leadership in political parties and parliament, at 
municipality, district, province or national level. In fact, many former student activists 
of Jamaah Tarbiyah have now been elected members of parliament at district and 
national level.  
Since the establishment of PKS on 20 April 2002, many activists who had 
previously devoted their energy to da’wa activities have become keen to be involved 
in politics. The cadres are also encouraged to enter state bureaucracy and to bring about 
changes in policy toward more Islamic goals. Political institutions are necessary to 
maintain and promote the existence of the teachings of Islam. As a political party, PKS 
struggles for the interest of Muslims, or at least to prevent any political moves that 
obstruct Muslim interests. The state must be able to guarantee its people of performing 
their religion and faith. Hence, the implementation of shariah must be carried out in a 
constitutional way, avoiding the use of force or violence.103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Ismail Yusanto, “LDK: Antara Visi, Misi dan Realitas Sejarah Perkembangannya,” 
www.fsldk.20m.com. 
101 Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, p. 120. 
102 Ibid., p. 125. 
103 Satria Hadi Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK Sejahtera, Jakarta: Miskat Publication: 2003, p. 4. 
	  	  
	  
38 
The transformation of an informal religious movement into a political party has 
made accommodation necessary for Jamaah Tarbiyah’s activists to survive. The 
structure of Jamaah Tarbiyah is likely of isolated social movement organization; it 
lacks structural organization and depends heavily on personal contacts. The repressive 
measure of the government and a hardly conducive political situation forced the 
organization to form a loose network structure so that it can elude the government 
control. In the post-Soeharto era, PKS adopted what Klandersmans calls “federation 
structure,” where branches are established to get closer to its constituents.104 This 
federation structure can take three main forms, i.e. the loosely couple network 
structure, pyramid structure and centralistic structure.105 
The first structure was introduced by Gerlach and Hine who characterize it as 
being segmented, polycepahalous and reticulate.106  It is being segmented because 
myriad of people within the organization have different political agenda. It is 
polycephalous – literally multi-headed – because its structure allows for a variety of 
leaders and no single competent leader controls the entire organization. It is 
characterized as reticulate – literally formed as a network – due to the existence of 
network that connects them with other groups and organizations. The structure of 
pyramid is characterized by the top-down interaction between the headquarter and 
local branches of the organization. In the case of PKS, its organization has central main 
office; it has Central Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP) that supervises 
Local Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, DPW) in provincial area, and 
District Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD) in a district, and Branch 
Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, DPC) in a municipality. The entire 
hierarchy of council is under the supervision of the highest institution of Majelis Syura 
(Syura Council) that is responsible to formulate vision and mission of the party, to 
appoint the president of the party, to form members of Party Deliberation Council 
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(Majelis Pertimbangan Partai) in charge of running the task of Majelis Syura in 
supervising the activities of the party, and to decide the party policy and strategic plans.  
The dramatic success of PKS participation in the 2004 general elections, by its 
significant achievement of share in votes, was beyond prediction. Indonesia Survey 
Institute, for instance, had predicted that PKS would only gain about 2.3% in 2004 
election; it proved to be wrong, since the electoral gain of the party significantly 
beyond the survey’s predictions. On the press conference prior to the National 
Deliberation Meeting of PKS in Bali on 1-3 February 2008, Tifatul Sembiring, the 
president of the party, maintained that PKS targets at 20% of the total vote in general 
election of 2009.  
To realize this ambitious dream, the party was forced to tread a new path of 
becoming an open party, allowing it of the influx of constituents from many different 
religious and social backgrounds, whose commitment to the party ideology is 
questionable. This new strategy of becoming an open party arose some criticism from 
the puritan segment of the party, mostly coming from the previous PK members. 
Generally speaking, the electoral gains of most Islamic parties in the general election 
of 2009 were marked by sharp declines. Partly due to the new strategy, PKS gained 
7.88% (8,206, 955) of the total vote, making it the fourth biggest party in Indonesia, 
and the biggest Islamist Party of the country. 
PKS’ remarkable achievement during the 2004 and 2009 elections cannot be 
separated from its capability to provide facilitating infrastructures. In the study of 
social movement, this infrastructure falls under the term of resource mobilization. 
Unlike during the Soeharto Era, post-Soeharto Era witnessed the emergence and 
development and expansion of formal organization, network, and leadership of PKS 
with its capability of recruiting supporters and cadres which in turn has shift Jamaah 
Tarbiyah into promising Islamist party with steady increasing votes.  
c.   Framing   
The transformation of Jamaah Tarbiyah into political party can also be 
explained from the ideas received and adopted by its activists. In the theory of social 
	  	  
	  
40 
movement, the study of social construction of the idea is known as collective action 
frame. In Snow and Robert Benford’s words, framing is an interpretive schema that 
simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and 
encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s 
present or past environment.107 Collective action frame serve as accentuating devices 
that either “underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition 
or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps 
tolerable. 108  Social movements are deeply involved in the work of “naming” 
grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of 
meaning that will resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and 
communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others.109 
A typical movement mode of discourse is built around what William Gamson 
calls an “injustice frame.”110 “Any movement against oppression,” writes Barrington 
Moore, “has to develop a new diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering, a 
diagnoses and remedy by which this suffering stands morally condemned.”111 Like 
Gramson and Moore, Snow believes that frames like injustice are powerful mobilizing 
resources. There is strong relation between framing and ideology in mobilizing 
collective action. In this context, PKS proved successful in its capability to offer clear 
ideology that strongly resonates and influences the viewpoint of its activists and 
supporters. Klandermans maintains that the support to participate in social and political 
movement fluctuates and depends on aspects of behavior and attitude. Social 
movements will use consensus mobilization to gain public support for disseminating 
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its ideas and point of view.112 While consensus mobilization consists of deliberate 
attempts to spread the views of a social actor among parts of a population, action 
mobilization refers to attempt of convincing people to be readily available to engage 
in a collective action by sacrificing their resources, such as money, time, ability and 
skill for the success of social movement.113 
In order to understand the complexity of consensus and action mobilization, 
scholars of social movements introduced a concept of frame resonance. This concept 
is aimed to examine the efficacy of a certain social movement to transform potential 
mobilization into actual mobilization which is dependent on its capability to frame and 
influence the consciousness of participants. 114  Frame resonance can explain the 
capacity of a movement in realizing and interpreting its mobilization potentials into a 
concrete collective action.  
According to Benford and Snow, there are three main elements in social 
movement framing: firstly, diagnostic framing, which identifies problems and the 
perpetrators that should be taken care of; secondly, prognostic framing, which provides 
a solution to the problem and offer strategy, tactics and target; thirdly, motivational 
framing, which involves a psychological process of calling the participants to move 
and act after learning the problem and its solution.115 
As a social movement, PKS highly involved in producing the meanings and 
framing the condition of Muslim in Indonesia in particular and Western domination in 
general. Liberalism and secularism, for instance, are framed as the main source of 
moral decadence, economy injustice, and political upheaval in the Muslim world, 
especially in Indonesia; hence, it is the biggest challenge for Muslim community. The 
president of PKS said that secularism is in contradiction with PKS and irrelevant to the 
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social reality of Indonesia.116 According to PKS, secularism made Muslims apart from 
Islamic principles. In this context, PKS formulated diagnostic framing by identifying 
the problem of Muslims today. In order to counter secularism and liberalism, PKS offer 
a notion of “Islam as solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hall) as a form of prognostic framing. 
By framing of Islam as a solution, PKS has participated in politics. To advance Islam 
as a solution to multi-dimensional crisis of the country, PKS offers two patterns of 
Islamization: cultural and structural.  
As a prognostic framing, cultural and structural Islamization are aimed to 
redirect Indonesian Muslims to return to Islamic sources (al-ruju‘ ila al-Quran wa al-
Sunnah). As a da’wa movement, PKS calls individuals and society to strengthen their 
cultural basis. This process of cultural Islamization would take gradual and long 
process. The structural Islamization necessitates the involvement in politics in order 
that PKS could influence and restructure state policy, because all policies are decided 
through political process, not through sermons. People who just speak out in sermon 
would unlikely be able to make a big impact in state policy. Therefore, PKS believes 
that the practice of Sharia within the community must be supported by political 
structures. Any effort to influence the state must be carried out by an involvement in 
political activities.  
The commitment of Jamaah Tarbiyah to participate in politics has altered its 
religious orientation. A new paradigm in viewing the relation between Islam and the 
state has evolved. Conformity between the movement’s belief and popular issues 
cannot be avoided by the party if it is to win mass support. In promoting Sharia, for 
instance, PKS cloaks it under the secular terms, such as ‘clean government’ and ‘anti-
corruption’. This attempt is made to relate Islamic teachings to worldly issues in order 
to bring the party closer to popular aspirations. At the grassroots level, PKS activists 
have started to educate Indonesian Muslims about the essence of Sharia through da’wa 
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activities. By doing so, PKS hopes that the demand for the application of Sharia will 
be a simultaneously bottom-up and top-down.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  
	  
44 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE CAUSE OF DA’WA AS A DISCURSIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE 
 
This chapter explores the commitment towards the adhered and shared values 
of the party and its maintenance within the internal members of the party.  This is 
virally important because the commitment to engage in da’wa become the party’s 
fundamental shared value. This discursive superstructure become an identity for the 
party members and a guide to the cadres’ behavior and thinking processes. These 
shared values are delivered by the party elites to the members and cadres of the party 
through a standardized mechanism, as a means to establish a party disciplines as well 
as to maintain and protect the uniformity of understanding of da’wa among the cadres.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the party’s 
most important shared values and their infusion to the party’s cadres. Due to its 
relevance for the discussion of this chapter, the spirit of collectivism will be discussed 
in a large portion and followed by the discussion on the preservation of party cohesion 
in the second section. Numerous examples on how the party struggles to preserve its 
cohesion give us insight about the situation in which party’s shared values are 
implemented, and how these values influence the behavior and attitude of the party. 
A.   PKS’ Shared Values 
It could be argued from the outset that above everything else PKS is a da’wa 
party. Indeed, the slogan “nahnu du‘at qabla kulli sha’i” (We are advocates [for God] 
before we are anything else)  is known well by the cadres of PKS. The raison d’être of 
the party is to conduct da’wa. Da’wa comes first and the party as a tool comes as a 
secondary, albeit very significant. PKS without da’wa will cease to exist, but not vice 
versa. The party cadres have a strong conviction that their loyalty is to the cause of 
da’wa, not to the individual, or even the party itself. Accordingly, in case the party 
becomes a hindrance for the success of da’wa, it could be dismantled at any time. 
Regarding this bold statement, Marfendi and Mohammad Yasin, PKS leaders of 
Padang, West Sumatera, used to refer the success story of AKP of Turkey that had to 
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metamorphose several times before the party becomes as it is now.117 More emphasis 
on da’wa work is also claimed to be the unique aspect of PKS. Unlike any other Islamic 
parties which are purely political in nature, PKS has been known to be a party with 
deep involvement in social, educational, cultural and humanitarian activities. Thus, 
political engagement is only one side of PKS. Again, if the party ceases to exist, the 
cadres remain in their work of da’wa, as they did before the party came to existence. 
Da’wa cause is the central value in the movement and life of the party and its 
cadres, and the partycadres believe that the existence of the party is a part of da’wa 
cause.118 The preamble of the party’s constitution states that the party is created to 
carry out da’wa messages.119 The principled aim of da’wa is to create a civilization 
built on the spirit of respecting morality, rules of law and people sovereignty, in which 
the people plays a salient role in establishing and controlling the government.120 
In order to realize this goal, PKS developed several fundamental values to be 
followed strictly by the party and its cadres. The first main value is the belief that the 
aim of their involvement in the party is to be a jund al-da’wa (soldier of da’wa) and 
their activities are solely for the sake of God’s pleasure (ridha Allah). By this very 
concept, individual interests became irrelevant; private ambition should be put aside 
for the sake of more important goal, namely God’s pleasure. All activities undertaken 
by the party and the cadres are considered to be the media of da’wa to advance Islamic 
norms and values, and to gain God’s pleasure. This shared value of being “jund min 
junud al-da’wa” (one of the soldiers of da’wa)121 has eventually developed the sense 
of militancy among the cadres. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 AKP’s party predecessors such as Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi, and Refah 
Partisi are among the parties dissolved by the Secular Turkish government. See Nuran Savaskan 
Akdogan, “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey,” in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), Interpreting Islamic 
Political Parties, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2009, p. 209. 
118 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum 
Muda Kontemporer, Bandung: Teraju, 2004, p.185. 
119The Muqadimmah of The 2005 AD of PKS. 
120 See Anis Matta, Menikmati Demokrasi Strategi Dakwah Meraih Kemenangan, Jakarta: 
Pustaka Saksi, 2002, p. 8. 
121 Hilmi Aminuddin, Menegakkan Kepemimpinan Dakwah, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPP 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, 2011, p. 116-117. 
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PKS’ cadres conceive of themselves as members of a party with a strong 
commitment to the religiously-inspired shared values. The spirit to hold tight to such 
commitment helps to create internal solidity within the party. This solidityis considered 
responsible for imparting to the party a degree of immunity to the sort of external 
interventions that could potentially destroy the very characteristics of the party.122 As 
will be discussed later, this esprit de corps has proven crucial for the party in dealing 
with both internal disputes and with political turbulence impacting the party from 
without in the aftermath of successive scandals involving the party’s elites. 
The other main value is the spirit of berjamaah (togetherness). To reach the 
party’s ideals, as a da’wa party that believes in collective action, PKS endorses the 
importance of holding the spirit of berjamaah as a means to preserve ukhuwwah 
(brotherhood). For PKS cadres, this value constitutes an important prerequisite for the 
success of the da’wa struggle to promote Islamic values and norms. The party’s official 
documents states that the concept of berjamaah is the prominent feature of the party 
due to its role as a uniting element of the ummah, and the void of this value is the very 
cause of any failure, or at best the drawback, to the establishment of Islamic 
interests.123Therefore, for da’wa to be successful, it needs to be conducted collectively 
or berjamaah.124 
In connection to the concept of berjamaah, the party’s document mentions the 
correlation between the weak condition of jamaah (group or party) and the drawback 
situation of the ummah.125The famous saying that al-haq bi la nizam yaghlibuh al-batil 
bi al-nizam, meaning that “poorly-managed goodness will be defeated by well-
managed evil”, is often quoted to substantiate the importance of advancing da’wa cause 
in an organized manner. In other words, well-organized jamaah is a prerequisite of the 
success of establishing Islamic values and norms in society. In this regard, the spirit of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  Djony Edward, Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Bandung: Harakatuna 
Publishing, 2006, p. 22-23. 
123 Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridho, Untung Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, Jakarta: 
DPP Partai Keadilan, 2000, p. 22. 
124  Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Bandung: 
Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004, p. 107. 
125 Sekilas Partai Keadilan, Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998, p. 44-45. 
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togetherness and brotherhood became a shared value developed by the party and 
infused into the cadres.  
Closely connected to the cadre’s commitment as a “soldier of da’wa” is the 
spirit of ta’ah (obedience) towards qiyadah (the leaders).126 PKS believes that with the 
existence of unshakeable obedience, any da’wagoals could be reached. The concept 
“sami‘na wa atha‘na,” meaning “we hear and we obey”, becomes an important feature 
that characterizes the very relation between the party leaders and the cadres.127 For the 
cadres at a higher level, obedience to their leadersis more demanding as a part of total 
commitment that they should undertake for the party.128 This structural obedience of 
the party’s cadres helps the party to easily mobilize its cadres for the political, social, 
or cultural events. In the practical level, obedience and disciplined cadres have also 
made it possible for the party to make important adjustments as a response to the 
current political situation, without creating unnecessary internal commotion.  
However, it is important to assert here that the shared value of structural 
obedience developed in the party is not at all to be considered as an exercise of “blind 
obedience.” In term of neo-institutionalism of Northarian, it is only the “rules of the 
game.”129 According to the concept of obedience, the party’s cadres owe their leader 
respect and obedience, as long as the latter has strong commitment to the maintenance 
and implementation of the party constitution. As mentioned by Mushthafa Masyhur, 
“the obedience tothe leader and his leadership in various subjects that do not fall into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah 
di Indonesia, Bandung: Teraju, 2002, p. 117. The concept of cadres’ obedience towards their leaders 
find its basis literally on the Al-Qur’an (4:59), stating that: “Obey the God, and obey the Messenger of 
God, and those of you who are in authority (ulu al-amr)…” The term ulu al-amr refers to legitimate 
leaders appointed by the people. To strengthen cadres’ understanding of the importance of obeying the 
leaders, the party provides readings and training materials under the topic “Qiyadah wal Jundiyah” (the 
leader/commandant and the follower/soldier). 
127 Noorhaidi Hasan, The Making of Public Islam. Piety, Democracy and Youth in Indonesian 
Politics, Yogyakarta: SUKA Press, 2013, p. 232. 
128 Ali Said Damanik, 2002, p. 117. 
129 According to North, “rules of the game” means that institutions regulate actors’ behavior by 
specifying what they can and cannot do. In this way, institutions reduce uncertainty for interaction, 
transaction and collaboration, by providing information on the range of what is allowed to do. Without 
such information, actors would proceed interaction on the basis of pure speculation. See Douglass C. 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p. 27-35. 
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the category of ma’siyah (unfaithfulness) could be regarded as similar to the obedience 
to God.”130 With this condition, the party’s shared value of obedience is not at all the 
same as encouraging in cadres’ blind devotion to a single human leader.  
Gradualism and moderation are also seen to belong to PKS’ shared values. PKS 
believes that the success of da’wa requires both a gradual process and moderate 
approach, which should not be overlooked by da’wa activists and institutions.131 To 
some extent, this attitude distinguishes the party from other Islamist movements in 
Indonesia, which so prioritize their strict Islamist agenda – pushing the immediate 
implementation of Sharia – that they ignore the readiness of the people. 132  This 
particular shared value of PKS translates into the party’s inclination to stay away from 
direct discussion or involvement on highly heated-debated issues such as the state 
ideology or religion-state relation.133Instead, PKS prefers to focus more on being 
involved in “practical” problems faced by the society, such as corruption eradication 
and poverty alleviation, or humanitarian programs and community development.134 
Instead of protracted debate on an abstract concept, the practical level of Sharia 
implementation is what the people need to experience the goodness of Islam, as a 
preparation for them to more comprehensively implement Sharia norms, not only in 
their family and social setting, but also in the state level. These shared values of 
gradualism and moderation represent, in their own understanding, essential 
characteristics of PKS in its political attitudes, actions and policies.135 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Mushthafa Masyhur, Al Qiyadah Wal Jundiah, Jakarta: Al Ishlahy Press, no year, p. 90.  
131 Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003, 
p.62.  
132 See for instances in Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle 
East, Islamism and Indonesia, Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005; Muhammad 
Iqbal Ahnaf, “MMI dan HTI; The Image of The Others”, in A. Maftuh Abegebriel, A Yani Abeveiro, 
SR-Ins Team, Negara Tuhan. The Thematic Encyclopaedia, Jakarta: SR-Ins Publishing.  
133 Yon Machmudi, Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008, p. 47. 
134 Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, Bandung: 
Harakatuna Publishing, 2005. “PKS Pledges to help civil society flourish”, The Jakarta Post, 6 June 
2005.  
135  Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia. Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer; 
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From the discussion above, the struggle for the cause of da’wa as the discursive 
superstructure of PKS, together with some derivative values, has become the central 
focus of the party’s leaders and cadres, serving as a guide for political judgment in a 
top-down schematic fashion, transmitted from party elites to the cadres. As will be 
discussed in the following section, these living values find their relevance in both 
external and internal dynamic of the party.  
Transmitting the Shared Values  
In order to preserve and transmit the party’s shared values, halaqah (religious 
circle supervised by murabbi, a religious teacher, as an ideology apparatus) is designed 
to facilitate the infusionof the party’s values within its membership. In this regular 
meeting of halaqah, the shared values are introduced to and developed for the cadres. 
To allocate the ample time to discuss the study materials of each meeting, the number 
of cadres in each halaqah does not exceed 12 people. This learning process is 
obligatory for all cadres of PKS of all levels, including parliamentarians and the 
general chairman of Majelis Shura (Deliberative Council), the highest institution of the 
party. 
To facilitate this value infusion process, the party standardizes and systematizes 
the materials used in the halaqah. Materials on obedience, mainly under the theme of 
Qiyadah wal Jundiyah (The Commandants and the Soldiers) and the importance of 
togetherness, for instance, are subjects that must be understood by all cadres. In term 
of tarbiyah process, the cadres are separated into 4 distinct levels, namely kader 
pemula, kader muda, kader madya, and kader dewasa (beginners, youngsters, 
intermediates, and advanced), each of which has different curriculum. Materials for 
halaqah are divided into topics of four themes, namely the fundamentals of Islam, self-
improvement, da’wa and Islamic thought, and social science.136 For this purpose, PKS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Collins, “Islam is the Solution, Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia,” in 
http://www.classics.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf. 
136 See Panduan Lengkap Manhaj Tarbiyah Kader PK-Sejahtera. Kader Pemula-Kader Muda-
Kader Madya-Kader Dewasa, Solo: Media Insani Press, 2005. 
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publishes several books containing materials that should be discussed in this process 
by all cadres.137 
Within the framework of tarbiyah, PKS has continuously attempted to develop 
learning activities among its cadres, including halaqah (compulsory weekly meeting), 
daurah (intensive study), rihlah (physical activity), mabit (night activity) conducted 
monthly, six monthly and yearly.138These activities are necessary as manifestation of 
the tarbiyah vision to build an Islamic society, based on Brotherhood principles of 
Tarbiyah formulated by Hasan al-Banna. These principles include Da’wah Salafiyah 
(calling for return to the tradition of the first generation of Muslims), Tariqah Sunniyah 
(commitment to emulate the path of the prophet and his followers), Haqiqah Sufiyyah 
(realization of morality), Hai’ah Siyasiyah (preparedness to political and social 
change), Jama’ah Riyadiyah (attention to the necessity of health), Rabitah Ilmiyyah 
Thaqafiyah (continuous effort to increase science and knowledge), Shirkah 
Iqtishadiyah (building economic strength and fair distribution), and Fikrah Ijtima’iyah 
(active involvement to the resolution of social problems).139 
The party also conducts an evaluation of the cadres, the results of which are 
reported regularly by murabbi to the Cadre Development Body as a formal institution 
in the party that handle and supervisehalaqah. The report is used as one of the 
references in evaluating and determining the future career of the cadres. The party also 
established the BPDO (Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisation, the Board for 
Organizational Discipline Enforcement) as the body in charge of disciplinary issues, 
hence the main instrument to ensure the cadres’ commitment to the implementation of 
the party’s mission. At a practical level, BPDO playsa significant role in receiving 
complaints from murabbi or cadres about other cadres who show lack of commitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 
1, unpublished. Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: 
Buku 2, unpublished. Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah 
Islamiyah: Buku 3, unpublished.   
138  See Ahmad Ali Nurdin, “PKS’ Democratic Experiences in Recruiting Members and 
Leaders”, in Al-Jami‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011, p. 339-347.  
139  Further account on Brotherhood strategy of movement, see Hasan Al-Bana, Risalah 
Pergerakan, Solo: Intermedia, 2001; Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah 
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to the party’s shared values when performing their duty. Generally, the main reason 
for BPDO to exert disciplinary measure relates to the cadres’ inconsistency in 
following halaqahactivities which is of paramount importance for the infusion of the 
shared values. This indicates the significance of halaqah in preserving the corps spirit 
and developing the character of the cadres that should not be taken lightly.  
The discussion above indicates that the process of shared values maintenance 
is very carefully managed. These processes are said to be put in place to guarantee the 
infusion of the shared values among the cadres of all levels. Looking it from this 
perspective, halaqah is designed to bring about uniformity of the cadres’ understanding 
and subsequently constraint the cadres’ freedom to act and think independently, thus 
decreasing the spirit of democracy in this party.140 For the same reason, Masdar Hilmy 
maintains that “the lack of autonomy among PKS activists is to a large degree inspired 
also by the cell system (usroh) inherited from the tarbiyah method, which relies heavily 
on collective action.”141 
The indoctrination process of halaqah has been an effective way of transferring 
and maintenance of the party shared values among the cadres. According to Randall, 
PKS is one of the parties in Indonesia that has most successfully developed its value 
system, and it indicates the presence of institutionalization where the party could create 
“its own value system or culture.”142 In his research on the behavior of seven political 
parties in Indonesia, Ignas Kleden also comes to the conclusion that PKS is one of the 
parties in Indonesia that has most successfully developed its value system.143 
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The Spirit of Collectivism  
PKS cadres believe that only through berjamaah canIslamic norms and values 
be realized. The spirit of collectivism demands that the cadres sacrifice their self-
interests and put forward the party’s interests on the top priority. The spirit of sacrifice 
has been practiced by the cadres in a daily basis, such as joining party activities in a 
difficult situation, giving financial assistance to the party’s activities,144  and even 
devoting their whole life torunning the party. 145  In such a situation, ‘self-benefit 
behavior is seen as having no place in the party. In general, the cadres regarded 
themselves as the tool of da’wacause for the glory of Islam. This mindset encourages 
them to uphold the interest of the party above their personal interest.  
The commitment to put forward the interest of the party and the existence of 
jamaah over personal interestalso encourages the cadres to do their best for the success 
of the da’wa movement. Cadres are taught that disappointment and regret will ensue 
when the cadres tint the party with disgraced behavior. In some cases, a cadre chooses 
to leave the party voluntarily after committing something inappropriate. In Jambi 
Province, for instance, Zulhalmi Al Hamidi preferred to leave the party after the media 
reported him among several people caught by the police raid while he was attending a 
massage center.146 It has become a policy of PKS that the cadres are not allowed to 
attend some places associated by general public with vice, mischief, and 
shamelessness, massage centers (Panti Pijat) being one such place. His supporters, 
however, argue that given that illness meant that he genuinely needed a therapeutic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 The party cadres are obliged to donate some percentage of their income to run the party’s 
programs and activities. The famous slogan of “Sunduquna Juyubuna” (Our [party’s] treasures is 
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Dakwah,”18 February 2013, www.goriau.com/berita/politik. “Kesaksian Ustadz Hilmi Aminuddin Atas 
Ustadzah Yoyoh Yusroh (almh),” www.asihsunjoto.blogspot.com.au/2013/10.  
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massage, he had good reason to go to the Panti Pijat Sehat Bersih. However, due to 
negative image of the massage clinic as a place often used for illegal prostitution, and 
in order to save the party’s image, Al Hamidi resigned from the party.147 The party 
accepted his decision, even though Panti Pijat Sehat Bersih actually has a legal 
certificate as bona fide therapeutic massage clinic and, unlike many massage centers, 
is not involved in sexual services and prostitution.148 
Closely related to the cadres’ collective awareness is the willingness to put 
aside personal opinion upon receiving the party or leaders’ (qiyadah) decisions.149 The 
obedience of the cadres to the party leadership might be taken as a proof that the cadres 
are prone to the party’s indoctrination process of blind obedience. In PKS, obedience 
to the leader is one of the party shared values, and the rules of the game that will 
strengthen the cohesiveness of the party. As a party with highly disciplinary character, 
obedience to the decision of the leadership is a necessary tool to ensure the success of 
the agreed programs of da’wa. In fact, before coming to the decision, opinions of the 
cadres are taken into great consideration. Not all decisions taken by the party leaders 
will satisfy the cadres, but once the decision is made, all the cadres are obliged to 
follow. Cadres’ obedience to the party leadership is partly the result of their 
unswerving commitment to da’wa, as enumerated in the point of declaration ofsumpah 
kader (the cadre’s oath). Sumpah Kader mentions loyalty to da’wa and willingness to 
establish Islamic values.150 There are at least three important points in the cadres’ oath; 
(1) the establishment of Islamic Sharia, (2) consistent fulfillment of the obligations as 
a member of the party, including obeying and being loyal to the leaders, and (3) 
implementation of the objectives of da’wa.151 
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read/news/2009/02.   
149  “PKS Menurut Santri NU,”4 August 2014, www.banten.pks.id/artikel/berita. “Busyro: 
Kader PKS Taat, Tapi Tidak Kritis,” www.nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2013/05/25. “Kader PKS Itu 
Taklid Buta. Ah, Masa Sih?” 13 June 2013, www.kompasiana.com.    
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As a party driven by ideological motivation, the quality of understanding of the 
ideology becomes a parameter for making decisions. The level of understanding and 
commitment of the shared values is considered to be one of the indicators that 
determine the position of a cadre in the party. The party leaders are considered by the 
cadres to have the most commitment and understanding of the party’s ideology. Due 
to the seniority and ideological maturity, members of Majelis Syura are considered the 
best cadres of PKS, whose decision owes obedience and respect. Despite the concept 
of obedience to the party leadership, the relation between cadres and leaders tends to 
be like a member of family, where every cadre had a chance to convey his arguments 
and treated as a brother and sister rather than as subordinates. In this circumstance, the 
party could relatively maintain the culture of consultation, which enhanced the 
collectiveness. The spirit of collectivism helps to create a sense of interdependence that 
enhances the notion of one community united by similar beliefs, and becomes the 
foundation for the spirit of sharing and understanding each other.   
B.  Preserving Party Cohesion 
Halaqah plays an important role in developing the cadres’ collective 
commitment to the party’s shared values that proves advantageous for the preservation 
of party cohesion. The first advantage is that the cadres perceive the party as a tool 
where they can develop and pursue their idealism. In other words, despite the 
shortcoming, the party becomes the cadres’ political vehicle to carry out the spirit of 
da’wa. As a parameter of cadres’ behavior and thinking, the party’s shared values 
prevent any individuals from creating and developing alternative ideological positions 
that will create schisms, fractions or camps within the party. It also protects the party 
from the presence of figures who might take over the process of understanding and 
interpreting the ideology or the leadership of the party in the name of improving the 
party’s situation. This condition makes the creation of alternative camps or parties 
within PKS highly difficult. Another advantage is that the commitment to the unity of 
the party encourages the cadres to promote party harmony rather than personal 
ambition. It created the belief of the importance of being part of one group. This esprit 
de corps becomes an important reason for many of PKS’ cadres to remain in the group, 
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or at least restrain themselves from actions or activities that will give a bad name to the 
party or harm the cohesiveness of the party.  
The relative success of the party in infusing the shared values means that the 
internal conflict will not be about the fundamental issues such as party ideology, but 
most likely about strategic or tactical issues. As the PKS spokesman, Mardani Ali Sera, 
once said that internal debate or conflict among PKS leaders is nothing but about 
“choosing the best vehicle after agreeing about the place to go.”152 Therefore, conflict 
is considered as a natural consequence of the deliberative efforts to find the best 
possible way of implementing the party ideology. Under this circumstance, differences 
at the technical or strategic level do not jeopardize party’s cohesion. The willingness 
of the cadres to maintain the unity of the party and their obedience to the decisions of 
the leaders has rendered the internal dispute manageable. In relation to the 
cohesiveness of the party, the following sections discuss the way the party manage 
some politically controversial issues.    
On July 2004, Indonesia held the first direct presidential election, with five 
pairs running for the race, namely Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid, nominated by Golkar, 
Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi, endorsed by PDI-P, Amin Rais-Siswono Yudhohusudo 
from PAN, S.B. Yudoyono-Jusuf Kalla, from Democrat Party. Initially, PKS preferred 
to refrain from giving support to any candidate, and advised its cadres not to participate 
in any campaign for the presidency. However, this political stance did not last long. 
Two weeks before the election day, PKS released a statement that the party supports 
Amien Rais for presidency.153 The delay in making this political decision was actually 
caused by the heated controversies among the party leaders concerning a better 
candidate to choose from, namely Rais or Wiranto. According to a group who 
supported the first, the figure of Rais was strategic and perfect in a way that he would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in 
Jakarta, 6 October 2010. Cited in Firman Noor, Institutionalising Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia: 
A Study of Internal Fragmentation and Cohesion in the Post-Soeharto Era (1998-2008), 2012, 
Unpublished thesis. 
153 In his interview with Alfred C. Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler, Amien Rais recalled that PKS 
political support was half-hearted. See “An Interview with Amien Rais,” in Journal of International 
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be a magnet for people committed to the reform, due to his credential in the Reformasi 
movement that resulted in the Soeharto’s resignation, marking the end of the 
Indonesian New Order. And as a leader of Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest 
Indonesian Muslim organizations, Rais will be very supportive to da’wa movement.154 
However, for the proponents of the latter, Rais was only popular within the 
modernist Muslims, intellectual groups and professionals in urban areas, which 
comprises only a limited number of the total population. They are more convinced with 
Wiranto chance to win the race due to his popularity at the grassroots level or remote 
areas. Furthermore, the fact that Golkar was in full support of Wiranto candidacy, his 
chance to win was even greater. Hence, for the sake of da’wa, they urged PKS to lend 
support to the candidate who had a better chance to win the race. Moreover, they also 
saw Wiranto as the figure that was just as sympathetic to da’wa movement as was 
Rais.155 Wiranto’s track-record showed that despite his military background, he was 
not hostile to da’wa movement. In fact, his two daughters were members of PKS’ 
tarbiyah.156  Nevertheless, eventually, all the cadres who supported Wiranto could 
accept the party’s decision that all the people and especially PKS’ members should 
support Rais in the 2004 Election.157 
The abovementioned case indicates that the prospect of da’wa was the 
underlying reason of each group in determining the support for certain presidential 
candidates, meaning that despite differences in their political preference, they shared a 
similar commitment to the struggle and continuation of da’wa movement. From the 
neo-institutionalism perspective formulated by Douglas C. North, PKS’ political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154  R. Alex Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan 
Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, Master 
Thesis, Depok: Islamic Studies and Psychology, Middle East and Islamic Studies, Post Graduate 
Program, University of Indonesia, 2006, p. 120-121.  
155 Defy Ruspiyandi, “Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS”, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004. 
156 Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, p.107. 
157 Anis Matta was among the party elites who support Wiranto for president. However, when 
the decision was reached, he was readily abided by the decision. See Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik 
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behavior represents the party ideology. When PKS finds that existing institutions are 
advantageous to them, the party tends to behave rationally and pragmatically, but 
otherwise, it will resort to its ideological underpinning. As the case of 2004 presidential 
election kick-off show us, PKS was facing a hard choice. More pragmatic elements, 
such as the chance to win the election, led the party to incline more to Wiranto, but a 
final decision to lend support to Amien in the last minute signifies the greater influence 
of ideology in the party’s political inclination, since Amien was considered to have 
very close ideological as well as organizational relation with the party. This particular 
case alsoindicates that, despite serious debate among the party’s cadres, the party is 
still able to maintain its solidity due to the strongly held commitment to shared values 
among the cadres. 
Another delicate case, or perhaps the most significant issue, was the party’s 
decision to support the government policy to raise the price of petrol by reducing the 
very generous government subsidary. Initially, PKS leaders explicitly rejected the 
government plan to cut the subsidy in 2005. Despite its coalition of President 
Yudhoyono’s cabinet, the party clearly understood that supporting unpopular 
government policy would incite unfavorable reaction from its supporters and 
constituents. This attitude changed after the party elites met with the president. This 
sudden change of attitude triggered a strong reaction from PKS supporters, especially 
from KAMMI, the student organization affiliated with PKS and the tarbiyah 
community. Many of them even urged PKS to withdraw from the coalition, since the 
party’s support for the government’s policywas having a debilitating impact upon its 
popularity.   
Despite the strong reaction from PKS cadres,158 the commitment to preserve 
the unity of the party remained an important element in party’s cohesiveness. In this 
case, cadres’ attitude of obedience to the leader becomes the main reason to accept the 
decision of the party’s leadership, and most of the cadres eventually accepted the 
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party’s policy to remain in the coalition. Even though their opinion was in diametrical 
opposition with party policy, due to the spirit of jamaah and obedient attitude toward 
the leaders, the cadresfinally agreed to accept it and kept their decision as individual 
preferences. Again, this case reflects the party’s capability to preserve its unity through 
the cadres’ commitment to the shared values.     
PKS decision to be an “open party” in 2008, hence the willingness to join 
coalition with a Christian party in regional election and campaigning for non-Muslim 
candidates, is also one of the most controversial issues faced by the party’s cadres. This 
policy generated protest and resentment from the party activists, who perceived the 
party as giving priority to political success over da’wa movement. The primary issue 
is actually a dispute between ideological purity and political expediency.159 Ideological 
purists of the party argued that PKS must uphold the basic Islamist characteristic that 
provides guidelines for the Islamization of the society, and compromising this very 
characteristic of the party will imperil this mission. For the pragmatists, PKS aims to 
bring change to Indonesian society. However, since PKS is not in power, the party 
needs to gain support from the political mainstream. Ideological inflexibility will not 
do but a hindrance to the party’s prospect of expanding the constituency.  
Other component of the openness strategy of the party is the decision to conduct 
controversial campaign ads in the run-up to 2009 election. The political advertisements 
displayed Soeharto as one of Indonesia’s greatest heroes. The advertisements were 
obviously targeted to win the support of military families and Golkar grassroots, at the 
risk of alienating the core supporters, who still remember the repression that the 
Islamists faces during the regime’s power. Other advertisements with the theme “Partai 
Kita Semua” (the Party for Everyone) also irked purist cadres and supporters because 
they portrayed women without headscarves. The Great Indonesians and Party for 
Everyone ads were considered by the purists to be responsible for the PKS’ decline in 
core base areas of Depok, Jakarta and Bandung in the 2009 election, because 
supporters of the party previous election took them as evidence that the party has 
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changed.160 As a strategy of constituency expansion, these advertisements attempted 
to reach various segments of society to gain sufficient vote of twenty percent that will 
enable the party to run its own presidential candidate. However, this strategy proved 
to have adverse effect on the party’s core base; it might have appealed to small segment 
of new voters, but it alienated its core voters.  
Apart from the result of the 2009 election,161 both purists and pragmatists have 
unshakeable belief of the significance of da’wa cause as a shared value of all party’s 
cadres; they differ only on the methods and praxis, not on the substance and ideology. 
In this regard, the party leaders seek to develop an inclusive approach to include more 
segments of Indonesian society into PKS constituencies. The openness strategy is 
believed by the party leaders to give the party a better chance to win the election, hence 
increasing the possibility for the party to promote Islamic norms, values and ideals in 
Indonesian pluralist country. In other words, this strategy is merely a conceivable tool 
to further the da’wa movement. Although the leaders have tried to rationalize their 
policy,162 many of the cadres did not yet have a similar understanding on this issue, 
and took it as an indication of the party’s failure to maintain the very characteristic of 
the party.163 They also assumed that this decision was driven by political and material 
gain at the expense of party idealism. Some of them set up a forum named FKP to 
criticize this policy.164 For the party’s cadres who are in favor of this strategy, they 
believe that the party needed to be flexible in order to be acceptable to the plural 
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Indonesian societies and more influential on the life of the people. Furthermore, they 
maintain that being more inclusive does not contradict da’wa. In fact, the very 
characteristic of da’wa was the flexibility of delivering message for people of different 
background.  
The differences of opinion among the party cadres are inevitable, but these 
differences do not lead to the fragmentation of the party, nor to precariousness. The 
shared value of obedience prevents the cadres from prolonging the controversies. 
Instead of making counter statement on the controversies that might add fuel to fire, 
the party elites shift their focus on the practical social and political issues.165 PKS 
leaders believe that the presence of the commitment to the unity of the party will 
eventually manage to put an end to politically unnecessary debates on the openness 
strategy.166  Eventually, following the concept of sami’na wa atha’na,most of the 
cadres preferred to understand the leaders’ instructions and began implementing them. 
Although some ex-cadres might have a strong opinion on such policies, many of PKS 
cadres ceased to complain about such political accommodation, and refrained from 
seizing upon it as ammunition to attack the party leadership. The presence of the 
cadres’ consciousness to keepthe party united in difficult situations is an indication of 
the success of the party in infusing the shared values. The majority of the cadres also 
refused to follow FKP, which recently rebranded into LDKI (Lembaga Dakwah 
Kemuliaan Islam, Da’wa Council for the Glory of Islam)167 and attended mainly by the 
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disenchanted cadres and individuals who wanted to expose some wrongdoings of this 
party and how far this party has deviated from its initial platform.168 
However, some important figures are still very critical of their former party.169 
One of them is Yusuf Supendi, the former vice chairman of DSP (Dewan Syariah 
Pusat, The Central of Sharia Council) dismissedin 2009.170 After his dismissal from 
the party, Supendi expressed his resistance through the mass media and directly 
attacked the leaders of the party.171 The interesting point was that he did not attack the 
party for deviating from its ideology; instead, he accused the two leaders of the party, 
Luthfi H. Ishaaq and Matta, for committing improper behavior namely corruption, 
defamation and terror towards him,172 which was denied by both Ishaaq and Matta. He 
then also accused ten PKS leaders for illegally dismissing him from the party.173 This 
personal allegation did not create a serious impact on the cadres, nor the solidity of the 
party. Supendi’s maneuver to expose an internal issue within the party to the media, as 
well as attacking his former fellows in the party, indicates that he did not find any 
available support inside the party.174 According to Sembiring, all PKS’ cadres in all 
regions of the country were still solid and were not influenced by Supendi’s political 
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maneuvers.175 Hence, Sembiring’s statement can be seen to highlight the basic fact of 
the cadres’ solidity and maturity to the extent that they cannot easily be persuaded to 
uncritically follow certain figures or a group of people, especially when these people’s 
motive is obviously to make faction in the party. Consequently, the case represents 
further evidence of the close relation and relevance between the presence of shared 
values and the preservation of party cohesion.  
The much bigger scandal of “Beef-gate” is, nevertheless, undoubtedly having 
a devastating impact on the party whose reputation is heavily built on personal morality 
and zero tolerance for corruption. The scandal began in 29 January 2013, when 
investigators from Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi, KPK) raided a five-star hotel room in Jakarta and arrested a man named 
Ahmad Fathnah caught sharing a room with a college student, and confiscated suitcase 
containing IDR 1 billion (approximately $103,000).176 The next day, PKS chairman, 
Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq (LHI) was apprehended in connection with the same case. Later 
on two business executives of Indoguna were also arrested. These four individuals 
were accused of involvement in arranging additional beef import quota from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, whose minister was also a member of PKS. The allegation 
was that Indoguna executive paid a bribery in return to LHI’s assistance in helping 
them gaining government approval to get additional beef-import quota.177 Declaring 
innocence, LHI tended his resignation from the PKS leadership. His arrest was 
followed by an outcry among the party members as well as its elites that LHI’s case is 
nothing but a set-up and a frame to discredit the PKS chairman and destroy the party’s 
image and reputation. Hidayat Nur Wahid, a senior parliamentarian of PKS, mentioned 
the likelihood of conspiracy against PKS due to the party’s strong anti-corruption 
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stance.178 Anis Matta also alleged that KPK is being used as political tools, and he 
“feels the presence of a big conspiracy.”179 
While this indignant response resonated with the party faithful, it drew 
widespread criticism toward the party. One comment argued that attack on KPK would 
further undermine the party’s reputation, since the public faith in KPK was still much 
higher than it was in the party, and PKS criticism on this popular institution made the 
party’s stance on zero tolerance to corruption questionable. 180  Furthermore, 
constructing a conspiracy theory was tantamount to blaming ‘invisible enemies’, 
serving only to further damage to the party’s image.181 PKS leaders took this criticism 
wisely, and as a result the party’s handling of the scandal shifted away from denial to 
distancing the party from the any association with the case. Deputy Secretary-General 
of PKS at that time, Fahri Hamzah, for instance, stated that the case was a personal 
matter of LHI and Fathanah.182 Even much further, the party took a step back from the 
case by issuing a decree prohibiting the cadres from giving a comment on the case.183 
As the investigation continued, bribery and money laundering aspects of the 
scandal were followed by much more salacious elements that provided endless fodder 
for the media. The private lives of Fathanah and LHI were unpacked. During the 
investigation, it is revealed that Fathanah had affairs with dozens of women, and 
possibly had intimate relationship with many of them, in spite of being a married man. 
As for LHI, his third marriage to a high school student took a further toll on his image, 
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www.nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/02/01/17340248.  
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PKS Bakal Rontok,” 3 February 2103, www.news.detik.com/berita/2159833.  
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www.rmol.co/read/2013/05/11/110051, Friastuti, “PKS: Biarkan Luthfi dan Fathanah Dengan 
Kasusnya,” www.news.detik.com/berita/2243336,  
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as media painted an increasingly negative picture on the relationship between 52-year-
old man and a teenager.184 On the 4th of November 2013, Fathanah was found guilty 
of corruption for receiving grants on behalf of LHI and sentenced to 14 years 
imprisonment and a fine of IDR 1 billion or an additional six month in prison.185 As 
for LHI, despite his defense plea, he was sentenced to 16 years in prison on 9 December 
2013 and a fine of IDR 1 billion or additional year imprisonment.186 Predictably, LHI 
asked for appeal and maintained his innocence.187 Upon the issuance of the sentences, 
PKS responded that it was unfair judgment compared to other sentences given to 
politicians found guilty of corruption.188 In addition, PKS publishes Luthfi’s defense 
statement in its entirety without any commentary.189 
This scandal of corruption and sexual intrigue led to speculation that PKS was 
marching towards its ultimate demise.  Reporting in the mainstream media, polling 
results and opinion surveys made the general public believe that PKS was doomed. 
Surveying by Pol-Tracking Institute found that PKS was on the top list of political 
parties to have received the most negative media coverage throughout 2013.190 A study 
by CSIS (the Center for Strategic and International Studies) found that in term of 
electability, PKS was ranked the seventh out of twelve parties competing in 2014 
election, while the National Survey Institute ranked PKS as eighth most electable.191 
Surveys by other polling organizations also showed grim prospects for PKS. Lingkar 
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Survey Indonesia predicted that PKS would not pass the parliamentary threshold of 
3.5%,192 leading to speculation that PKS will eventually face “electoral extinction” in 
2014.193 
Badly damaged by a major corruption scandal widely covered by national 
media, PKS’ image and reputation seemed to be beyond repair. It was predicted that 
the Beef-gate would seriously undermine the chance of PKS candidates to win the 
gubernatorial posts.  The results of gubernatorial elections in West Java and North 
Sumatera, however, contradicted this prediction. The wins in these two provinces 
boosted the morale of PKS’s cadres and drew positive comments from some observers. 
According to Firman Noor, “PKS’ victories were a result of the candidates’ positive 
image and programs, generated mainly through social activities, including 
humanitarian activities and pengajian (Quran recital gathering).”194 Some observers 
also gave their comment that PKS’ victory in two gubernatorial elections demonstrated 
that despite wide media coverage, the case of LHI corruption scandal did not influence 
the grassroots voters, and the party’s reputation was not beyond repair.195 PKS leaders 
point to the triumphs as a solid proof that PKS was not only a resolute political survivor 
but also a solid political contender, and the party did not lose public trust.196 
PKS’ success in winning the gubernatorial elections amid the scandal 
beleaguering its chairman warrants some explanations. First of all, the party structure 
is responsible for the political survival of the party. The party is strongly based on 
grassroots membership and its cadres’ network constitutes one of the strongest political 
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party networks in Indonesia. Because ‘the cadres are the most precious assets of the 
party’, it is not surprising that the first response in handling the LHI case is to deal with 
the cadres’ concern first. They badly need to know what happened. As an effort to 
consolidate the cadres, PKS leadership aired their genuine concern about the survival 
and existence of the party. The presence of existential threat faced by the party was 
translated into the rhetoric of anti-PKS conspiracy. This rhetoric was deliberately used 
for two purposes, namely to mitigate the negative impact of the beef-gate upon the 
cadres’ solidity, and to mobilize reactionary support from among core cadres who 
found their party under attack and found themselves in uncertain and tumultuous 
situation. These psychological and situational factors contribute to the party’s 
inclination to stay true to its ideological underpinning.  
Conspiracy theory may draw criticism from political observers and general 
public, but it is effective in cultivating the support of PKS cadres,197 who are sincerely 
moved to defend their party’s reputation. 198  Unlike PKS leaders who restrained 
themselves from making public statement regarding the scandal, the party cadres made 
use of social media to accuse other political parties, and even other countries, of 
orchestrating the scandal to undermine PKS.199 Using information platforms such as 
Twitter and online news Web site, PKS cadres presented their version of the story. As 
for the party elites, instead of making counter-response through national media, they 
chose to reengage with cadres and reaffirm their commitment to the core values of the 
party. This popular move proves to be effective in regaining the grassroots support of 
the cadres who might have been disappointed by the scandal. At the rally in Central 
Sulawesi after the fasting month of Ramadan, PKS apologized to all its members and 
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asked them not to lose faith in the party’s vision.200 The party’s high concern to 
consolidate the cadres is not without reason. As a cadre-based party, cadres are the 
most important asset for PKS. It is the cadres who “give life” to the party, not the 
outsiders like Fathanah.201 Based on the public statements and actions made by PKS 
local branches of Magelang, Semarang, Solo, Sukabumi and Yogyakarta, to mention 
only a few, asserting their support for the party and its leadership, the party elites knew 
that PKS was never really in danger of losing its coherence amid the bombardment of 
negative media coverage.202 
When the PKS leadership was confident enough with the solidity of its cadres, 
they could focus more on the future of the party, especially in the upcoming election 
of 2014.203 For this purpose, PKS leaders began adopting a strategy of detaching the 
party from the scandal. This approach was in stark contrast to the outcry among PKS 
members when LHI was first arrested. Now, the party left the case to the investigation 
of the anti-corruption commission and let the judicial system handle the case. Without 
attempts to intervene, PKS assigned lawyers to defend the LHI case. This shift of PKS 
strategy in managing scandal was a consequence of party’s commitment to its ideology 
and shared values, and the external factors, namely national media with its intellectual 
and political network.    
The initial approach of PKS on the LHI scandal can be understood as an act of 
minimalizing “mortality salience.” Experimental studies demonstrate that mortality 
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salience would urge the people to incline more toward established belief systems and 
identities. Other qualities, such as greater patriotism, religious fanaticism, 
stereotyping, support for traditional gender norms, and preference for aggressive 
response to ideas, individuals, or groups perceived as threatening to the socially shared 
values and beliefs are some examples of the products of one’s awareness of mortality 
salience.204 
During the initial stage of the scandal, PKS leaders are facing an obvious threat 
of the demise or, at best, fragmentation of the party. There is a strong expectation that 
such relentless media coverage of the scandal involving a top leader of PKS would 
tarnish the party’s image and reputation to the point of beyond repair. Faced with this 
existential threat, PKS leaders attempted to find refuge in the established ideology and 
shared values of the party. The rhetoric of anti-PKS conspiracy is a natural response of 
the party to protect its cohesiveness and existence. This strategy also aimed to 
consolidate the cadres’ support for the party’s struggle to avoid or minimalize the 
mortality salience created by unknown actors through the scandal. When the situation 
became clear and the party leadership was reassured of the cadres’ solidity and support, 
with the LHI case being declared a personal issue, the party’s strategy changed 
accordingly.  
 
Conclusion 
The discussion above shows that the PKS cadres’ commitment to shared values 
provides a positive impact on the cohesion of the party. It prevents the party from 
fragmentation or fictionalization from within. Persuasion, provocation or defamation, 
even from some founding fathers and important figures who had officially left the party 
prove to be unsuccessful. PKS has shown considerable capacity to preserve unity of 
purpose by focusing on da’wa as its raison d’etre. Shared values such as collectivism, 
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obedience, and gradualism, are transmitted to the cadres through the halaqah. The 
unique identity as “a soldier of da’wa”, whose main duty is to struggle for God’s 
pleasure, creates commitment to preserve the ideals of the party, and the cadres 
regarded such ideals as their priority.  
For the cadres, the party is not merely “a disposable tool” for material and 
personal gain, rather it is a vehicle to advance the da’wa cause. Since da’wa should be 
collectively conducted, the commitment to obey the leaders is of paramount 
importance to maintain the spirit of togetherness. Thanks to the cadres’ commitment 
to the shared values of the party, PKS was relatively successful in effectively executing 
conflict-management strategy, hence avoiding internal fragmentation. The rule of the 
game is a significant foundation to base their attempt to resolve conflict, which, over 
time, satisfied most of the cadres and decreased any disappointment that may have 
ensued from it.  On numerous occasions, issues emerged issues that had the potential 
toshake the unity of the members. Nevertheless, thanks largely to the cadres’ 
commitment to shared values, PKS was able to avoid serious or prolonged conflict and 
was generallyable to maintain its cohesion and focus. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SURVIVAL OF A DA’WA PARTY AND THE MOBILISATION OF ITS 
BASE 
 
Since its inception in 1998, PKS has managed to recruit a large number of 
committed Muslim youth and expanded its organization to build one of the most 
dynamic Islamist parties in Indonesia. The party successfully expanded its organization 
against the declining popularity and electoral backdrop of most of Islam-based national 
parties in the last two elections of 2004 and 2009.205 Popular support for religious 
parties collectivelyhas shrunk at the national level over the last ten years.206 In the post-
New Order election of 1999, these religious parties managed to collect only 36.5 per 
cent of the total vote, and secure 163 seats in parliament (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, People’s Representative Council). The increasing support to 38.35 per cent in 
2004 is chiefly due to the dramatic expansion of PKS, while most of religious parties 
experienced a decrease in votes. The vote in 2009 election showed a drop in vote 
percentage, where the religious parties garnered only 29.6 per cent. In 2014, they 
managed to saw a modest improvement in their collective vote to 31.8 per cent. 
Compared to secular-nationalist parties, such as Golkar, PDIP (Struggle Democratic 
Party), Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) and Gerindra, parties which identified with 
political Islam failed in improving their electoral gain due to their exclusive and 
puritanical ideology.207 
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The polling trends for Islam-based party’s in the last four successive elections 
since 1999 point to a minimal role for political Islam in electoral politics.208 At the 
same time, against the declining trends of political Islam, secular-nationalist parties 
and their elites compete to become more ‘Islam-friendly’ and assertive in advancing 
religious-based policies and agendas in efforts to appeal to the median Muslim voter.209 
Secular-nationalist parties also managed to establish Islamic institutions within their 
own parties; PDI-P, Golkar and Partai Demokrat (PD) have Islamic wings.210 Through 
this soft Islamic policy, they have successfully courted Muslim voters away from 
Islamist parties. It is against this highly competitive electoral politics that political 
Islam, particularly the PKS, must search for a way to survive politically. How the PKS 
manages to mobilize and survive under such competitive democratic conditions is the 
main topic discussed in this chapter. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the PKS 
organizational cohesion achieved through the party institutionalization that accounts 
for its political survival and the expansion of the party in democratic Indonesia. The 
second part of the chapter discusses the party’s community building strategy in 
delivering social welfare that is considered to contribute to the party’s expansion of its 
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relatively solid mass support base. The third part analyzes the ability of the party to 
frame its social and political activism as religious duty and its ability to use institutional 
structure that allowed the party to provide the politically ambitious cadres an upward 
mobility for their political career. The last section deals with the result of party’s 
moderation in regard to its electoral gain. 
A.   Building Party Cohesion  
In the last decade of the New Order era, socio-economic transformations have 
brought about a new breed of educated young Muslims, who were assertive in 
advancing their religious identity and metropolitan life-style.211 After the demise of the 
New Order regime, a range of non-state religious movements and organizations 
competed with one another to address the interests of these nascent Muslimsof urban 
middle and working class, which were generally neglected during the reign of 
undemocratic secular regime. These organizations offered competing spiritual and 
socio-cultural functions, services and ideologies for these newly-emerged religiously-
committed youth. There is a long list of organizations to choose from; young Muslims 
aspired to build social ties and achieve spiritual rewards could join more established 
organizations such as the NU, Muhammadiyah or the prominent Islamic Student 
Association (HMI), or youth wings of religious national parties. Besides, the youth are 
also presented with multiple choices of religious groups, including Islamist ones such 
as the PK and Hizbut Tahrir.212 
Even though faithful membership has not become a norm among these youth, 
competition to court the young and promising Muslim leaders grows intense among 
religious-based organizations.213 In practice, these organizations were in competition 
with one another to gain control or influence of state powerand get state patronage. It 
came natural that in the wake of New Order’s collapse, one of these religious-based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization among 
Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia”, The RSIS Working Paper Series, Singapore: 
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212 See for example, Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003. 
213 Kristian Morville, “Student politics in Indonesia,” in ISIM Review, 2005, No. 16, p. 31. 
	  	  
	  
73 
organizations found a political momentum to create their own political parties, such as 
PK, while others chose to keep their intimate associations with particular parties, such 
as Muhammadiyah with PAN, and NU with PKB. The rise of the PKS and its 
aggressive recruitment of young cadres haveaccounted forantagonism of these two-
biggest religious organizations toward the party.  The fact that Islamist organizations 
have gained popularity among the newly ascending urban middle class Muslim 
constituencies has led scholars to understand the cause of successful Islamist 
mobilization, especially Islamist recruitment of the Muslim youth. 
The PKS mobilization power can be illustrated by its electoral performances 
during 1999 to 2009. In the first democratic national legislative elections in 1999, the 
party’s predecessor, PK, won just 1.4 per cent of the vote, gaining only seven seats in 
the 500-member House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). In the 
next election, PKS witness the increasing vote of 7.3 per cent, from which the party 
secured 45 seats in the DPR, and also in 2009 election, with slightly increase into 7.8 
per cent, winning 57 seats of the 560-member House.214 It is important to note that 
PKS electoral success in 2004 and 2009 elections was at the expense of the sharp 
decline of all other Islamic faith-based parties, and against the dramatic rise of the 
relatively new Democratic Party (PD) led by the previous President Yudhoyono. While 
all other parties of religious or nationalist background have lost most of their popular 
support, the PKS has managed to retain a steady support base and become the fourth 
largest party in the DPR and the most prominent religious party in the country.215 The 
relatively solid mass support base, both among members as well as sympathizers, is 
responsible for the mobilization power of the party. Based on the national survey of 
CSIS in 2008, PKS enjoys the highest level of loyalty (above 75 per cent) among party 
supporters, while other parties show comparatively modest rates ranging from 32 per 
cent to 61 per cent.216 While many other parties suffer opportunistic behavior and 
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Indonesia,” in Asian Survey 51:5, 2011, p. 975. 
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severe factionalism among party members that weaken their organizational cohesion, 
PKS has a better cohesiveness in term of party-member relationship.217 
Well-organized party machinery makes a substantial contribution to the 
strength of PKS. The organization has grown rapidly and steadily since its inception in 
1998 to achieve a more than ten-fold membership increase in the past ten years. 
Currently, approximately 800,000 members are registered with PKS.218 The party’s 
ability to recruit committed cadres ready to serve the party’s collective cause in the 
long term is particularly intriguing. Furthermore, the party’s relative success in 
recruiting the Muslim youth against the backdrop of democratization and 
Islamizationis also worth investigating because the youth in general and students in 
particular are always vital brokers for political change in Indonesian politics.219 The 
following section explains the recruitment and cadrerization method that contribute to 
the cadre’s loyalty to the party and leadership.  
Merit-Based Recruitment 
In regard with recruitment, PKS establishes internal organizational 
mechanisms which are different from other political parties. The party establishes a 
mechanism that enables young active and potential members a fair chance to pursue a 
career in the organization. The main purpose of this mechanism is to guarantee fair and 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion instead of personal loyalty and/or connections 
to prominent figures.220 Without exception, every single cadre is obliged to follow the 
process of cadrerization through halaqah or liqa. The cadres are organized into core 
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Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004, Unpublished dissertation, 
Depok: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Program Pasca Sarjana Sosiologi, 2011, p.136. 
219 See for instance Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime 
Change in Indonesia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
220 Greg Fealy, “Parties and Parliament: Serving Whose Interests?” in G. Lloyd and S. Smith 
(eds.), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, 
p. 101. 
	  	  
	  
75 
study groups at the district level. Each group forms the basic unit, called an usrah 
sytem, which is inherited by the party from the Tarbiyah movement. Throughout the 
mandatory weekly group meeting, the senior cadres, called murabbi, grade the cadres’ 
(1) commitment to service, (2) qualification, and (3) grassroots support for promotion 
and selection of cadres for higher office. Cadrerization results are used as a guide in 
the process of recruitment and promotion. Only the cadres who are qualified for 
particular positions and offices will be promoted for a higher office. New cadres cannot 
be promoted quickly without participating in cadrerization process, even if they are 
well-connected to a prominent figure. 
There are certain steps to follow before the team come to decision regarding 
the cadre’s promotion. At the local level, the murabbi monitors the potential cadres 
and then, based on his/her observation, promotes the cadres to the special team 
consisting of senior members of the party and representatives of the cadrerization 
department. The team will check the cadres’ halaqah or liqa performance, selected 
some names and convey them to all of the cadres for the selection. Because of the 
meritocratic dynamics of internal elections, 221  the opportunity to find the best 
candidates for the party leadership is greatly increased, because only the most-qualified 
cadres will pass the fit and proper test before joining the election. Therefore, in general, 
the top figures in the party structures and bodies are the cadres with a high level of 
commitment and capability to lead the party.   
The same is true for MP recruitment. To determine the most eligible MP 
candidates, the team would evaluate and scrutinize the personal and political capability 
of the candidates.222 The result of the election could not be determined solely by the 
party elite, because opinions of thousands of senior cadres should be considered. This 
internal election is conducted in such a transparent process that it is protected from any 
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form of collusion and nepotism. 223  Through the recruitment process, the cadres 
witnessed that the main tools to have a better rank and position in the party is the 
personal character of the person, not the connection with certain figures in the party, 
and regardless of the background, only the best candidate is eligible to lead the party. 
In the long run, this recruitment system contributed to developing and nurturing the 
trust in the party’s system. 
The case of Anis Matta, the previous President of the PKS and the General 
Secretary of PKS for three periods, demonstrated how the merit system works in the 
party. Due to his exceptional capability and strong commitment to the party’s ideals, 
he was appointed a top leadership of the party. Despite a rumor that his ascension to 
the top leadership of the party is due to his closeness with Hilmi Aminuddin, one of 
the founding father of the Tarbiyah movement, it is, the party maintains, his own 
character and vision for the party that made the members of Majlis Syura (Shura 
Council) elect him the General Secretary and then the President of the party.  
Over the years, the principle of recruitment process for the public offices (i.e., 
governors, mayors, district and municipality heads) seems to be violated by the party 
nomination of non-cadre figures, typically rich businessmen, prominent local figures, 
well-known celebrities, or retired officers of military or police. This has caused some 
discontent among the cadres, who has well-grounded reason to be unhappy with the 
leadership decision. The cadres question the motive of this breach. The remark from 
the party’s legislator, Zulkieflimansyah, is indicative of the pragmatic approach of the 
party in electoral politics. He said, “Immediately the grassroots will come to you, shake 
your hand, and just admire the beauty of the movie star and … you’re saving a lot of 
money.”224 
The nomination of non-cadres for the public office is merely political strategy 
to secure economic resource for the party success in the local election (Pilkada, 
Pemilihan Kepala Daerah). Zulkieflimansyah continued that the party cannot go blind 
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to the political behavior of the mass. People will flock to meet the celebrity during the 
campaign and vote for him, because they know him/her well from the media. This 
campaign strategy does not only help with the low funded-campaign of the party, but 
also helpsin winning the election.225 The same is true with Ahmad Heryawan, the 
governor of West Java, who is said to have won the election partly due to the popularity 
of his running mate, Dede Yusuf, a well-known celebrity. PKS also chose Marissa 
Haque, a popular actress and the wife of well-known rocker, Ikang Fawzi, as a running 
mate of Zulkieflimansyah of PKS in Banten provincial election of 2006, and Helmi 
Yahya, a successful television producer and news presenter, as a running mate of 
Syahrial Oesman of the PDI-P in the South Sumatra gubernatorial elections in 2008.  
Diverting from the initial principle of recruitment and cadrerization process, in 
2008 the party declared itself an open party and allowed non-Muslim to become rank-
and-file members of the party.226 This “open party” policy is declared to combat the 
popular perception of the exclusivity of the party and to enable the party becoming one 
of the top three parties in Indonesia. As a theological back-up, the party refers to the 
nature of Islam as rahmatan lil ‘alamin (blessing for all humanity). Accordingly, as a 
party based on Islamic teaching, the PKS should reflect the quranic norms. Regarding 
non-Muslim membership and nomination, the previous head of Shura Council of PKS, 
Hilmi Aminuddin, maintained that inclusivity is the character of Islam, so the PKS 
becoming an inclusive party is an inseparable part of the party’s struggle for the 
realization of inclusivity of Islam; it is not merely political strategy, but it is the 
fundamental belief (aqidah) of the party leadership.227 In the Muslim minority areas, 
such as Papua, East Nusa Tenggara and Central Timor province, the party supported 
non-Muslim candidates for legislative and executive elections in provincial (DPRD I, 
Provincial Representative Assembly) or district level (DPRD II, District 
Representative Assembly). PKS and PDS established coalition to lend the support to 
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two Christian figures, Lukas Enembe and Laurentius Kadir, for the governorship in 
Papua and West Kalimantan respectively. This “open party” strategy has raised 
concerns among purist cadre and party leaders, who fear the impact of an increasingly 
diverse membership for the overall long-term plan of transforming Indonesia. Besides, 
there is no solid evidence that non-Muslim are joining the party in significantly huge 
numbers.228 
For the purist cadres, the policy of non-cadre nomination and promotion proved 
to be a double sword for the party. In one hand, this strategy is effective as a short-term 
politics. The popularity or the social status of the candidate can be capitalized as a vote 
getter. But, in the other hand, it gives a strong signal to the public that the party has 
become increasingly pragmatic, and in the long run the party idealism will dwindle. 
According to the party internal survey in 2009, PKS is the popular choice (75.2 
percent) of the respondents who expect bigger role for Islam in politics.229 This image 
of the PKS as a party that represents the struggle for Islam will diminish if the party 
continues nominating non-cadres who do not share the party’s ideals. The purists point 
the result of 2009 election where the party’s electoral gain decreased by 119,065 votes 
vis-à-vis 2004, as a valid indication of the failure of the party to maintain the voters. 
According to the purist, the PKS image as the defender of Islamist ideology has been 
tarnished by the pragmatic maneuver of the party. The case of non-cadre PKS 
legislators, Misbakhun, who was arrested in 2010 for alleged involvement in the Bank 
century bailout scandal, is also an unfortunate example of the fallout of non-cadre 
nomination policy. Misbakhun was a successful entrepreneur who chose the PKS as 
his political vehicle to win the ticket to the parliament.  The party was oblivious to 
certain controversial aspects of his personal background and proceeded in nominating 
and promoting Misbakhun to be a member of parliament in 2009-2014.  Apparently, 
the party did not have any knowledge about the controversial past activities of the 
candidate until they were raised in the wake of public scandal. Had the party know that 
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Misbakhun had an issue about Letter of Credit of Century Bank, the party might have 
to reconsider his nomination. Recruited from non-cadres, Misbakhun’s loyalty to the 
party was also questionable. After being declared “not guilty” by the Supreme Court 
in July 2012, Misbakhun left the PKS and chose Golkar as his party for recent 2014 
legislative election.  
Cadrerization and Loyalty Maintenance  
As a cadre party, the PKS emphasizes the significance of cadrerization. The 
paramount importance of cadrerization can be observed from the party’s instruction to 
establish cadre development at every level of the party’s bodies, from the party’s 
national level to the lowest party structure. The 2005 statute of the party states that the 
DPP was “to hold cadrerization for party’s members” as a duty that has to be performed 
by each level of committee.230 It also states that every lower party structure has to 
establish Bidang Unit Pembinaan Kader (the Cadre Development Board), whose main 
duty is to organize and supervise cadrerization process. 231 The objective of 
cadrerization in the party is to create cadres with a strong Islamic personality, 
commitment to Islamic visions and values, and readiness to implement PKS’ da’wa 
method 232  and play an important task of building civilization. 233  In this regard, 
cadrerization becomes important sourcefor the success in da’wa and the revivalism of 
Muslims.234 Regarding the importance of cadrerization, Mahfudz Siddiq said that  
“The cadre is the secret of life and the revival of any nation. History of this 
umma (nation) is the story of militant cadres who have a strong sprit and 
determination. Indeed, the strength or weakness of the umma is determined by 
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our success in generating cadres with the characteristic of mujahid (the Islamic 
warrior).”235 
 
This remark indicates that cadrerization is designed to create militant cadres 
who are committed to develop Islamic civilization.236 For the purpose of party survival, 
programs and activities developed in cadrerization process will deepen the cadres’ 
understanding of party ideology and shared values, party management, and political 
insight. 237 Through the cadrerization, the party could strengthen the organization 
managementand obtain qualified cadres and future leaders.238 
The cadrerization has a dual-practical function: to develop the cadres’potentials 
and to prepare them for internal party positions.239 In this regards the party’s strength, 
survival and expansion depend so much on the growth of the cadres, both in quality 
and quantity.240 To maintain the quality of the cadres, the party establishes six levels 
of cadrerization, namely Anggota Pemula (the Beginner), Anggota Muda (the Junior), 
Anggota Madya (the Intermediate), Anggota Dewasa (the Advanced), Anggota Ahli 
(the Expert), and Anggota Purna (the Elder).241 In order for the cadres to get their rank 
upgraded, they need to join and pass several training and activities.242 The party’s 
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constitution dictates that every cadre has to participate in the training programs and 
pass them before they could hold certain membership status.243 For Beginners who had 
passed the evaluation process, for instance, the party introduced them to the halaqah 
activities, which include some informal activities such as daurah, rihlah, mabit, 
seminars and critical book reading as part of cadrerization process.244 These activities 
are actually derived from the Tarbiyah model of cadrerization developed in 1980s and 
inspired mainly by the Ikhwan Muslimin movement. This tradition is preserved as a 
core institution of the PKS.245 
Training programs are the soul of the cadrerization. Every cadre has to join the 
established programs and activities.246 One of the mostcrucial training programs for all 
cadres is halaqah. Attended by a maximum of 12 cadres, this compulsory weekly 
training is supervised by a murabbi who is responsible of delivering standardized 
materials and instructions. The party tried to preserve the continuation of halaqah, as 
one of the main cadrerization institutions. The Department of Cadrerization in every 
local committee down to the lowest structures has to ensure the continuation of 
halaqah and cadrerization process.247 It is very often that the cadres at the municipal 
level are sent to help running the halaqah at the village level. The preservation of 
halaqah method is unique to the party, which also becomes trademark of the PKS and 
distinguishes it from other parties and organizations.  
Every cadre is obliged to join the halaqah because information regarding the 
party’s policies and the reasons behind them are delivered during the session. Even 
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though the cadres might not be able to change the policy, they will be well-informed 
about its rationale, so they can understand the situation better and will not be easily 
misled by any rumors and gossips. In this regard, halaqah acted as a device to clarify 
the party’s political choices. During the meeting, the cadres are also exposed to 
ideology maintenance, which recalls the party’s ideology to the cadres, the most 
important of which is the vision and mission of da’wa. The murabbi also reminded the 
cadres about the importance of being loyal to the party and its leadership. As the soldier 
of da’wa, the party cadres are also provided with materials for self-improvement to 
help the cadres develop high-quality character and excellent behavior, so that they will 
become example of the goodness of Islam. The halaqah session is also used to raise 
the spirit of brotherhood and togetherness among the cadres. For this purpose, each 
cadre was asked to share experiences, aspirations and even difficulty they face in 
regard with the party issues or personal problems. Through this sharing activity, the 
sense of togetherness and brotherhood (ukhuwwah) between the cadres is hoped to 
grow stronger.248 It is safe to say that halaqah functions both as political tools and 
medium to develop and maintain the spirit of brotherhood.  
Systematic cadrerization is put in place for a crucial reason; it implants the 
sense of loyalty for the cadres. The development of loyalty is conducted gradually 
through halaqah and other training subjects, during which issues of loyalty is an 
inseparable part. Loyalty to the party is based on the belief that the party is the vehicle 
to realize Islamic ideals, not merely a power-seeking medium. During the halaqah, the 
cadres are indoctrinated that the loyalty is to the cause, not to the figures. However, 
there is an established code of conduct to obey the party’s leadership that results in 
mono-loyalty. It has become an accepted tradition that the cadres should regard the 
leaders’ decision as the best policy for the party, because they are considered to have 
a better knowledge and commitment. In this regard, the loyalty to the party’s ideals is 
transferred to the loyalty to the party’s leadership. Hence, obedience toward the 
leader’s decision is a trademark of party’s membership.249 The loyalty to the party’s 
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leadership has effectively closed any chance of dual-loyalty. This would enable the 
party to maintain a chain of command within the party membership. Assisted by the 
party apparatus, the party’s leaders could maintain its position as the only authoritative 
body in managing aspects of party’s programs and activities. The cadres are to 
implement the decision and policy made by the party’s leadership. However, the 
obedience of the cadres is well-compensated by the leadership’s commitment toward 
the party’s procedure and ideology. In other words, the cadres owe their respect and 
obedience to the elites due to the latter’s commitment to the party’s ideals. Through 
the halaqah, both the elites and cadres control each other so that it helps both parties 
with their commitment toward the shared goals.  
B.   Social Engagement 
The party institutionalization that has greatly contributed to the organizational 
cohesion has important effects on the party’s political mobilization and expansion. The 
cohesiveness of the party structure has made PKS well-equipped to run election 
campaigns effectively despite a relative shortage of financial and socio-cultural 
resources. The PKS has adopted a campaign strategy to build regular and intimate 
contacts with electorates not only during elections, but also during nonelection periods. 
To this end, party cadres are committed to a range of welfare and social services on a 
regular basis as part of their duties.250 Such grassroots activism has helped to reinforce 
“caring” and “clean” images in the eyes of the electorates, factors that have contributed 
to the political expansion of PKS.251 
The party engagement in social activities and popular programs has a strategic 
value for the image of the party, and it also become a social or political investment for 
the party. When the party works hard for the people, it is natural if they would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 “Pemilu atau Tidak Pemilu, Aksi Sosial PKS Lanjut”, PK-Sejahtera Online, quoted in Kikue 
Hamayotsu, “The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party”, p. 987. 
251  See for instance, Edward Aspinall, “Elections and the Normalization of Politics in 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research 13: 2(July 2005), p. 128-131; Bubalo and Fealy, “Joining the 
Caravan?” p. 69; Syahrul Hidayat, “Moderation and the Stagnation of the PKS in the 2009 Legislative 
Election,” Democratization & New Voter Mobilization in Southeast Asia, LSE (London School of 
Economics and Political Science) IDEA Report, SR005(2010), 
www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/.  
	  	  
	  
84 
supportive to the party. This politics of welfare service (khidmat) can be considered as 
the advancement of the resource mobilization approach which further emphasizes the 
organizational structures and strategies devised by PKS as an alternative strategy to 
attract greater masses. By providing welfare services to the lower class of the 
community, this strategy is devised to build a sustained mass-party relationship. The 
politics of khidmat serves material and spiritual needs of underprivileged Muslim 
constituencies, which in turn not only helps the party to expand its support base, but 
also boosts the party image and commitment within the recipients at large. Among the 
cadres, the welfare service for underprivileged communities is framed as a “religious 
duty,” reminding them that the party is committed to the Sharia norms of helping out 
the needy people. In other words, the party commitment to welfare services keeps alive 
its religious image, and helps the party recruit new members into the movement, 
against the fact that the party elites are becoming more politically pragmatic.252 
There are at least two conditions that substantiate the value of politics of 
welfare services in attracting general people in the context of Indonesia’s electoral 
political system of democracy.  First, the weak legal enforcement has led to rampant 
money politics during intensive electoral competition. Opportunistic behavior and 
political apathy among the general electorates help the practice of money politics 
widespread and escalated especially during the heat of election days.253 Besides, voters 
are becoming more pragmatic and resistant towards party ideology; they care  more 
about whether a party could bring them welfare and material assistance.254 Second, the 
government ineffectiveness in delivering welfare service needed by the majority of the 
people, such as basic healthcare and good education, has left an open gap to be filled 
by social service providers. Especially since the late 1990s, welfare service provision 
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conducted by religious welfare movements has forged the link between the party and 
the masses.255 
Lacking the financial capital to engage in more competitive and expensive 
electoral politics, PKS capitalize its capability and capacity of social welfare provider 
to recruit and mobilize supporters. This provision is integrated into an essential 
component of da’wa program of building a caring and just society.256 Staffed with 
skilled and dedicated youth working within disciplined and adaptable organization, this 
social service and program become a key success of keeping the loyalty of their 
recipients to the da’wa movement. To expand its welfare service, the party establishes 
strategic coalitions with various Islamic non-governmental organizations, which make 
it capable to cut across class boundaries to forge a party-mass linkage. 
The special party’s office responsible to manage and mobilize the cadres to run 
the operation of welfare provision nationally at the grassroots is called Kesra (People’s 
Welfare). In the district level across the country, Kesra establishes service stations 
called Pras (Pos Rakyat Adil Sejahtera, People’s Justice and Prosperous Service 
Station), which provides services in health care and family consultation for the 
underprivileged. One of the services provided by Pras is free health care, which is 
especially popular among poorer communities neglected by the government. In 
districts with scarcity of doctors and health care experts, for instance, PKS deploys 
qualified personnel to provide free medical checkups and medication. Circumcision 
operations for Muslim boys or immunization for children are often held in coordination 
with local schools. In many remote areas, Pras dispatches doctors from among the 
party’s cadres with vehicles equipped with basic medical equipment. In the run-up to 
the 2009 legislative election, it is reported that the central board of PKS provided its 
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local branches with 467 health care service vehicles to facilitate the cadres for electoral 
campaign.257 
Social welfare provision is also provided by the women’s wing of the party 
called PWK (Pos Wanita Keadilan, Women’s Justice Station) whose task focuses on 
services targeted at housewives, mothers, and children. Depending on the local need 
and the availability of resources, the services provided include, but not limited to, 
donation of books and school materials, mobile libraries for children, parenting course, 
classes on home health care and baby nutrition. Various trainings, such as growing 
herbs, sewing, making cakes, catering, and handcrafting from recycled products are 
also provided to empower housewives with simple skill that enable them to earn 
moderate income for their household.258 Such social empowerment activism by female 
cadres of the party helps to build connection with people in the grassroots. More than 
a decade after its establishment in 2002, PWK have reached more than 45,000 
households nation-wide, and with more than 200 PWK, women cadres of the party 
manage to build close communication with families and communities untouched by 
the government development projects.259 
Strategic Coalition with Islamic NGOs 
Since political parties are not allowed to run charity foundations, PKS has to 
circumvent such institutional constraints by forging strategic coalitions with numerous 
Islamic civil society organizations. Functioning as PKS service brokers to deliver a 
range of social services across the archipelago, these NGOs are of crucial channels for 
the party to gain access to state-funding sources and projects as well as CSRs of private 
companies, domestic and abroad. From the political perspective, strategic coalition 
with religious NGOs is a means to penetrate society, especially the grassroots 
communities, and to minimize common suspicion and resistance among Muslim 
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communities towards political parties.260 Some well-known social organizations and 
foundations associated with PKS cadres include JSIT Indonesia (Jaringan Sekolah 
Islam Terpadu Indonesia, the Indonesian Network of Integrated Islamic Schools), 
Rumah Zakat (Islamic Charity House) and PKPU (Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat, 
National Humanitarian Foundation). The last two institutions, which have grown 
rapidly since the democratic transition, offer prominent examples of strategy of 
penetrating marginalized Muslim communities. Also, the expansion of these 
institutions indicates the PKS increasing penetration, both in urban and rural areas.261 
Established in 1993 by Fahmy Alaydrous, one of PKS founders, JSIT Indonesia 
is religious education movement that introduces a modern type of Islamic school 
emphasizing a comprehensive approach that incorporates both secular and religious 
curricula.262 Starting from only five Islamic primary schools in the area of Jabodetabek 
(Jakarta, and its surrounding areas of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi),263 the 
school network has now housed 1,926 schools, comprising of 879 
kindergartens/preschools, 723 elementary schools, and 324 high schools nationwide. 
The recent chair of JSIT, Sukro Muhab, reveals that JSIT was inspired by the party 
concern about secular system of national education that separate secular and religious 
subjects, and the JSIT expansion cannot be separated from the increasing demand of 
Muslim families to find schools that provided balanced system of education for their 
beloved children. Apart from conducting training for teachers and educational staff 
members, JSIT also establishes cooperation with internationally recognized 
institutions, such as International Center for Educational Excellence of Malaysia, 
Association for Academic Quality of Pakistan, Al-Irsyad and Al-Juneid Islamic School 
of Singapore, Smart Bestari of Thailand, and Khoirat Foundation of Turkey.264 
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A charity-based welfare foundation named Rumah Zakat (Zakat House) is also 
linked to PKS. Founded in 1998 by a PKS prominent figure, Abu Syauqi, Rumah Zakat 
(RZ) has developed into one of the largest zakat institutions in the country, running 28 
branches in Bandung alone, and delivering various innovative nationwide welfare 
programs for the poor. The program is categorized into six main fields, which is 
education, economic empowerment, health care, green environment, and charity. In 
the field of education, RZ helps students from underprivileged families with 
scholarship. For economic development, RZ provides micro financial support, together 
with one-year assistance and product development, to help small and micro enterprises 
stand on their feet. Health service is given for the needy which includes free maternity 
clinic, mobile clinic service and cataract surgery. Building water well and distributing 
clean water becomes a popular program of RZ that contributes to preserve the 
environment and maintain healthy life style. Last but not least, RZ also runs a special 
charity program during the month of Ramadan to put a smile on the face of the needy. 
This special program provides complete and nutritious menu for breaking the fast 
which is distributed to the targeted areas and communities.  
Rumah Zakat (RZ – Zakat House) has built a reputation as a leading Islamic 
philanthropy movement whose program is well known among both urban middle-class 
Muslims and the corporate sector, whose yearly donation amounts to 110 billion 
rupiahs, making RZ one of the biggest zakat collection management organizations in 
the country. In 2014, RZ achieved Top of Mind Zakat Management 2014 Award in 
Indonesian Middle-Class Brand Forum III held by SWA Magazine and Center for 
Middle-Class Consumer Studies for various assistances given to outermost areas in 
Indonesia. The adoption of modern technology and management has enable RZ to 
coordinate large-scale operations of humanitarian aids such as natural disaster relief 
programs and war victims. In 2013, for instance, RZ participate in aiding the victims 
of Mount Sinabung eruption and Haiyan thypoon in the Philippines and civil war in 
Rohingya.265 By helping and encouraging marginalized population to live in healthy, 
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dignified, and financially independent life, RZ has contributed to community-building 
and empowerment of the poor.  
Mass-Party Relations 
As discussed above, community service leads to community networks 
developed by the PKS functioning as a means of connecting the PKS cadres and their 
service beneficiaries in the grassroots to the party elite. Both cadres and sympathizers 
have built a collective identity that go beyond narrow class boundaries. Recruited 
mainly from educated middle class, the cadres provide leadership and services to their 
constituents and become the representatives of the party within the grassroots, while 
the service beneficiaries primarily coming from underprivileged lower-class 
communities provided a basis for the party electorates. In the long run, they are also 
expected to join into the rank of the party cadres and serve the da’wa movement 
program.266 The party frames this welfare service as an integral component of da’wa 
upon which the cadres should show commitment, and the service beneficiaries are 
expected to give their vote in return for the service they have received from the party 
cadres. The welfare programs conducted by the party cadres compensate the limitation 
on party’s financial capacity and on state bureaucracies’ access. With this welfare 
program, the party are able to penetrate directly into the ‘mind and heart’ of the 
electorates. By providing them with material and spiritual needs, the party has forged 
relatively solid party-mass relations at the grassroots. 
The party elite are fully aware that utilization of services provision for political 
and religious mobilization of the party does not entirely remove or limit the 
opportunistic behaviors among service recipients.267 To minimize the occurrence of 
commitment problem among pragmatic electorates, especially relating to the program 
involving financial fund, the party invents a mechanism of “communal responsibility.” 
This mechanism is designed to keep the service recipients attached to the party. The 
attachment to the party is possible by the obligation of the service recipients to form a 
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group of 10 to 15 members to take joint responsibility for managing their loans. For 
the success of the group, PKS cadres give supervision and hold regular group meeting 
to discuss various business and financial problems. With this cooperative scheme, the 
service recipients are enmeshed in the community-based network, and, it is hoped, 
become prospective supporters of the party.268 
Socioeconomic treatment of the party towards underprivileged communities 
provides the PKS elites an instrument to introduce, encourage and finally incorporate 
the service beneficiaries into the rank of party cadres. The process of this gradual 
process of recruitment and cadrization explains the pattern of the party mobilization. 
Through the regular meeting between the cadres and the people, in their homes or 
public places, such as village hall or mosques, the service recipients’ familiarity with 
the party programs and leadership is gradually increasing. The party acts as an anchor 
for members of the community who were previously isolated and vulnerable. Through 
service provision, the community familiarize themselves with the party activism.269 
The bond between these social segments of communities and the PKS cadres can be 
converted into social and political capital, ready to be utilized effectively during the 
campaign.  
The welfare services have become a part of the party strategy to expand its 
electoral base. The policy of gradual incorporation and mobilization of the people 
affiliated with the party’s socioeconomic network is also adopted in other social, 
religious, and educational institution linked to PKS. All the students, teachers and 
parents affiliated with school network of JSIT, for instance, will be fully coordinated 
and mobilized to support the party’s political programs. The efficacy of this 
socioeconomic treatment for the vertical mobility of the cadres can be observed by the 
mere fact that almost all female cadres securing legislative offices both at the national 
and sub-national levels originates from an activist committed with these community 
services. 
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The commitment and efforts of PKS cadres to welfare provision for the 
underprivileged have contributed to “clean and caring” (Bersih dan Peduli) images that 
account for the electoral rise of the party.270 Due to the party’s strategic emphasis on 
welfare services, and its commitment to the struggle of da’wa in building an Islamic 
society, the party finds the cadres supportive to the party program, even when they find 
that the leadership of the party has relaxed their Islamist ideals and engaged in 
pragmatic political maneuver. While reminding the cadres that PKS is still committed 
to da’wa, the party platform also reminds them that the cadres’ dedication to service 
and people’s welfare is a part of “religious duty.”  
C.   Ideological Framing and Opportunity Structure 
In theory and practice, the PKS is not simply a political party; the first and 
foremost it is a mass-based religious movement with the ultimate goal of propagating 
Islamic teachings and practices, and building a society submitting to the Islamic 
rulings. As a da’wa movement, the PKS strives to disseminate Islamic norms and 
values within its cadres and their family, and then society and government. Politics is 
only a means to fulfill the mission of da’wa. In this regard, the PKS was created as a 
political wing to carry out the da’wa mission. Accordingly, all of the party’s activism 
is framed under the notion of da’wa. PKS leaders particularly emphasize their political 
activism and social service as religious obligation (wajib) and service to the God 
(ibadah).  
This ideological framing approach is indeed helpful to explain the reason for 
devout Muslim youth to join the PKS in the first place. Religiously conscious Muslim 
youth were mainly attracted to the activism of the PKS that is framed as a religious 
duty. 271  There are socio-political conditions accounting for the appeal of PKS’ 
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religious ideology among young urban Muslims, especially students at many secular 
universities such as university of Indonesia (UI) or Bandung Institute of Technology 
(ITB). The first condition is sociological. In a sociological perspective, university 
students from all over Indonesia who come to Jakarta or other metropolitan cities found 
themselves in unfamiliar settings. In this situation, they need a social anchor for 
bonding andsecurity. They find PKS’ religious training and activities attractive and 
fulfilling, not only for their personal moral guidance but also for social networking.272 
From the political perspective, these post-authoritarian Muslim generations are 
exposed to the ideas of democracy, and eager to make a political and social change. 
These devout Muslim youths found in the PKS prominent figures who were active in 
campus da’wa movement that led the students in a mass-demonstration to topple down 
the “un-Islamic” New Order regime in 1998.273 They were considered as representative 
voices of new generation of pious Muslim that struggled to bring fundamental change 
in the socio-political landscape of post-Soeharto regime. Regardless of their 
backgrounds, these socio-politically conscious new generations of Muslim youth felt 
attracted to the ideology of the party established by these campus da’wa activists who 
consider their involvement in socio-political arena as driven by religious duty as 
Muslims. 
The PKS did not limit its membership to any certain socio-religious 
background. Both traditionalists (associated with the NU) and modernists (associated 
with Muhammadiyah) are welcome to join the party. In fact, there is no clear 
association between the PKS and certain socio-religious stream, nor factionalism along 
socio-religious line in term of cadres’ promotion and leadership succession. Although 
the party tends to attract more members from modernist background, numerous cadres 
of the party come from traditionalist background, the most prominent of which is Irfan 
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Asy’ari Sudirman, widely known by his nick name Ipang Wahid, the oldest son of 
Solahudin Wahid, Abdurrahman Wahid’s younger brother. It is true that in its initial 
stage, the party has a relatively narrow social constituency; mostly from among pious, 
educated, young professionals and students from urban lower-middle-class of 
metropolitan cities, especially in Jakarta and its surrounding satellite cities such as 
Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. However, general policy of party recruitment is 
not concerned with the socio-religious background of the cadres.  
Starting from only 60,000 cadres in 1999, PKS’ membership has grown 
steadily and registered more than thirteen-fold to more than 800 thousand cadres in 
2014. Over the years, the PKS has expanded its membership beyond its traditional 
urban constituencies into areas long-known as the PKB stronghold, such as Central 
and East Java. The PKS’ inroads into the PKB communities cannot be separated from 
the sustained efforts by the party’s cadres in emphasizing the similarity and avoiding 
the differences regarding the ritual practices. The allegation is often made that PKS 
rejects the NU devotional practices, such as tahlilan, yasinan, and 
mauludan.274Through the bayanatof Sharia Council of PKS on 21 October 2008, the 
party refuted the allegation and sought to clarify that the PKS is religiously moderate. 
As a party and religious movement, the PKS does not adhere to some certain Islamic 
ritual practices. According to the bayanat, the practice of tahlilan, yasinan, and 
mauludan is not a principle issue of religion; it is merely a matter of khilafiyah (opinion 
differences) and the unity of umma should be taken precedence over differences. 
Instead of rejecting these ritual practices, the PKS considered the practices a good 
tradition and a part of cultural da’wa that should be preserved. The bayanat also 
mentions list of the party’s figures who have the NU family background, such as Nur 
Mahmudi Ismail, Hidayat Nurwahid, Surahman Hidayat, and Muslih Abdul Karim. 
The PKS claim of close connection with the NU tradition proves beneficial for the 
party expansion in the PKB strongholds.   
In addition to the appeal of the party ideological framing, growing number of 
state offices is also a strong reason for politically ambitious religious youth to join the 
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PKS. Their commitment to the party cause is not without any political reward. The 
opportunity to higher political career for any potential cadres is open wide, especially 
with the existence of numerous provincial and district election, both legislative and 
executive. This institutional structure has allowed the party to provide the politically 
ambitious cadres an access to the state corridor in return for their commitment to the 
party and service to the society. Each cadre has an equal opportunity to win the office, 
which is a natural step for the potential party’s leaders to conduct da’wa in a wider 
arena.  
The decentralization program starting in 2001 witnessed the allocation of more 
power to locals where the government approved the mounting aspiration of the locals 
to form new provinces and regencies. This institutional change happened at the same 
time when the PKS was in its stage of organizational expansion. In 1999, there are only 
26 provinces and 300 districts, but now there are 34 provinces and 514 districtsacross 
the archipelago. The increased number of public offices means a bigger opportunity 
for the cadres to fight and win the offices. For the PKS, direct elections at various sub-
national levels introduced in 2005 offered good opportunity for mobilizing and 
promoting qualified young cadres. Until 2014 the PKS has succeeded in securing 4 
provincial offices and 26 district offices. Provinces won by PKS cadres include North 
Sumatera, West Sumatera, West Java, and North Maluku. In this regard, Anis Matta 
claimed that the PKS have won 10 per cent of the provincial election and since all the 
four provinces are populated by 60 million people, he further claimed that the PKS 
have led 25 per cent of Indonesian population.275 
Not only promoting its own young cadres for the governor or mayor 
candidature, the PKS also openly supports many young figures from other parties. 
Zainul Majdi of Democrat Party, for instance, was supported by the PKS and elected 
as the youngest governor in Indonesiaat the age of 36. Previously, the governor of West 
Java from the PKS, Ahmad Heryawan, was at his 41 in the time of the election. Both 
cases have motivated and inspired other ambitious young cadres of the PKS to follow 
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suit. It is safe to say that without the decentralization process and its ramification, such 
as the more election and availability of state offices, it is unlikely that the PKS could 
achieve such a rapid organizational expansion. For the PKS, this opportunity structure 
serves well the leadership training program of the party, and provides a wider 
opportunity for the cadres to pursue their political career in the government offices. 
However, this institutional change may become a source of friction among the party 
cadres, since the party sometime forms coalition with other parties to nominate non-
cadres that have a better chance to win for the local offices.  
D.   Political Moderation and Electoral Gain 
PKS has slowly expanded its constituency against the background of the 
challenge from nationalist parties and competition from other Islamists. This obstacle 
from both ends of the political spectrum has left PKS little room for maneuver. The 
party has well-grounded evidence from the electoral history of Islamic parties that the 
truly Islamic constituency is always a minority. Historically, the combined electoral 
gain of Islamic parties never exceeds 40 percent of the total votes. The party elites also 
believe that the shift toward more moderate and pragmatic political positions that 
would appeal to the large median voters is one key to political success. To gain 
widespread inroads into the center, PKS has to repackage its Islamist agenda and focus 
more on non-Islamist issues.  
The party’s effort to move toward the center of the political spectrum was 
driven by a desire to increase the votes and the pursuit of public offices. PKS shifted 
toward the center for the purpose of winning the election. For the party with an Islamist 
agenda, the move to the center means the sacrifice of some aspects of its ideological 
standpoint as a political requisite to initiate centripetal tendencies of gaining wider 
popular support and integrating the party into the democratic system. Despite its 
political necessity, adaptation of moderate ideology may not an easy option; it could 
potentially create internal conflicts within the party and confusion among party’s core 
members and potential supporters in the election. The PKS leadership realizes that to 
be a “big” party, sustained effort to capture the politico-religious center should be done. 
While the party leadership is convinced with the idea that moderation is necessary for 
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power, the purist groups within the party, both among Tarbiyah founders and the core 
base, prefer that the party stay true to its origin and reinforce its commitment to its 
Islamist base. 
In February 2008, PKS elites declared that the party is inclusive and also 
nationalist, ready to accept different groups and faiths into the party membership. The 
policy was taken as the party has set a target of 20 percent of the vote in the upcoming 
election on 8 July 2009, which would enable the party to nominate presidential 
candidate from its own cadre. However, the election results dashed the hope of the 
party leadership; the party only made a half per cent (0.48 per cent) increase in votes 
vis-à-vis 2004, with a decrease of total number of votes from 8,325,020 to 8,204,946, 
slightly decreased by 120,074 votes. For the purist wing of the party, the electoral gain 
of the party indicated that the leadership’s effort to capture the median voters has failed, 
and at the same time the “open party” strategy has failed the expectation of many 
potential supporters who started to see that the party has abandon its idealism and 
turned to look like other parties.  
The data from the 2009 and 2014 elections shows two significant trends for the 
party: the decrease support from among the traditional voters of the party, and the 
inroads into new communities. The first trend can be found in Jakarta, West Java and 
Banten, where the party used to get a majority votes in the previous election. Jakarta 
showed a sharpest decline of support; from 1,057,256 votes in 2004 to 726,356 and 
424,400 in 2009 and 2014 respectively. It is a drop from 37 percent, to 18 per cent and 
then 10 percent of the votes.  
A similar loss was also witnessed in West Java, the birthplace of the Tarbiyah 
movement, where the party lost 343,476 votes in 2009 and again 122,207 votes in 
2014. In Banten, the electoral gain of the party decreased from 520,202 in 2004, to 
422,275 in 2009, and 379,328 in 2014; a decrease by 97,927 and 113,787 in 2009 and 
2014 respectively vis-à-vis 2004. By contrast, the party made an increase in East Java 
and Central Java, by 260,043 and 236,022 votes, respectively in 2009 and 105,535 and 
1,140 votes in 2014. While the Party has made inroads into new rural communities, the 
decline in total votes in traditional strongholds of Jakarta, West Java, and Banten shows 
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that the strategy to be the “party for all” (partai kita semua) cost the party its vote in 
its traditional bases. Efforts to moderate the party have had a consequence for the 
electoral gain of the party.  
Conclusion  
The political survival and expansion of the PKS in the Muslim democracy of 
Indonesia have much to do with the party’s organizational cohesion. This achievement 
defies common assumption that Islamist ideology would harm the party’s survival in 
light of Indonesia’s secular state as well as moderate Islamic tradition. The party 
cohesion and well-institutionalized machinery are responsible to the party’s 
ideological adjustment to moderate its Islamist agenda without causing serious 
political rifts within the party. The ability of party leaders to provide organizational 
structure and ideological instrument in order to mobilize targeted constituencies also 
contributes to the expansion of the party membership. These organizational structures 
and mechanism provide fair and institutionalized opportunities that enable young 
qualified members to achieve political careers both in the organization and in the 
corridors of state power. In short, institutionalized organizational structures become 
the key of survival. 
PKS has well-established organizational characteristics that resemble those of 
merit-based well-institutionalized parties around the world. The party recruitment 
system based on the merit-based assessment has strengthened the cadres’ dependency 
on the system, not on personal relationship. This meritocratic recruitment system 
secures the cadres’ loyalty to the party, because they believe that the career promotion 
will depend more on individual efforts rather than an elites’ exclusive 
recommendation. In this situation, dependence on certain figures for the promotion is 
kept in a minimum. This merit system eventually contributes to the cadre’s 
performance and professionalism, and reduces the favoritism. 
The process of party’s recruitment accelerates following the institutional 
change in Indonesian democracy. The aggressive democratization and decentralization 
has created numerous elections in the local level, hence the increasing availability of 
executive and legislative offices. This “opportunity structure” allows the party to work 
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hard and win as many state offices as possible to meet the political ambition of the 
politically ambitious cadres that they have recruited. To some extent, the relative 
success of the recruitment and mobilization is explained by “ideological framing,” that 
is, the party’s ability to frame its social and political activism as religious duty. The 
PKS cadres are indeed initially inducted into the organization through religious 
activism and service. As a da’wa party, PKS urges its cadres to involve in welfare 
provision, propagated as “religious duty.” This distinctive community-building 
strategy is designed to attract the service recipients into the reach of the party, and also 
to bind the cadres and sympathizers with the party elites. By direct involvement in 
community development and social service, the cadres have forged relatively solid 
party-mass relations at the grassroots, and have provided the party with community 
networks mainly in the urban areas and recently also in rural areas. The social welfare 
strategy is undoubtedly designed to reinforce the party’s image as “clean and caring.” 
Moreover, for the purpose of party cohesiveness, the social program also functions as 
a reminder for the cadres that the party is still committed to da’wa, as a struggle to 
realize justice and equity for all people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DA’WA AND POLITICS 
 
This chapter examines the interplay between da’wa and politics in democratic 
Indonesia. How da’wa is conducted in the political setting of the country and why PKS 
uses da’wa in politics constitute the main focus. The chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first section will explain a rationale of engaging da’wa in politics. Related 
issues, such as the importance and goals of parliamentary da’wa (da’wa fi al-
hukumah), and the meaning of da’wa in politics will also be discussed. The second 
section will be devoted to the analysis of the struggle of the party in conducting da’wa. 
Specifically, this section attempts to scrutinize the importance of da’wa for the political 
agenda of the party, the avenue as well as the nature of da’wa of the party, and the 
relation between da’wa and Sharia implementation. Good understanding about these 
issues will provide better insight into the strategies and attitude of the party in 
implementing Sharia in democratic Indonesia that will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. The discussion about how the party evaluates and understands the result of the 
recent election of 2014, as well as its meaning and relation to the work of da’wa, will 
be presented in the last section of the chapter. 
A.   Engaging Da’wa in Politics 
Da’wa has become well-established as the raison d’etre of PKS.  Practical 
politics is seen to constitute but one locus of da’wa. The establishment of the party 
should be seen as a necessary tool for da’wa in political arena.276 Within PKS circles, 
a politician is also a missionary (Arabic: da‘i, pl. du‘at) at the same time. In the 
evangelical PKS worldview, when it comes to da’wa, there is no difference between a 
politician and a preacher or a farmer; they are all burdened with the same obligation of 
calling and inviting people to the cause of Islam. Regardless the occupation and social 
or educational background, all cadres of PKS are trained to be individuals with the 
passion for da’wa. According to Thohari, PKS parliamentarian of Purworejo regency, 
every cadre of PKS has a duty of da’wa according to his or her capacity and level of 
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authority. Following this logic, just like a preacher conducting da’wa on the pulpit, 
PKS cadres in executive and legislative branches of the state have thus an inherent duty 
of conducting da’wa in the parliament. This form of da’wa is known within PKS cadres 
as parliamentary da’wa (da’wa fi al-hukumah).  
For Thohari, the task of a parliamentarian in the house of consultative assembly 
is similar to that of a preacher on the pulpit, in which both use their persuasive 
communication skills to deliver goodness for the people. However, he continues, the 
impact of their da’wa is different; while preaching in the pulpit can only reach hundreds 
of people and his sermon has no binding power, regulations promulgated by the 
members of legislative body can reach and bind millions. Therefore, in order to be 
effective and successful, Najamuddin, PKS parliamentarian of Bogor, West Jave, 
believes that da’wa needs power and authority. This is exactly something that makes 
PKS, as a da’wa party, different from other parties: it brings da’wa into politics, and 
uses politics to advance Islamic norms.277 
“Whoever witnesses evil, use your hand to change it. If you are not powerful 
enough, use your tongue, and if you are unable to speak up, just deny it in your heart” 
is the popular saying of the prophet that is invariably used to encourage the party cadres 
to become involved in parliamentary da’wa through legislative and executive body of 
the state, where they can exercise power and authority. Once they succeed in capturing 
the power, they are obliged to use it to enjoin good and prohibit evil, which is actually 
the essence of da’wa.278 Through parliamentary da’wa, for instance, PKS cadres can 
introduce Sharia norms into the state law.279 
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Article 3 of the Article of Association of the party states that da’wa at state 
level aims at realizing universal goodness, such as justice, prosperity, security, and 
good governance. This article points out that working hard to realize universal norms 
through the instrumentalities of the state is considered as a part of da’wa cause. 
Interestingly enough the party leaders believe that the most viable tool and system to 
realize these goals is democracy. Implicit in this statement is that democratic system is 
not a hindrance for the implementation of Sharia norms; it is actually a means to realize 
them, and Sharia norms can thrive within democratic state.280 
PKS involvement in democracy is not without a risk; PKS has been accused of 
being excluded from the path of da’wa and of being a power-chaser.281 Merely due to 
the ijtihad of forming a party and promoting democracy, PKS is conceived as being 
casual to the struggle of Shariatization. 282  Refuting the accusation that PKS has 
betrayed its da’wa cause and abandoned Sharia, Thohari has this to say:  
“Indonesia has chosen democracy as the system of politics. We cannot deny 
that fact. All we can do is to conduct da’wa within this system. It will be 
counterproductive to work against the agreed system of democracy. … we 
would like to work within the system. So far, we have joined in the process of 
democracy and gained power in some areas. It is very obvious for everybody 
to see that all of the regents and governors of PKS as well as the 
parliamentarians are working within the system. … our agenda is to implement 
Sharia norms within the system.”  
There remains the accusation that PKS uses democracy only to capture power, 
and once in power, the party will hijack democracy and substitute it with khilafah, an 
Islamic system of government.283 According to PKS common opinion, this allegation 
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is far from reality, hence baseless and only good for media coverage. On the contrary, 
PKS believes that democratic mechanism is a necessary tool for the party to deliver its 
da’wa. Democratic attitude of the party is shown in its participation and contribution 
to the process of democratization of the country.284 Similar response is voiced by 
Surahman Hidayat, a head of PKS National Council of Sharia, who points to the fact 
that some cadres of PKS are elected governors or mayors in West Java, Depok and 
South Halmahera for the second tenure, and none of them works against democracy. 
In his opinion, this fact shows that PKS leadership would not end up in turning over 
democracy, as some observers may predict about the involvement of Islamist parties 
into the system of democracy.285 
It has been a matter of firm conviction within PKS circles that the party does 
not have any problem with democracy, because it does not contradict Sharia; both are 
not antithetical. According to Ahmad Heryawan, a leading figure of PKS who is also 
a governor of West Java, to say that Sharia contradicts democracy, or vice versa, is a 
misleading remark. To substantiate his position, he points to the fact that Indonesia is 
now the third-largest democracy in the world, and the majority of Indonesians are 
Muslims. Ahmad Heryawan continues that PKS has also practiced democracy in 
electing its leaders, and has joined several elections since its establishment. 286 
However, it is important to note that Sharia, for the party, is much more comprehensive 
than democracy. While the first regulates all aspects of life, ranging from private to 
public, from sacred to mundane, and from ethics to law, the later concerns only on 
issues about governing the people living in a particular country. In other words, 
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286  Relevant studies confirm Heryawan’s statement. See for instance, Ahmad Ali Nurdin, 
“PKS’ Democratic Experiences in Recruiting Members and Leaders,” Al-Jamiah, Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 329-
360. 
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democracy is only a system in running the state, while Sharia covers not only principles 
regulating human relation in social and political life (mu’amalah), but it also consists 
a guidance to worship God (íbadah). Thus, efforts to make apple-to-apple comparison 
between the two will not do justice to Sharia. In other words, democracy is of lesser 
importance when one compared to Sharia. Implicit in this statement is the superiority 
of Sharia over democracy. However, this line of thought does not necessarily translate 
into an agenda or political action of removing democracy and substituting it with 
Islamic governmental system.  
In a monochromatic perspective, Jamal Lulail, PKS leader in Malang, East 
Java, understands democracy as a tool to present fairly the struggle between good and 
bad. In a democratic system, he asserts, both proponents of good and bad are given an 
equal chance to manage their affairs. In this contest between good and bad, people are 
granted with the freedom to choose. A popular dictum la ikrah fi al-din (there is no 
compulsion in religion) guarantees this freedom, and all parties should play fair. A 
party who losses the contest in a democratic process should wait for the next round. 
What happened in Egypt in the aftermath of Arab Spring, according to Jamal Lulail, is 
the example of unfairness. He explains further that military regimes just cannot wait to 
capture the power. Not only unfair, for him, military coup in Egypt is an example of 
treachery against democracy. Quoting the quranic verse (17:81 reads “ja al-haq wa 
zahaqa al-bathil, inna al-bathil kana zahuqa”) regarding the battle between good and 
bad, he substantiates the idea that the good comes to remove the evil). He also quotes 
the famous saying: al-haq bi la nizam yaghlibuh al-batil bi al-nizam, meaning that 
poorly-managed goodness will be defeated by well-managed evil. Relating this popular 
saying to the political reality, Jamal Lulail asserts that Mursi came to power purely by 
democratic election, but he does not have a good managerial skill to run the country, 
and fails in running the state. Compared to Mursi, Erdogan of Turkey is perceived by 
him as having an excellent skill in managing people conflicting interests, so he can 
survive political turbulence. Needless to say, these observations were recorded well 
before Erdogan’s recent authoritarian turn. 
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B.   Da’wa Before Daulah (Islamic State) 
One of the functions of political party is to navigate da’wa in the state level. As 
agents of da’wa, PKS cadres are encouraged to equip themselves with skills and 
capabilities to engage da’wa through the parliament.287 Political party is a tool for the 
cadres to learn and train themselves in matters relating to state management. Before 
aiming at the state, the cadres are prepared to conduct da’wa within their household 
and community. Only after succeeding in conducting da’wa within the community, as 
the small unit of the state, that the PKS cadres are considered well-prepared to hold a 
bigger responsibility to conduct parliamentary da’wa.288 With this in mind, da’wa 
should be conducted in a gradual and systematic fashion. Fahmi Fuad is of the opinion 
that da’wa should precede the establishment of daulah (Islamic state). For this reason, 
he is critical toward individuals or groups which demand the reestablishment of 
caliphate and formalization of Sharia without making serious preparation for managing 
good government. He asserts that such a demand also neglects political landscape and 
social fabric of the country, as well as the complexity of the ummah, and is thus 
tantamount to wishful thinking. Commenting on such a demand, Fahmi Fuad expresses 
his strong opinion:  
“To those who can only talk loud about implementing Sharia and establishing 
khilafah, but lack action, I challenge them with this question, ‘what have you 
done so far to walk the talk?’ Talking is easy, but walking the talk is hard.”  
Implicit in this rhetoric question is the struggle and work of PKS in realizing 
its political goal through da’wa, including the predicaments and challenges the party 
had to face along the way of da’wa. In order to gain a better understanding about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Hilmi Aminuddin, the previous head of PKS Deliberative Council (Majlis Shura), names 
the cadres in the parliament as junud al-da’wa (the soldiers of da’wa), who should equip themselves 
with any skill needed to win the battle. See Hilmi Aminuddin, Menegakkan Kepemimpinan Dakwah, 
Sekertariat Jendderal DPP PKS Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, 2012, p. 113-150. 
288 For a snapshot of PKS parliamentarians’ daily activities in their effort to implement Islamic 
norms, see Hepi Andi Bastoni and Syaiful Anwar, Penjaga Nurani Dewan. Lebih Dekat Dengan 45 
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party’s da’wa activities in implementing Sharia and Islamizing society, discussion 
about the predicaments, challenges, avenues and strategies of da’wa follows. 
Finding Equilibrium 
In the work of da’wa, everything starts with individuals. Individual awareness 
of the ideals of Islam and Sharia should be improved through Tarbiyah (systematic 
education on Islamic ideals), defined as a movement which preaches Islam as a total 
way of life, and which began to gain ground on Indonesian campuses in the 1970s.289 
Since an attempt to a comprehensive implementation of Sharia is considered a utopia, 
PKS aims instead to raise the bar of people awareness, understanding and acceptance 
of Sharia norms, and draw them as close as possible to the idealism of Islam.290 
According to Jamal Lulail, the da’wa to the cause of Islam is a negotiating process 
between idealism and pragmatism; when idealism meets pragmatism, then the point of 
equilibrium is achieved. 
It is a common conviction among PKS circles that Sharia norms needs to be 
implemented by taking into the account the level of people’s readiness, awareness and 
understanding. Knowing so well the varied level of people’s commitments to Sharia, 
PKS avoids using a top-down approach in implementing Sharia.291 With this in mind, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Discussion on the Tarbiyah movement is elaborated in details in some scholarly works 
including: Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among 
Youth in Bandung, Indonesia, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006; Salman, “The Tarbiyah Movement: Why 
People Join This Indonesian Contemporary Islamic Movement?” in Studia Islamika, Vol. 13, 2006, p. 
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Justice Party, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008. 
290 Hilmi Aminuddin, Bekal untuk Kader Dakwah, DPP PKS Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, 2012, 
p. 114-118. 
291 Rather than PKS, implementation of Sharia-inspired regulation has been urged by Golkar 
and other secular parties as a strategy to demonstrate their concern and commitment to Islamic affairs. 
However, while the party has not proposed Sharia by-laws, it has not opposed them. See Robin Bush, 
“Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Sympton?” in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), 
Expressing Islam, Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, p. 174-191, and 
Michael Buehler, “The Rise of Shari’a By-Laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing 
Pattern of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption,” in South East Asia Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
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PKS tries to strike the balance between the ideals and the reality, by relaxing the 
rigorous Sharia agenda of the party and at the same time raising the bar of people 
awareness towards Sharia through education (Tarbiyah). The majority of PKS leaders 
are well aware that this middle strategy does not come without criticism. The PKS 
flexibility toward Sharia leads fundamentalist and radical groups to perceive the party 
as being casual in its attitude toward Sharia,292 while at the same time its consistency 
to practice Sharia norms has made the party an extremist in the eyes of the secular and 
liberal groups.293 
PKS identifies that the biggest challenge to the effort of Sharia implementation 
is the internal factor of the umma itself. In term of Sharia implementation, there is a 
gap between expectation and reality of the umma. Islamist Individuals, groups or 
parties have often mistakenly believed that the mere number of Muslims in Indonesia 
will entail substantial support for the implementation of Sharia and the establishment 
of Islamic state.294 On the contrary, the history of political Islam in Indonesia shows 
that attempts to incorporate Sharia into the constitution, as a legal basis for the 
establishment of Islamic state, end in failure.295 PKS’ strategy ofthe implementation of 
Sharia is not by imposing it to the people, but rather it should be carried out voluntarily. 
Accordingly, good knowledge, awareness, and understanding of Sharia should be in 
place before the state could impose Sharia upon the people. It is for this very reason 
that PKS works slowly but surely in preparing and educating the people to live under 
the Sharia. It is no wonder that da’wa should take a gradual and simultaneous way, by 
directing people to live according to Sharia norms, which starts from individuals (islah 
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292 “Syariah Tak Laku?” in Al-Wa’ie, No. 105, Tahun IX, 1-31 Mei 2009, p. 9-13. 
293 See Zuly Qodir, HTI dan PKS Menuai Kritik: Perilaku Gerakan Islam Politik Indonesia, 
Bantul: Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 2013; “Azyumardi 
Azra: Penerapan Syariat Bisa Kontraproduktif,” in Islamlib.com, 5 August 2001; Lutfi Assyaukanie, 
“Berkah Sekularisme,” Islamlib.com, 11 April 2005. 
294 Mark Woodward, Ali Amin, Inayah Rohmaniyah and Chris Lundry, “Getting culture: a new 
path for Indonesia’s Islamist Justice and Prosperity party?” Consortium for Strategic Communication, 
Arizona State University, 2011, p. 4-5. 
295 See Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate” Journal 
of South Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2005, p. 419-440. 
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al-fard), then families and communities (islah al-usrah wa al-mujtama), and finally 
the government (islah al-hukumah).296 
PKS gradual step of da’wa dictates that before the state could be Islamized, 
individuals should at least govern themselves by Sharia norms.297 This is the first step 
of the journey to the establishment of an Islamic state. In other words, the long journey 
to establish Islamic state starts with building individual awareness, as the frequently 
cited tarbiyah motto states: “establish the state of Islam in your own self,” meaning 
that if we are not capable of establishing Islamic system of government, then at least 
we govern ourselves by the Sharia norms. 
Islamic State: Substances, not Labels 
It is repeatedly mentioned by PKS leaders that name and label are not 
important. What matters is the substance. As it applies to Sharia implementation, it 
also applies to the establishment of Islamic state. According to Mohammad Yasin, the 
head of PKS Sharia Council of West Sumatera, Islamic state is a country run by 
Muslim democrats who have commitment to the implementation of Islamic norms, 
such as eradicating corruption, improving public education, empowering women, 
dispensing justice and delivering prosperity, in the life of the people.298 He further 
asserts that a true Islamic government will not implement Sharia only in a formalistic 
way, let alone only a name or label, at the expense of the substance. About the 
difference between an Islamic and a non-Islamic government, he has this to say:    
“We should struggle for comprehensive implementation of Sharia norms, i.e. 
both formally and substantially. We cannot divorce justice from Sharia rules, 
for instance. So, it is not considered a struggle for Islam when we implement 
Sharia law of hudud (criminal laws) but at the same time we are also repressive, 
authoritarian and doing injustice towards others. I dare to say that governments 
such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, is not at all Islamic, because they are not hesitant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296  Muhammad Sa’id, “Hatmiyah At-Tarbiyah: Tarbiyah Suatu Kemestian,” in Tarbiyah 
Berkelanjutan, Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2003, p. 50. See also PK-Sejahtera.org, 22 August 2002, 
cited in Yon Machmudi, 2006, p. 205-206. 
297 Yon Machmudi, p. 199. 
298 By adopting the national and democratic rhetoric, the party struggles in creating a new 
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and Party Transformation. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in Perspective,” in Peter Burnell 
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to eliminate political enemies or restrain the rights of women. Both countries 
are violating universal norms of Sharia, such as justice and freedom, which 
makes them unislamic.”  
This opinion is also shared by Fahmi Fuad, in which he states: 
“We do not need Islam only as a label on the state polity. What we are badly in 
need of is the state that implements Islamic values. As long as the state 
promotes Islamic values, the label we put onto the state, whether Islamic or 
United Republic of Indonesia [NKRI], is no longer relevant. Take a look at 
Turkey. We should look upon Turkey as an excellent example of a state which 
promotes Sharia norms and struggle for the glory of Islam.” 
The history of Islamic government is often cited to substantiate the argument 
that Islam does not command its adherents to follow a particular system of government. 
History of leadership in Islam shows us that the system of succession in Muslim 
communities varied from one generation to the other. It is due to the fact that the 
prophet Muhammad did not leave any specific instruction on how the succession of 
leadership (khilafah) should be conducted. He left it to the ummah to invent the 
mechanism of succession and government by taking into consideration the context of 
their time and place. For this very reason, Islamic history of leadership shows us that 
the khalifahs (heads of state) were elected in various modes of succession, but it did 
not include yet the process of general election as we know today in a democratic 
system, because the system is not known until the modern era.299 This is not to say that 
democracy is not Islamic, or Islam gives no room for democracy. Even though a fully-
fledged concept of the state is absent in the Quran and prophetic tradition (sunna), 
Islam does provide a set of ethical values of political principles, such as justice (‘adl), 
consultation (shurâ), and egalitarianism (musâwâ). Since the current form of the 
Indonesian nation state, with Pancasila as its ideological basis, is sufficient to 
accommodate the realization of those Islamic socio-political injunctions, the 
Indonesian nation state deserves religio-political legitimacy from and acceptance by 
Muslims.300 The fact that these principles have not been fully realized, should not be a 
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The History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet to the Present, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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reason to transform the national unitary character of the state. Efforts to reinstate those 
principles should be carried out within the framework of the present ideological 
construct of the state.  Furthermore, the concern of the state with the implementation 
and development of religious values is considered to be the gradual evolution of the 
state into a ‘religious state’ without having to become a “theological state” which is 
constitutionally base on certain formal religious institutions. The acceptance of the 
current form of the state has also been strengthened by the Muslim favorable 
perception of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Both the ideological and 
constitutional foundations are perceived to reflect the substance of Islamic 
teachings.301 
Historically speaking, Muslims throughout the world have not seen or lived 
under the system of khilafa after the dissolution of Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1924. 
Reestablishment of khilafa has often become a political goal for Islamist parties or 
groups.302 The phenomenon of ISIS has drawn worldwide attention, because despite 
all of its atrocities and brutality, ISIS labels its movement with Islam and brings Islamic 
symbols and institutions of great magnitude, namely Islamic state. This issue has 
created apprehension among PKS leader.303 Far from being a state governed by the 
abovementioned principles of democracy, a sudden emergence of ISIS, according to 
Thohari and Jamal Lulail, is nothing but a conspiracy to discredit Muslims and political 
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Islam. For Thohari, ISIS is not a representation of true Islam or Islamic state, even 
though they used the label of Islam and Islamic state as a justification for their action. 
Representing the opinion of PKS cadres, Thohari maintains that the ISIS case is 
designed to associate Islam and political Islam with terrorism. As he perceives it, wide 
media coverage on the terrorist acts carried out by ISIS will give the strong impression 
in the people’s mind about the danger of political Islam and what the Islamic state will 
actually do to the world. According to Thohari, the case of ISIS is used as an effective 
means for media to discourage people from any participation in and from something 
associated with political Islam. Jamal Lulail also shares the same opinion that PKS is 
not worried about the impact of ISIS on the national security, but he has a deep concern 
on the impact ISIS could have on the image of political Islam in Indonesia. Regarding 
this concern, he further states:  
“Moderate Muslim groups often [felt to] become a victim of discredit, because 
they have concern on politics, economy, social and cultural issues. The war of 
ideas has always been in place between Islam and the West. They are not 
worried about Muslims going to mosque for praying or to Mecca for 
pilgrimage. But once Muslims talk about politics and economy, they will sound 
the alarm. This is what we call ghazwul fikr (war of ideas). The recent 
phenomenon of ISIS, for instance, is no more than a product of ghazwul fikr to 
discredit Islam and Muslims, by depicting these as brutal, violent, uncivilized, 
and terrorist. Muslim individuals and groups then become the target of 
accusation, by associating them as affiliated with ISIS. If ISIS is a genuine 
Islamic state, we wonder why they do not act to help Palestine.”  
By this statement, Jamal Lulail has turned the case of ISIS into the issue of 
liberating Palestine from what he calls a Zionist colonialism. It is not surprising that 
the issue of solidarity to the Palestinian cause resurfaces following the emergence of 
ISIS. Adhered to many PKS leaders, such a statement describes well the party’s 
position on foreign affairs relating to the issue of Palestine. In his bold statement about 
ISIS and terrorism, Thohari opinion will make it clear the position of PKS on the global 
issue of terrorism, and the party foreign policy that has a strong anti-Israeli discourse:   
“Islam as I understand it would not conform what ISIS is doing. Killing people 
for no reason, let alone your Muslim brothers, is strictly prohibited in Islam. 
ISIS is a new phenomenon which is described as a threat to the world. My only 
concern is that this issue will be engineered to become another form of 
accusation against Muslim groups as did the issue of terrorism. If this is about 
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terrorism, what is the substance of terrorism? Who is the real terrorist? Are the 
fighters of Gaza in Palestine considered terrorists while the Zionist colonials 
are not?”  
 
People’s Sovereignty    
For the time being, as a party PKS is not yet talking about an Islamic state 
(daulah Islamiyah) in the Indonesian context, they argue, there is no need to campaign 
for an Islamic state. Establishing an Islamic state is considered as too far a goal. 
According to Abdul Ghofar, PKS parliamentarian of Solo, Central Java, what is more 
crucial and also obviously very viable, is to educate people about their religion so they 
will have a good awareness about their religious duties. He calculates that when 
Muslims practice their religion, they will automatically practice Sharia; when Muslims 
understand the goodness of Sharia, there will come a time when they will demand that 
the government implement Sharia for them. 304  The phenomenon of popularity of 
headscarves among Muslim women is taken as an example for this case, i.e. the 
increasing awareness of Muslim about Sharia, to which Abdul Ghofar gives his 
opinion: 
“Nowadays it is very common to find Muslim women wearing scarf 
voluntarily. There is neither regulation nor fatwa forcing them to wear scarf. I 
am convinced that when da’wa is diligently delivered to the people, the 
establishment of Islamic state will automatically follow.”  
Implicit in this statement is that Islamic symbols, such as the headscarf, 
constitute an important indication of Muslim observance towards Sharia. It might be 
considered a micro-practice of Sharia, but since PKS always starts da’wa from a 
personal level, the phenomenon of individual piety is deemed a great success and a 
building block for a further step of da’wa.305 Citing the popular slogan “ishadu bi anna 
muslimin” (witness that we are Muslims), Abdul Ghofar suggests that:  
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“We cannot negate or remove the symbol of our faith, neither can we emphasize 
too much on Islamic symbols. If scarf is considered a symbol of Islam, then 
wearing it becomes an inseparable part of our Islamic identity. So, it would be 
incorrect to say that taking off the scarf is permissible as long as we have a 
good attitude and character. We still have to value the symbol of Islam while 
at the same time we also show an excellent behavior towards others. 
Moderation is a path we should take in dealing with Sharia.”  
The discussion above demonstrates that educating the public about Islamic 
norms so that they become aware, understand and then practice the Sharia in their 
individual and social life, is the first important step for the realization of ultimate goal 
of political Islam, i.e. establishment an Islamic state, in which people are willing to 
regulate themselves by Sharia norms. However, the demand to establish an Islamic 
state should originate from the majority of people, not from a few Islamist figures or 
politicians. In this way, PKS firmly believes on the people sovereignty in making a 
decision about how they would govern themselves as a nation; it is not up to the PKS 
or any other parties or groups to decide.306 Regarding the general consensus of people 
and a diligent work of da’wa as a prerequisite for the establishment of Islamic state, 
Thohari suggests that:  
“Because Islam is shamil (comprehensive), nothing can escape from Islamic 
rulings. Daulah Islamiyah is not unnecessary; it is a part of Islamic system of 
government. However, daulah Islamiyah is too high to achieve in a short period 
of time. It takes much preparation and political structure before we can 
establish the real daulah Islamiyah. For the time being, our concern should be 
focused on the political reality on the grassroots. We could learn from the result 
of the recent election in some parts of the country. In Solo, for instance, more 
than 60 percent of the people vote for the bull [PDIP]. It indicates the lack of 
affinity of the majority of the people in Solo to our vision and mission. In this 
situation, our main duty is to conduct da’wa among them so that they will have 
good understanding about Islam. We do not have to propagate for daulah 
Islamiyah, because when the people have already had high awareness about 
Islam, the establishment of daulah Islamiyah is only a matter of time.”  
Implicit in this statement, Islamic state is not an immediate goal of the party. 
Besides, it is not an easy endeavor, and not relevant to the political context of the 
country. However, despite its highly demanding requirement, an Islamic state is not 
impossible to establish. Thohari then enumerates the widely-known recipe of achieving 
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that goal. The first step, he explains, is to work on the individual character (islah al-
fard). Individuals with excellent character would give good influence to their families 
and surroundings. Once the family and society have been Islamized (islah al-usrahwa 
al-mujtama‘), the establishment of daulah islamiyah will come naturally. He concludes 
that the four-step process of Islamization (islah al-fard, -usrah, -mujtama, -dawlah) 
should run gradually and simultaneously. 
Character Building 
Before its involvement in politics, as early as the 1980s, PKS was already 
concerned with character-based education. Accordingly, PKS has built private schools 
and Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren) to raise a new generation with an excellent 
character, and encourage the government to have such schools as well. Marfendi, the 
Vice of PKS Provincial Office of West Sumatera, believes that character-based schools 
(Sekolah Berkarakter) will give a significant contribution for the successful 
development of the country. He believes that if government-owned schools adopt this 
system, the country will advance. He further argues that Indonesia is in need of leaders 
as well as society with character, therefore, from the outset, PKS da’wa aims to build 
the character of the people.  
According to Marfendi, the aim of building character-based schools is not to 
indoctrinate people with PKS values, but to inculcate in the people an excellent attitude 
and manners. “PKS will be happy to have persons [with excellent moral and 
character]in PDIP or Golkar,” said Marfendi, and he continued with his reasoning: 
“We are not dreaming of our cadres to flock into the party. The party cannot 
accommodate all the cadres to sit in the legislative or executive powers. [In 
Padang, West Sumatera], there are only 65 seats available for the legislatives, 
19 regents, and only one governor. Our cadres are expected to play an active 
role in many fields of profession. They are also encouraged to be active 
members in NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) or Muhammadiyah. For us, names or labels 
are not important; substance is more important. If we focus only on names or 
labels, we as the ummah will be divided and lost. They can be cadres of PKS, 
and at the same time remain active in NU or Muhammadiyah. We expect them 
to be a flag bearer of Islamic virtue.”  
Marfendi points to the example of previous parliamentarians of PBB (Crescent 
and Star Party, Partai Bulan Bintang), who were also active members of tarbiyah. He 
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had a dream that the two biggest Muslim organizations, namely NU and 
Muhammadiyah, would join force with PKS to build the ummah. For him, PKS gives 
more emphasis on the important issues, such as the unity and glory of the umma, rather 
than names or labels of organizations or political parties. Marfendi claims that the PKS 
cadres have already had an active involvement in Muslim organizations, such as NU, 
Muhammadiyah or Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam, The Unity of Islamic Education). 
He explains that the party’s cooperative attitude results from its conviction that, as a 
unifying force, the party never intends to make any further split or chasm within the 
ummah.  
As a part of educational system in Indonesia, madrasah (a school for the study 
of Islamic religion) has also become a concern of PKS. So far, private teachers and/or 
institutions run the madrasah without proper support from the state. As a da’wa party, 
PKS considers religious education, whose system is generally called Diniyah 
Taklimiyah (Religious Lecture, DT), as important as formal secular education, and 
discrimination against madrasah should be ended. Najamuddin, PKS Parliamentarian 
of Bogor, argues that the Law of National Educational System dictates that education 
aims to create God-fearing students (Pelajar yang Bertakwa) with excellent morality, 
ethics and character. Najamuddin believes that instilling God-awareness to the students 
necessitates the religious teaching. So, due to its substantial role in realizing it, he 
insists that DT be promoted. As the initiator of the Perda on Diniyah Taklimiyah of 
Bogor, Najamuddin expresses his concern about the DT: 
“From my experience and observation, I am confident to say that DT has been 
marginalized. Teachers or schools running DT received no support from the 
government. For so long, they have been running the DT by their own efforts; 
underpaid and with minimum facilities. With Perda no. 2/2013 on DT, we have 
a legal umbrella to give financial or managerial support to madrasah.” 
As he perceives it, the government has done little to realize this particular aim of 
education. He continues lamenting that government seems to neglect the development 
of DT which is actually the vanguard of religious education for Muslims. So, he 
concludes that it is high time that government pays attention to DT. 
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Religious Tolerance  
As PKS cadres come from different backgrounds, so that the party, its leaders 
assert, should exercise great tolerance toward different opinions (khilafiyah) of fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) among the cadres. In order to keep unity among the cadres, 
from the outset, PKS leaves the door open for the matters of khilafiyah; it is up to the 
individual cadre to follow the opinion most suitable for them. The cadres are free to 
adhere to certain school of fiqh. PKS Sharia Council is only concerned with discussing 
and dispensing fatwa (legal opinion) on the real issues faced by the cadres, such as 
money politics, gratification money, non-Muslim candidates, or female president. As 
a rule of thumb, Sharia Council will not interfere in traditional fiqh issues. The cadres 
are free to practice their fiqh according to their schools of law (madzhab). As an open 
party, PKS houses diverse religious affiliations of the people. According to 
Mohammad Yasin, PKS never intends to create new madzhab within the ummah, but 
instead, the party wants to be seen as a unifying force of the ummah.  
The fact that PKS membership is composed of people from many different 
social backgrounds and mass organizations, such as Persis, Muhammadiyah, NU, and 
al-Irsyad, leaves PKS no viable choice, the leaders argue, but to exercise tolerant 
attitude. Differences in ritual practices (khilafiyah) are of no political party business, 
but of a personal preference. However, it is important to note that PKS tolerance does 
not extend to Ahmadiyah, because PKS leaders consider it as a deviant sect in Islam 
whose ideology and teaching contradict with the fundamental principle of Islamic 
faith.307 In regard to the ban of Ahmadiyah, Jajat Sudrajat, PKS parliamentarian of 
Bogor, West Java, has this to say: 
“Regarding the issue of Ahmadiyah, PKS follows the fatwa of MUI (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Ulama). One might judge us as 
intolerant to other faith, but we should remember that in the municipality of 
Bogor, we are only operating and implementing the instruction from the higher 
authority in Jakarta. It is unfortunate that in an effort to implement the fatwa, 
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mostly in municipalities, some clashes occured between the followers of 
Ahmadiyah and those of the religious mainstream.”  
Jajat Sudrajat argues that the ban on Ahmadiyah is the right decision, because 
this sect has deviated (kelompok sesat) from the true religion of Islam. For him, being 
tolerant to a deviant sect is to misplace tolerance, because the concept of tolerance only 
applied to the entity of different religion. Ahmadiyah claims to be a part of Islam but, 
according to Ahmad Heryawan, this group actually corrupts the fundamental basis of 
faith, which is the belief in Muhammad as the last prophet, because never do the 
Muslims have a conviction other than the shahada (pronouncement of witnessing the 
oneness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad). Accordingly, in his opinion, 
those who have a different shahada would consequently be considered as non-
Muslims. Regarding the ban of Ahmadiyah in Bandung, West Java, Ahmad Heryawan 
argues that:  
“We have to be clear to the public that we would ban any activities of a group 
who claim to be Muslims while their shahada is at odds with the basic teaching 
of Islam as taught by the prophet and understood by his companions. If 
Ahmadiyah claim to be a new religion, separated from Islam, the concept of 
tolerance would apply to them as it applies to other religions in Indonesia. 
However, if they remain on their claim to be a part of Islam, they would be 
banned, due to their deviation. In my opinion, this measure is not tantamount 
to discrimination. Some might have different opinion, or some would say that 
we have discriminated them. Furthermore, the issue of Ahmadiyah is not 
unique to Bandung; it is a national issue. MUI has issued a fatwa saying that 
Ahmadiyah is a deviant sect. The governor edict on the ban of Ahmadiyah 
should be understood as an effort to implement the fatwa in a provincial level.”  
 
This particular issue of the ban of Ahmadiyah raises a question about the party 
position regarding a universal value of the freedom of faith. Just as the difference in 
Islamic jurisprudence should be tolerated, the difference in Islamic theology does not 
deserve intolerant attitude. If we agree that faith is a personal matter, fatwa or decree 
prohibiting particular belief or sect would amount to the violation against the freedom 
of faith, and it also means the state intervention toward personal belief. This particular 
issue of Ahmadiyah prohibition might be interpreted by a general public as a negative 
signal about PKS stance on religious tolerance. However, if we look it from other 
perspective, PKS stance on the issue of tolerance is consistent to the concept of the rule 
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of law. As Ahmad Heryawan argues, the ban of Ahmadiyah is based on the join decree 
(Surat Keputusan Bersama, SKB) no. 3/2008 between Minister of Religious Affairs, 
Minister of Interior Affairs and the Supreme Judge on the Prohibition of Disseminating 
Ahmadiyah Teachings (Larangan Penyebaran Faham Ahmadiyah). Ahmad Heryawan 
continues that since the year of its issuance, the authorities have made da’wa to 
Ahmadiyah adherents in order to take them back to Islam, but all to no avail. The 
spread of Ahmadiyah teachings and followers has raised great concern among certain 
Muslim communities and often led to atrocity between the proponents and opponents 
of Ahmadiyah. Heryawan asserts that it is only after years of da’wa and numerous 
communal clashes that the governor of Bandung decided to ratify the SKB and 
rendered all the activities of Ahmadiyah throughout West Java illegal.  
The case of Jasmine Church of Bogor is also worth mentioning, because it 
shows us the delicate relationship between freedom of faith and the rule of law and the 
place of tolerance in this equation. Jajat Sudrajat suggests that the case has been 
internationalized by media which created an opinion to the effect that the Christian 
congregation has been denied permission to build their own place of worship. 
According to Sudrajat, this case was actually due to the lack of appropriate building 
permit that led the court to issue a verdict to halt the building, and the community 
within the vicinity of the church has also conducted protest against the enactment of 
the church. According to Sudrajat, there are at least two reasons for people’s refusal: 
the legality of the building and the location of the church. Sudrajat explains that the 
people are complaining that their signature has been manipulated, and the church 
locates in the street bearing the name of a prominent Muslim figure of Bogor, Kyai 
Haji Saleh Iskandar. In this particular issue, PKS is in agreement with the government 
position that the case of Jasmine Church is more about the issue of building permit 
than that of religious freedom. PKS and other parties in DPRD (municipal parliament) 
of Bogor, to the exclusion of PDIP, agree that the issue of Jasmine Church is about the 
legality of the building. Sudrajat is of the opinion that for the church to be enacted, the 
permit must be legally obtained. As in the case of Ahmadiyah, tolerance comes after 
the rule of law. 
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Politics of Service (Khidmat) 
The primary function of da’wa in politics is to give a real example about how 
a good politician and party should look. PKS wants to lead by example. Arif Ramdani, 
PKS parliamentarian of Bandung, believes that people will not hesitate to lend their 
support, if they experience the goodness of da’wa; otherwise, people would be a priori 
toward PKS. Ramdani continues that as agents of da’wa, all of PKS cadres are 
encouraged to observe Sharia norms by showing their religious observance and social 
involvement, while in the state level the parliamentarians are obliged to give good 
example, such as denouncing and avoiding the practice of corruption and bribery. It 
has become a consensus in PKS that the party cadres in the parliament are not allowed 
to accept gift in any form. In a community level, people have seen the involvement of 
PKS cadres in social services and humanitarian act, ranging from Bakti Sosial (social 
service) to bazaar, and from health service to natural disaster relief. It is safe to say that 
participation of PKS in political engagement is coupled by the work in building 
excellent individuals and society.  
People generally perceive PKS more as a political party than a party of da’wa. 
Accordingly, the party social and humanitarian activities are more often seen as merely 
political maneuver and invariably perceived from political perspective. The following 
statement of Mohammad Yasin captures the discontent feeling of majority of PKS 
parliamentarians towards the public perception of the involvement of da’wa party in 
politics:  
“People often interpret our development program as political. We find it hard 
to believe that provincial programs such as express highway and character-
based schools are perceived to be PKS hidden political program. These 
programs will actually benefit the people of West Sumatera as a whole. To be 
honest, PKS wants to work together with other parties; however, they seem 
unwilling to accede to PKS popular program. The root of their refusal actually 
results from the way we communicate with others. As a new comer in politics, 
PKS needs time to tune in with the political reality in the parliament, and it also 
takes time for them to feel convenient with us.”  
 
PKS engagement in social activities and popular programs might have a 
strategic value for the image of the party, and it might also become a social or political 
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investment for the party. When the party works hard for the people, it is natural if they 
would be supportive to the party. However, the real politics does not follow this logic. 
As the recent election indicates, the vote of PKS in numerous provinces and 
municipalities is in decline. Regarding the socio-political engagement of the party, 
Sudrajat maintains that when da’wa engages in politics, all the work of da’wa will be 
perceived as having political agenda. According to Jajat Sudrajat, despite this public 
misperception, PKS continues giving social service as a part of implementing Sharia 
norms; whether or not the people would vote for them at the ballot is not the party 
concern.  
The issue of sincerity is important to discuss in relation to the politics of 
service. Perceiving parliamentary da’wa and engagement in politics as a part of 
religious duty to promote Islamic norms, PKS emphasizes the sincerity in action as a 
necessary ingredient of da’wa. While the work of da’wa is noble and sacred, the 
political arena is murky and requires compromise in all senses of the word.308 How the 
party handles the temptation of the murky world of politics is a matterof great interest. 
As Marfendi suggests, engaging da’wa in politics will put sincerity to the test; whether 
or not they work for the greater good of society or for their own accomplishment. The 
sincerity is also central in keeping the wheel of da’wa moving forward.309 As a da’wa 
party, PKS should never cease giving service to the people, and, as Marfendi again 
suggests, the party is well aware that the cadres in all levels of the party structure have 
worked hard to deliver the service, but despite years of service in the community, PKS 
often finds that people in the community do not lend their support for PKS cadres to 
win their position in government offices. The commensalism between PKS and general 
subjects of da’wa would become a potential discontent on the part of PKS cadres. The 
recent PKS slogan “keep giving service” (Tetap Melayani) following the result of 
recent election seems to keep the cadres’ moral high.    
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In term of media coverage, the sincerity of PKS cadres in government office is 
also put to the test. Bearing the noble and religious task of da’wa, PKS cadres in 
legislative or executive body should fulfill high public-satisfaction index. Marfendi 
asserts that if PKS elite are reported of making a mistake, people tend to remember 
their shortcomings and forget their achievement. He laments that media coverage of 
the fault of PKS cadres tends to be unfavorable, not to say damaging, to the party 
image. For PKS, negative media propaganda is like rubbing the salt into the wounds. 
Especially a year before the election of 2014, Marfendi perceives that in relation to the 
topics about PKS, the motto “bad news is good news” seems to be a media norm, to 
which he comments that media is silent regarding the achievement of PKS, but quick 
in covering the scandal involving the party. Regarding the bias of media coverage and 
the sincerity of the party cadre, Marfendi has this to say:  
“Our cadres sometime feel irritated with negative media coverage about PKS, 
and urge the governors or regents of PKS background to counter it with positive 
media coverage. However, many are reluctant to get their work covered by 
media. Their work is only for God pleasure, not for publicity. In one hand, this 
attitude is not good for political investment, but on the other it is the success of 
PKS in creating individuals with sincere and honest character.” 
 
Negative media propaganda is understood by Marfendi as a conspiracy to halt 
the da’wa progress of the party, which should be responded by improving the work 
and performance of the cadres, so the people will witness and experience the goodness 
of their work. He gives example of Governor of West Sumatera, Irwan Prayitno, who 
is one of the most successful governors from PKS cadres. He narrates that when he 
took the office, Padang was just hit by the earthquake. Prompt actions were taken by 
the governor to alleviate the impact of the disaster, and to put the city back to normal. 
Mohammad Yasin explains that it is during his tenure that West Sumatera witnesses 
one of the best road networks that contribute to the development of economic activities 
of the people. Mohammad Yasin continues that despite this achievement, the governor 
refuses to expose his works in the media, saying that his work is for God alone. PKS 
leaders consider the work of serving people as a work for God’s pleasure alone (ikhlas), 
so it does not need media coverage. With this in mind, Marfendi asserts that media 
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conspiracy against PKS is considered a test for sincerity, as well as a challenge for the 
da’wa cause. In regard with this challenge of da’wa, Marfendi states: 
“The challenge of da’wa will definitely increase, and so does our spirit of 
da’wa. That the challenge will increase by the passing days is the nature of 
da’wa itself. In doing da’wa, we will always be tested, and our real victory is 
not in this world, but in the next world. Entering paradise is our ultimate goal. 
If our intention is only to chase the worldly glory, such as winning the election, 
then it can be easily achieved by money politics. What is the point of being 
elected president or ministers, but we end up in the hellfire? All the tribulation 
in the path of da’wa is a sign that da’wa is in the right course.”  
 
To keep the cadres’ spirit high, PKS designs a weekly meeting called lawazim 
(great obligation). Having paramount importance in maintaining sincerity and loyalty, 
the lawazim should be fulfilled regularly. If the cadre does not show up in 3 meetings 
consecutively without any valid reasons, he or she is liable to a warning of disloyalty, 
and the membership is at stake. The soul or engine of the movement lies in this weekly 
meeting, where the cadres get recharged and reminded about the party’s ultimate goal. 
So, no matter what the position within the movement or the government they may have, 
all of PKS cadres have to follow this lawazim. The system of lawazim is also 
responsible for the solidity of the movement. According to Marfendi, the key success 
of PKS in going through political turbulence lies in this lawazim, without which PKS 
would not survive. 
C.   Da’wa and the Recent Election  
General elections are reliable tool, the PKS leaders argue, to measure and 
evaluate the da’wa performance of the party. To conduct a survey on the number of 
people accepting PKS da’wa would be prohibitively expensive. The result of recent 
election provides the party with a real number of people who accept the party da’wa. 
A ballot is a tool to figure out the progress or the stagnancy of da’wa. The fact that 
PKS share of vote is only 7 percent indicates that PKS da’wa is only acceptable to a 
very small number of people. It is also a wake-up call that the party still has so many 
things to do ahead of them. Therefore, according to Marfendi, there is no reason for 
the PKS cadres to be satisfied or proud with their work. Even if the party’s vote hits 
10 percent, there are still 90 percent who refuse to join the party. With this in mind, 
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Marfendi suggests that becoming members of parliament, or elected governor or 
regents, is only a bonus, because for PKS, the most important thing in the election is 
that the progress of da’wa is well-recorded through the election. 
An optimistic look at the election result is made by Mahyeldi, PKS leading 
figure of West Sumatera who is also major of Padang, West Sumatera, stating that PKS 
da’wa has been appreciated by the people. The issue that should be addressed by PKS 
is not about public acceptance, but more about the method of recruitment. Mahyeldi 
maintains that:     
“Our vote in the recent election is actually increasing, indicating a good public 
acceptance. It was quite something that our vote slightly increased by 200,000 
in the time of political turbulence. Compared to Democrat Party and Golkar, 
which suffers dramatic loss of vote, PKS still survives the storm. In the next 
election, we should change our strategy of reaching out the people. We cannot 
depend on conventional strategy of social programs. In its formative period, 
PKS programs of social activities might contribute a lot to wide public 
acceptance. Decades have gone by, and it is a high time that we find other 
modes of social and political program and strategy that could raise public 
acceptance and vote as well.” 
 
PKS share of vote in the recent election was indeed below the party expectancy. 
However, Jamal Lulail perceives the result of recent election as a blessing for the party. 
The success in maintaining loyal voters and surpassing the electoral threshold is 
something the party is grateful of. In recent election of 2014 PKS garnered about 
200,000 votes higher (8,480,204 or 6.79 percent) than that of the last election of 2009 
(8,206,955 or 7.88 percent), but the parliamentary seat drops from 59 (10.59 percent) 
to 40 (7.1 percent). Jamal Lulail suggests that despite insignificant increase of vote, 
PKS is considered successful in keeping the vote stabile. According to him, the case 
of previous PKS president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq (LHI), in corruption scandal does not 
seem to give adverse influence on PKS loyal voters who are considered mature enough 
to understand a political nuance behind the case.  
It has become a matter common belief within PKS circle that the case of LHI 
and the political fitnah (tribulation) in its wake was manufactured to retard the progress 
of PKS in politics, and PKS does not see the decrease of its number of seats in 
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parliament as a failure, but more as a success in resisting the negative campaign by the 
media. Representing the standpoint of PKS cadres, Jamal Lulail has an intriguing 
opinion about the issue of corruption that has tarnished the image of PKS as a party 
with a noble work of da’wa: 
“In 2012, PKS was predicted by many observers to be leading in the upcoming 
election of 2014, because PKS is widely known as a clean party, with very 
minimum corruption case, compared to other parties. For some, the prediction 
is considered a threat. Something should be done. The worst possible scenario 
should be drafted and put in motion. They know that catching a small fish 
would not inflict maximum damage to PKS, hence targeting the big fish. I can 
say in full confidence that the case of LHI is politicized.”  
 
According to Jamal Lulail, normal and legal procedure does not apply in case 
of LHI. He compares LHI case with that of Anas Urbaningrum of Democrat Party. It 
takes almost a year after the latter conviction of corruption suspect that he was finally 
apprehended. In Anas case, KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption 
Eradication Committee) needs long process of collecting evidence and witnesses 
before arresting the suspect. Jamal Lulail explains that unlike Anas, LHI is not 
convicted suspect, nor proven evidence of corruption. PKS leaders are convinced that 
the LHI case is not merely a legal but a political maneuver. It is a common conviction 
among PKS leader that the real target is not to imprison LHI, but to dismantle PKS. 
Jamal Lulail explains what he believes as the KPK scenario in arresting LHI: 
“They tried to find evidence that PKS as a party is receiving fund from illicit 
source, i.e. the money LHI got from alleged corruption. To their dismay, such 
evidence never exists. So, they lower the target: no longer dismantlement of 
PKS, but preventing it from achieving electoral threshold, hence its 
disappearance from political arena.” 
 
In his taujih (directive speech) in Silagnas (Silaturahmi Anggota Legislatif 
Nasional PKS) on 20 September 2014, Anis Matta, previous PKS president of 2013-
2015, announced that PKS should be grateful with the result of the recent election, 
because despite a political tsunami, PKS still survives. Right after Hidayat Nur Wahid 
and Fahri Hamzah were elected the vices of MPR and DPR respectively, Anis 
mentioned that it was a great success for PKS, the success that might raise the rivals’ 
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eyebrows. The fact that both figures are the most mature, influential, and experienced 
among MPR and DPR deputies would make PKS bargaining in the parliament even 
higher. Furthermore, in the KMP (Koalisi Merah Putih, Merah Putih Coalition), PKS 
is acting as a backbone and eager to cooperate with other parties. For all this 
achievement, in his taujih, Anis urged that all the cadres keep a low profile and seek 
to gather more friends. 
Establishing communication with different groups and parties as well as 
building coalition is one of the strategies of da’wa. Despite the small vote share of 7 
percent, PKS still have to meet people’s expectation and give voice to people’s 
interests. Knowing that the party does not have enough voice in the parliament to be 
heard and followed, the natural way to advance the party’s goals is to establish coalition 
with other parties. PKS might constitute only 10 percent of all the coalition power, but 
the party can multiply its power by working together with parties of the same vision. 
PKS cannot work alone; it needs a coalition to exchange ideas.   
The coalition in KMP is made to be a permanent one, and PKS will be 
consistent with its decision and work hard to maintain the cohesiveness of the coalition. 
So far, as Marfendi suggests, PKS has shown its loyalty to the coalition, especially 
during the political campaign for Prabowo presidency where PKS cadres were 
mobilized to support the presidential election through their active participation in every 
step of vote counting from the village level all the way to the national counting by KPU 
(Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission). PKS Headquarters also 
released their own quick count. All these efforts were acknowledged by the chief of 
KMP, Prabowo, as Mahyeldi has this to say: 
“Prabowo has acknowledged the party’s significant role and contribution 
within the coalition. In many occasions, Prabowo himself expressed publicly 
his appreciation for the hard work and loyalty of PKS cadres. That is actually 
our attitude and character, as a result of tarbiyah. When we are given a trust, 
we will keep it to the last breath. Minang philosophical expression says: Kato 
pertamo ditapati, kato kaduo bacari-cari (first words are binding, the second 
words are lying). So, PKS holds to its first words and will never budge. 
Decision to join the coalition was taken after a long process of deliberation, 
because it is meant to last for a long-term period of time.”  
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According to Marfendi, one of the reasons of PKS support for Prabowo in the 
recent presidential election is that the party saw in him the readiness to work together 
for the best interest of the nation. Prabowo is considered by PKS as having a deep 
concern of protecting national natural resource from the exploitation of foreign 
countries, and ready to use it for the greater benefit of all the people. The protectionist 
rhetoric of Prabowo was congruent with the goal of PKS da’wa of realizing prosperity 
of the people by protecting and managing the country’s natural resource. Regarding 
this goal, Marfendi states that:  
“We are now in a big coalition. Our target is to build the country, maintain our 
dignity, and free ourselves from the control of foreign nations. Indonesia is a 
big country with highly rich natural resources, but these are seized by foreign 
countries. We have a huge gold deposit in the mountain, but it is under the 
control of Freeport. So, we should work together to build our country.”  
PKS decided to form a coalition with KMP partly because PKS platform has a 
close affinity with Prabowo’s vision about self-reliance and sufficiency. According to 
Marfendi, Indonesia is becoming a big market for the foreign producers, due to her 
huge number of population. He substantiates his claim with the fact that Indonesia 
starts importing sugar and rice now, and this situation needs to be ended. It is in this 
particular issue that PKS sees the affinity between the popular program of Prabowo 
and the aim of PKS da’wa of social empowerment. Both Prabowo and PKS seem to 
come to terms with the issue of economic platform. Marfendi explains that numerous 
dialogs between Prabowo and the party elite were responsible to the smooth join force 
between an Islamist party and ultra nationalist party of Gerinda (Gerakan Indonesia 
Raya, Greater Indonesia Movement Party). Referring to the initial process of coalition 
with Gerindra, Marfendi states that:  
“Prabowo had once been apprehensive about PKS due to the image of the latter 
being an extreme group. However, once engaged in dialogue with us, he 
admitted that he found in PKS what he strove for all this time, and in numerous 
occasions he asked PKS to help mentoring the cadres of his party. If Prabowo 
wins the presidential election, we will have a big chance to begin realizing our 
dream of welfare and prosperous society.”     
Being in the coalition is not without disadvantage to the PKS image. There 
exists a perception that the party is of no difference from other parties in KMP, which 
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is perceived as a coalition of corrupt parties or parties fraught with problems. That the 
coalition is merely based on interest, not on ideology, so it is destined to be 
unsuccessful is another critical comment of the public. By joining the coalition, PKS 
is also accused of having abandoned its ideological belief, preference, and goals. 
Addressing to this issue, Marfendi maintains:  
“We cannot counter this perception by delving ourselves into debate and 
argument. We would rather counter it by our real work for the society. Our 
cadres who become regents or mayors in many municipalities are actually 
ambassadors of PKS. Due to their closeness to the community, regents or 
majors have strategic role and position to deliver da’wa in a widest sense of the 
word. If they succeed in delivering justice and prosperity, they will become 
representations of PKS value. Someday, if people want to know about PKS, we 
can simply ask them to see our cadres.”  
The coalition of KMP is formed as a balancing power and a ‘watchdog’ for the 
government’s performance.  In the recently established administration of Jokowi, PKS 
decided to be with the coalition of KMP and become a loyal opposition. According to 
Jamal Lulail, this position is taken due to the lack of confidence in working with the 
ruling party, whose ideology is relatively antagonistic toward PKS ideals. It is feared 
that the inclusion of PKS in the Jokowi cabinet would be counterproductive. Joining 
the cabinet was also seen as unhealthy for the party-political investment. Jamal Lulail 
gives his opinion about the reason for PKS to be outside the cabinet: 
“Since PKS cadres are known to be outspoken in defending the principled 
value, it is easier for PKS to be outside the Jokowi cabinet. We are free to 
express our criticism against government policy that we deem inconsistent with 
public interest. Being outside a government is not a novel experience for PKS. 
We have a long history of being an opponent during the new order era. So being 
inside or outside the government is not a big issue, the important thing is that 
we keep working for a good cause.”  
Since da’wa is a collective duty of all PKS cadres, the absence of PKS cadres 
in the Jokowi’s cabinet does not necessarily mean that PKS ceases in doing da’wa in 
politics. If one gate is closed, others are open. Commenting on the absence of PKS 
cadres in the state cabinet, Surahman has this to say: 
“Being inside or outside Jokowi cabinet is a blessing for us. When we are 
assigned the posts in the cabinet, we consider it as a means to enhance our 
performance and capacity in delivering our mission of da’wa for the benefit of 
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the nation, but when we are not, then it is an opportunity for us to learn and 
train ourselves on how to become a good critic and control for the government. 
So, in both situations, we can still perform our duty of da’wa.” 
However, there is also a concern among PKS leaders about the decision of 
becoming an opposition. Since da’wa needs power and authority, the absence of PKS 
cadres in Jokowi’s cabinet would entail a difficulty for da’wa. While still hoping that 
Prabowo is elected president, Marfendi states the benefit and disadvantage of being 
outside the cabinet:   
“If Prabowo won the president election, our da’wa would run much easier, and 
knowing that he lost the election, then we should multiple our energy and 
perseverance for da’wa, especially, when we are now choosing to be outside of 
Jokowi cabinet. To be inside the cabinet is not always easy; it puts us on a 
dilemma. In the last part of SBY’s administration, for instance, we were given 
3 ministerial posts in his cabinet. Being critical to the government’s policy 
which we often found unfavorable for the people, was interpreted as disloyal 
to the government in which we were parts of its coalition. After ten year within 
the coalition with government, our share of vote seems to be in stagnancy. It is 
around 7 percent. There is no significant increase. Now, being outside Jokowi 
administration makes us easy to be critical to the government. However, it also 
comes with serious consequence. Remember that LHI was apprehended and 
sentenced to 18 year of imprisonment, and revoked of his political rights. It 
happened while we are inside the government coalition. You can imagine what 
would befall on us now. So, we should all the time be ready for the worst.”  
 
Conclusion 
PKS claims that it brings da’wa into politics, and use politics to advance the 
cause of Islam. This, it argues, makes PKS different from other parties. As a da’wa 
party, the ultimate goal of PKS is the realization of universal Sharia norms in the 
everyday life of the people. In the era of democracy, efforts to achieve this goal 
necessitate their involvement in politics. The political party is utilized as a means to 
combines da’wa and politics. Therefore, PKS is not only a political party but also a 
party of da’wa, and politics constitutes only a part of da’wa channels. The engagement 
of da’wa party in politics is not without criticism. Due to its participation in politics 
PKS is conceived by many as degrading its commitment to da’wa and merely 
appropriating da’wa as a vehicle to power. The radical Islamists conceive party-
political promotion of democracy as aevidence of being indifferent to the struggle for 
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Shariatization, but at the same time, the liberal secularists accuse PKS of participating 
in democratic process as mere subterfuge. The PKS leaders respond to these 
accusations by arguing that this is the price that they pay for following the middle path 
advocated by Islam.  
The engagement of PKS in national politics, the leaders argue, aims to promote 
Sharia norms in the state level. Having a firm conviction in the superiority of Sharia 
over democracy, PKS acknowledges that Sharia norms can thrive in a democratic 
system of government. Through democratic mechanisms, PKS is struggling to 
incorporate, promote and support Sharia norms into laws and regulations on one hand, 
and on the other hand to prevent and remove any policy or regulation that potentially 
contradicts Sharia norms. However, the support for Shariatization does not necessarily 
translate to the call for the establishment of an Islamic state.310 That is considered too 
distant a goal to be discussed now. Nevertheless, it has become a commonly expressed 
conviction among PKS leaders that considerable prior preparations are required to 
establish an Islamic state, the most importance of which is the consent of the people 
and the implementation of universal Sharia norms in the state, such as justice, 
consultancy, public participatory, transparency, accountability, equality and freedom, 
to mention but a few.  
From the perspective of da’wa, the party aims, it says, to Islamize society and 
government. To achieve this goal, the PKS leaders say that the party is working hard 
to enhance the awareness, understanding and practice of Sharia norms in individual 
level (islah al-fard), as a building block for the further Islamization of the government 
(islah al-hukumah). For the party, this immediate goal of da’wa should take into 
consideration the varied level of people’s commitments to Sharia, hence the demand 
of gradual approach. Any attempt at a hasty and untimely implementation of Islamic 
norms within Indonesian society and in the state level will only lead to resistance and 
destruction. This gradual strategy of carrying out Islamist agenda has distinguished 
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PKS from other more radical Islamist groups in Indonesia.311 To this end, tarbiyah 
training programs form the backbone of PKS da’wa. Tarbiyah is designed, the leaders 
explain, to build individuals with good character, and to make sure that once the cadre 
is appointed to a leadership position in the government, he or she will be trustworthy 
and hold the responsibility to the fullest. The paramount importance of tarbiyah can 
also be observed from its ability to standardize the cadres’ understanding and 
perception about Sharia. Through tarbiyah, PKS proves successful in promoting 
tolerance in the matters of fiqh differences, which can help strengthening the unity of 
ummah. In the controversial casesinvolving Ahmadiyah and the Jasmine Church, the 
PKS leaders argue that they seek to put the rule of law before gestures of tolerance.  
Tarbiyah is considered successful in keeping the party safe from the political 
tribulation in the aftermath of LHI scandal. One year prior to the election of 2014, PKS 
was hit by severe political turbulence. It was a year of tribulation for PKS. 
Notwithstanding, the party still maintained its share of the national vote at the 7 percent 
level. Without this turbulence, PKS was convinced of gaining 10 percent of the vote. 
Despite relentless negative bombardment from the media, PKS cadres held fast in 
maintaining the party’s electoral threshold. As Anis Matta said about the result of the 
recent legislative election of 2014, that PKS today is lean and fighting fit – it is 
genuinely cadre-based, blessedly free from the flab of hangers-on. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NEGOTIATING SHARIA 
 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the party’s struggle to negotiate 
Sharia in the political landscape of the country. How Sharia is presented and the 
strategy the party uses to legislate Sharia is the main topic of the chapter, which is 
divided into three parts. Discussion of the (mis)understanding of Sharia among 
Muslims, including that of the earlier cadres of tarbiyah movement, will be presented 
first, followed by the shift of understanding Sharia within PKS cadres and what PKS 
means by Sharia. The last part will analyze the role of Sharia by-laws (Perda Sharia), 
and how Perda are used as a new avenue to formalize Sharia norms.  
A.   Misunderstanding and The Shift in Understanding Sharia 
In the 1980s, a new form of Islamic activism emerged. This new religious 
movement was known widely as Jemaah Tarbiyah. The Tarbiyah (‘education’) 
movement saw the cleavage of the Muslim community (ummah) into “traditionalist” 
and “modernist” as being outmoded, and they tried to find alternative points of 
connection to established Muslim groups.312  Very often, this group is dubbed as 
ikhwani, due to their close contact with the Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwan) of Egypt. 
They themselvesare more comfortable with Tarbiyah - the name given to them by their 
Indonesian counterparts.313 In the early 1980s, campus based Islamic activist were less 
united than they would later become.314 Like their counterparts in Middle East, the 
Indonesian campus Islamic movements were dynamic.315 PKS and HTI represent the 
two most important political forces to emerge from the Tarbiyah Movement.  Growing 
out of campus da’wa initiatives, Jemaah Tarbiyah adopted a non-revolutionary 
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approach, contrary, they assert, to what some authors may have described.316 They 
focus rather on cultivating cadres and enhancing their understanding of Islam. Through 
weekly meetings, mostly conducted in praying rooms of university campuses, the 
pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah claim to have made a significant success in converting 
some radical young generation into moderate Muslims. 317  These efforts in 
deradicalization continue up until the present according to leaders like Hilmi 
Aminuddin.  Commenting on the problem of extremism and radicalism among the 
youth he proudly proclaimed: 
“Please, [ask them to] join PKS. God willing, it is guaranteed, [after joining] 
they will no longer become extreme or radical. Even many of them turn to 
become outstanding cadres and contribute tremendously to the cause of 
da’wa.”318 
This statement from the previous head of Deliberative Council (Majlis Syura) of PKS 
also indicates the diversity of PKS cadres in term of their social, religious, educational, 
and cultural background.  
The two decades of 1980 to 1990 represented the height of New Order regime 
power, which was as wary as its predecessor in dealing with the ideological and 
political articulation of Islamic groups. The repressive policies of the regime lead 
Jemaah Tarbiyah activistshabitually avoiding any expression of a confrontational 
attitude, because any effort to oppose regime policies was very risky.319 From the 
perspective of social theory movement, when the regime tightens its grip over all civil 
society groups, the highly political constraints and low opportunity compel a social 
movement to avoid confrontation. Jemaah Tarbiyah activists adopted a dual strategy 
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of avoiding conflict with the authorities and keeping their followers away from being 
targeted by the regime.320 
Direct resistance was replaced by learning and training activities within small 
groups, called halaqah (Islamic circle).321 Through these circles, the activists made 
efforts to strengthen their spiritual practices and religious knowledge. Consequently, 
the government’s policy of restricting student’s political activities in 1980s and 1990s 
helped Jemaah Tarbiyah activists to expand their influence on campuses. The success 
of Jemaah Tarbiyah in expanding its membership in campuses during these two 
decades is claimed to have led to a significant reduction in the number of radical 
groupson campuses.322 
Rahmat Abdullah, one of the pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah recalled what the 
radical and extreme orientation could have impact to the students: 
“In the 1980s, there were many students who dropped out of university because 
of their rigid and extreme understanding of Islam. They considered that what 
they learned at university made no contribution towards the development of 
Islam. The English language was perceived as the language of the infidels. 
Architecture was in violation of the Prophet Muhammad’s injunction, because 
there was a prophetic tradition (hadith) saying that whoever built two-storey 
building would be crushed by the angels. As a result of these excesses, many 
Muslim students become too lazy to study, turned to a kind of escapism and 
even refuse to wear the gifts of shoes that were bought by their parents … This 
issue was very naïve, but true as it happened at that time. Here Jemaah Tarbiyah 
functioned as a bridge between hardliner and soft-liner orientation. If we did 
not think of saving them from that situation, the da’wa of Islam would be 
blamed for their role in hampering the national development program of 
Indonesia. We started to give them sensible arguments to change their 
orientations. Their resistance towards the regime was accumulative and 
reached the situation where they even rejected wearing clothes that were 
associated with the regime, such as batik shirts and dress coats. Such was the 
repressive attitude of the regime towards Islamic groups and they reacted to its 
repression in radical ways and with physical confrontation.”323 
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In the early years of their movement, Jemaah Tarbiyah activists had distinctly 
differentprofile compared to the rest of community, especially in matters of dress and 
in interaction between men and women. This was partly due to their rigid 
implementation of Sharia as they understood it. In this phase of ta’sis (building the 
basis), the cadres were still in the process of social detachment and identity formation. 
Hence, they focused on maintaining their distinctiveness from mass public. Strong 
individualistic pattern of Islamization become one of the distinctive hallmarks of 
Jemaah Tarbiyah in comparison with mainstream Islam in Indonesia. By this template 
of individual conversion, new adherents accept not only the new religion but also a 
new cultural and ethnic identity.324 Consequently, they broke off ties with their old 
social and traditional entities. Their high level of commitment to new doctrine came 
with the possibility of alienation from theirformer convictions and practices.  
This pattern of Islamization requires that adherents “define crossing of religious 
frontiers and the acceptance of new worship as useful supplement and not as 
substitutes.”325  One example of the detachment or passive resistance of Tarbiyah 
activist is the practice of women wearing the hijab or veil. Not only regarded as a 
religious symbol, the hijab for them also symbolized the sharp turn in conviction and 
their new identity. In 1982, when the Ministry of Education issued a decree forbidding 
female student from wearing head-scarves at schools, most activists of Tarbiyah 
refrained from rallying protests on the streets as other student groups or organizations 
did. They practiced silent resistance against the decree by keeping themselves covered 
wherever they went in public, until finally on 16 February 1991, wearing the hijab at 
school and on campus was declared permissible.326 Regarding this issue, Aus Hidayat, 
PKS leader of Depok, explains that “at that time, we did not want direct confrontation 
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with the government. We just needed to encourage our cadres to adopt Islamic thinking 
and practice.”327 
Stringent practice in gender relation also marks the phase of ta’sis (formative 
period). Abdul Ghofar, PKS parliamentarian of Solo, Central Java, describes how the 
PK cadres often practiced strict gender separation during their meetings, where men 
and women were separated with a high curtain. Furthermore, female voices in public 
were considered taboo (awrah). Accordingly, women were not allowed to become 
public speakers. Through the course of time, their understanding and practice of Sharia 
developed. The separating curtain got lower and lower, and finally there was no curtain 
at all; then women voiceswere no longer seen to be taboo and women were finally 
given a chance to be speakers.  The, PKS cadresnegotiated the interaction of Sharia 
with the social and cultural norms. Regarding the reason for this shift, Abdul Ghofar 
asserts:  
“It seems to me that our cadres are adaptable to the cultural and social 
imperatives as long as they are not diametrically in contradiction with Sharia. 
To the best on my knowledge, I have never heard of any official instruction or 
edict from PKS National Sharia Council (Dewan Sharia Pusat, DSP) regarding 
the legal validity of these shifting of attitudes.”328 
 
It is important to note that, as Abdul Ghofar said, no official statement from DSP of 
PKS is needed to validate the change in social and cultural attitude of the cadres. 
However, the policy relating to the political realm will be made public, such as the 
decision to be an open party in 2008.  
During the early period of da’wa, most of Tarbiyah activists,who are generally 
educated on secular university campuses, had only limited and partialunderstanding of 
Sharia and of Islam in general. Coming from different backgrounds, they did not learn 
about Sharia properly before joining PK in 1998 onwards, so they have to reshape their 
understanding about Sharia. Irsyad, a PKS parliamentarian from Padang, West 
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Sumatera, remembers his involvement in Tarbiyahmovement during its formative 
years that Tarbiyah activists had an antagonistic approach toward the state and non-
Muslims. They tended to labele the government as being at odds with Sharia, as they 
understood it, and as being thagut (oppressive tyrants). The activists at the time tended 
to be opposed tot any practices considered to be violating Sharia, such as the school 
assembly ceremony every Monday morning, where students should sing the national 
anthem and salute to the flag, and learning PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, 
Pancasila Civic Education), where students are infused with state ideology, Pancasila. 
Regarding non-Muslims, they assumed them to be kafir (infidel), hence the enemy of 
Islam. Regarding the initial rigidity and awkwardness of earlier cadres in applying 
Sharia norms in social and political context, Irsyad also has an interesting comment to 
say: 
“Involvement of PK in politics is considered to be a historical accident. 
Comparing it to the school curriculum, the cadre has not actually finished grade 
2 when they have to join junior high school. We did not have a slightest idea 
that we had to join the political arena and formed a party as early as 1998. 
Therefore, awkwardness and rigidity may occur when we have to implement 
Sharia, as we understand it, in a wider social and political context.” 
 
Hilmi Aminuddin spoke in a similar way on the need for reevaluation of the 
cadre’s understanding and practice of Sharia: 
“When they were still radical, they did not want to have an identity card with 
the logo of eagle (burung Garuda—Indonesian state symbol), to which I ask 
them a rhetorical question, such as ‘why don’t you throw your money, since 
the same logo is also printed on it?’ Many activists of 1980s were also against 
wearing batik (traditional cloth) because it is considered as clothing of the 
arrogant, to which I respond by wearing it during my meeting with them. Some 
activists even quit their study because they perceived the rector as thagut, to 
which I told them that the rector could be thagut, but the campus is still a place 
to seek knowledge. Some others were reluctant of working as government 
servants, to which I responded that we are the ones that have more rights to 
manage the country, or else, somebody will take it over. Now, all of these 
radical activists have joined PKS and most of them have a high-level post 
within the party. Therefore, once again, I would like to emphasize that the 
method of eradicating radicalism is simple: come and join PKS, then, God’s 
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willing, radicalism will soon be over. On the contrary, radicalism will thrive if 
PKS cease to exist.”329 
 
This statement gives us insight into the thinking of Tarbiyah activists, in term 
of their ideology, culture, and knowledge of Islam. Not all of tarbiyah activists ended 
up becoming members or cadres of PK and PKS; many of them join other groups, such 
as Salafi group or Hizbut Tahrir. This statement should not be taken as a proof that 
radicalism is accepted in PKS, or that PKS is a hub for radical Muslims. On the 
contrary, the PKS leaders claim that they worked hard to deradicalize those with 
extremist views.  Rahmat Abdullah, one of the founding fathers of PK, explained it 
this way: 
“Our group is immune from radical activities and groups, because we strictly 
avoid them. Before, we had personal contact with them, but then we finally 
realized that we had a different agenda and orientation. We left them and kept 
our distance because the regime apparatus launched its operations without 
compromise. When many Muslim activists from a particular group were 
arrested during training sessions in Puncak, West Java, we did not get arrested, 
even though we held similar training there. We always emphasize the need to 
protect our movement from radical influences. Rather than recruiting cadres 
with radical backgrounds, it is better to train and educate ordinary people with 
no Islamic knowledge at all.”330 
 
It was due to socio-cultural and political demands that PKS cadres decided to 
adapt. When PK was founded in 1998, most cadres were devout and idealistic young 
people from middle class, privileged, secular backgrounds. Those who came from the 
Tarbiyah movement came with a strong sense of Muslim identity, but limited 
knowledge of Islam and Sharia. As a political party, PKS is interested in expanding its 
constituency. However, the highly diverse nature of Indonesian society in term of 
ideological, cultural and religious backgrounds presented the party with a dilemma. 
Sticking with a rigid interpretation of Islam and Sharia would alienate sympathizers of 
less rigid platform. To cope with this problem, the party had to temper its ideological 
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strictness and broaden its base and constituency. On the other hand, tempering its 
ideological position threatened to alienate the core base of supporters.  
In order to be successful, da’wa, the PKS leaders explained, it needs to be 
adaptable and flexible as well. For the purpose of da’wa, PKS cadres have to fit in with 
people, by correcting their understanding and practice of Sharia and at the same time 
recognizing social and cultural practices of the people. The example of manifestation 
of this cultural strategy was seen in February 2011 when PKS held a national 
convention in Yogyakarta.  By being hosted in the home of traditional Javanese culture, 
including mysticism, this convention was intended to send a signal to general public 
about the new image of PKS as a culture-friendly party. The apparent embrace of 
traditional culture accords with the party’s gradualist approach. As the leaders explain 
it, adaptation is actually the nature of da’wa. And too, for the pursuit of electoral gain 
PKS has to moderate its position on the acceptability of local culture.331 Because da’wa 
operates in stages, the public announcement of party, the leaders explain, does not 
necessarily reflect the party’s core values. It is possible for party cadres to advocate 
“deculturalized” Islam, while their elites publicly announce the openness to culture and 
traditional practices. Arif Ramdani, PKS parliamentarian of Bandung, West Java, put 
it this way: 
“During the early phase of PK, we did not have adequate experience and 
understanding of how is it like to be in political field and in interaction with 
wider community. I can say that intermingle with socio-cultural and political 
reality results in the shift of our understanding of Sharia. However, this shift is 
still within the boundary of Sharia and under continuous supervision. We oblige 
all cadres to join weekly meeting, the purpose of which is to evaluate and 
remind them”  
 
After being involved in social and political realms, PKS cadres becomesteadily 
more mature, socially and politically. They moved incrementally to the middle, 
indicated mainly by two distinct features. Firstly, the platform of the party is now less 
explicit about religious issues compared to that of its predecessor. The platform is 
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translated into the selection of neutral themes of election campaign, such as social 
justice, the fight against corruption, and poverty alleviation, which are appealing to 
greater segment of the population. 332  This strategy bore fruit; PKS managed to 
quintuple its share winning 7.3 per cent of the vote and 45 seats in the parliament. 
Secondly, the inclusion into the ministerial post and national as well as local parliament 
draw the party more into the middle. Deep involvement in electoral politics and 
democratic system required the party to adjust its ideological belief and preference.333 
Cooperation and negotiation with parties of different ideologies become the normal 
value in politics, where the party often has to give up some ideals and satisfy with 
whatever seats or office it could win.  
In politics, idealism should come to terms with reality. PKS learnt from its 
predecessor that used to push Islamist ideology and emphasize its exclusiveness as an 
Islamist party. PK’s failure to garner significant votes in the 1999 election was a signal 
for its successor that its political agenda and policy was not adequate for the expansion 
of the party’s constituency; it was only appealing to Tarbiyah activists and a limited 
range of like-minded sympathizers. The image of PK as a party of deeply committed 
Muslims was thought to give a hope for a country assailed by multiple crises and facing 
moral decline.  This overtly uncompromising religious image, however, proved to be 
a disadvantage to the party, since non-Islamist voters would not appeal to the Islamist 
agenda of the Islamist party.334 Voters of nationalist orientation were suspicious of the 
party’s hidden agenda to change the secular NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik 
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333 Whether or not Islamist parties will moderate as a result of inclusion into the state organs 
and contribute to democratic consolidation is still debatable. See Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: 
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Indonesia, the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia) into an Islamic state. Muslim 
traditionalist and modernist voters, associated with NU and Muhammadiyah 
respectively, would be reluctant to give their vote for a newly emerging Islamist party 
considered to be a threat to their religious, cultural and political credentials.335 When 
PKS da’wa manages to expand and penetrate into NU and Muhammadiyah followers, 
concern rises among the leadership of these two biggest Muslim organizations. In order 
to protect NU’s principle of Ahl al-Sunna wa-al-Jamaah from the infiltration of 
allegedly neo-Wahhabist ideology of PKS, NU chairman, Hasyim Muzadi, repeatedly 
warned NU followers to be alert and stay away from PKS incitement.336 The same is 
true with Muhammadiyah which issued a letter denying access for PKS to involve in 
managing Muhammadiyah’s mosque and schools and another letter forbidding the use 
of Muhammadiyah’s facilities by any political party.337 
The social and political reality required PKS to be flexible and accommodative 
to cultural demands. Otherwise, as a political party, PKS would face continuous 
difficulties in expanding its constituency. Accordingly, if PKS cadres want to win the 
hearts of the people, the leaders explain, they should intermingle with the people and 
adapt to their culture. Adaptation to the religious practice and tradition, is a necessary 
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approach to being culturally accepted by a given society. The case of PKS of South 
Kalimantan gives a clear example of how the flexibility and adaptability to cultural and 
religious practices are important for PKS to gain ground in a society largely practicing 
traditional Islamic culture and rituals linked to NU. 
For Muslims in Banjarmasin, Sharia is not something new. Sharia was 
implemented in Banjarmasin at the time of Sultan Adam (1825-1857). Since then, 
Sharia became the constitution of the Sultanate of Banjarmasin. Therefore, the PKS 
strategy to gain ground in Banjarmasin was not by introducing or promoting Sharia. 
From the outset, the PKS approach in South Kalimantan was more cultural than 
legalistic. Cultural engagement become the main strategy. The party needed to show 
that it valued local religious practices and traditions. This included the established 
cultural symbols of Muslims of Banjarmasin, such as recitation of Surah Yasin (36th 
chapter of the Quran), Qunut (raising hands during prayer) and Burdah (the Prophet’s 
story), and practices of Tahlil (supplication for the deceased) and Maulud Nabi (the 
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday). All these practices are central to the culture of 
Nahdliyyin (members of NU, Nahdlatul Ulama), and the overwhelming majority of 
PKS cadres in Banjarmasin are Nahdliyyin. PKS’ accommodative strategy toward 
local culture succeeding in winning the hearts of Nahdliyyin, who came to comprise 
the biggest element of PKS in South Kalimantan. According to Ibnu Sina, a PKS 
parliamentarian from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, from the beginning, PKS had 
to declare that NU is the madzhab (school of law) of PKS of South Kalimantan. 
Consequently, in South Kalimantan, the ritual practices of PKS cadres do not differ 
greatly from those of NU.  
In terms of the understanding and practice of Sharia, the diversity of PKS 
cadres mirrors the diversity of Muslims in Indonesia. There exists a wide spectrum of 
understanding about Sharia among Indonesian Muslims. Some groups have an extreme 
attitude toward Sharia such that they focus more on symbols and formalities rather than 
substance. On the other end of the spectrum, some groups are ‘allergic’ toward Sharia, 
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even though it has actually become a part of their cultural practices.338 The PKS leaders 
explain that a long process of da’wa is needed to drag these two extremes towards a 
middle position. At the one end of the spectrum, radical Muslims may give a label of 
“kafir, fasiq or zhalim” (infidel, sinner and transgressor) to other Muslims who are not 
seen to be applying the God’s law in the Quran and Sunna (prophetic tradition) in their 
personal and public life. They demand that Sharia be applied in the private and public 
sphere. Meanwhile, in the other end of the spectrum, liberal and secular Muslims 
associate Sharia with a draconian rule, such as amputation of limbs, flogging and 
stoning, hence Sharia is seen to be devoid of humanitarian aspects.339 
According to Arif Ramdani, this Sharia-phobia is worsened by the 
stigmatization of the West about Sharia.340 Therefore, he continues, in response to the 
radical views of both far ends of the spectrum, PKS offers a middle path, which is not 
without adverse effect; there remain the conflicting accusation of both sides that PKS 
is being casual toward Sharia and at the same time is considered being very Sharia-
minded. In treading the middle way, PKS invites the umma to revisit Sharia by trying 
to understand the ultimate aim and main contents of Sharia. Understanding these twin 
issues about Sharia, he argues, will give a comprehensive understanding about how to 
implement Sharia norms in the life of Muslims as individuals and as a member of 
bigger community.   
B.   PKS’ Understanding of Sharia   
Muslims in Indonesia have been long practicing the major elements of Sharia 
rules in their daily life, such as praying, circumcision and marriage. In the last decade, 
the term Sharia has even become more popular in the business enterprises, such as 
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cosmetics, fashion, banking, hotel, insurance, and travelling.341  Nevertheless, it is 
asserted, Sharia-phobia still exists among many people, including mainstream 
politicians. People in general associate Sharia with severe punishment, such as 
flogging, amputation and stoning (hudud punishments), while the politicians perceive 
Sharia as a threat to national legal and political system. According to the common 
conviction among PKS leaders, this false perception about Sharia has resulted in the 
comprehensiveness and the humanitarian aspects of Sharia being overlooked and 
misunderstood; it has long been stigmatized as a draconian law, so the call for the 
implementation of Sharia is often misunderstood as practicing the law of hudud. 
Contrary to this common perception, Ahmad Heryawan, for instance, explains that the 
execution of hudud is actually the sole authority of the government, so individuals or 
institutions are not granted the authority to execute the hudud. Also, he adds, the 
application of hudud law for theft or fornication, for instance, is only applicable in a 
country where the basic needs of the people have already been fulfilled.  
To emphasize the humanitarian element of Sharia, PKS leaders often refer to 
popular legal incidents occurred during the time of the Prophet and his successor, the 
caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. In the time of Umar reign, a thief was exempted from 
hudud due to poverty; his abject poverty forced him to commit the crime. This policy 
of suspending the law of hudud upon the people who stole due to their poverty is a 
solid argument for PKS to suggest that punishment is not the goal of Sharia.342 Instead, 
Sharia means to protect wealth and life, and bring justice to all. To punish the poor for 
stealing due to the negligence of the rich or the government failure to deliver justice 
and prosperity is the act of injustice. The vulnerable should not bear the burden of 
social and governmental system failure. In short, the realization of social and economic 
justice should come before the enforcement of severe punishment of hudud.  
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Legal precedent in the time of the Prophet is repeatedly cited by PKS leaders 
to give a close look at how hudud was implemented. It is narrated that a pregnant 
woman confessing of adultery came to the prophet to ask for hudud law, to which the 
prophet responded that she has to deliver her baby, then to raise him and to breastfeed 
him for 2 years before she could come to see him again for his legal decision. It is 
narrated that her repentance would be enough to cleanse all the sin of the inhabitants 
of Medina. Commenting on this narration, Jamal Lulail suggests that if Muslims have 
high awareness toward Sharia, they will ask the government to implement it. If they 
are not ready yet, the work of da’wa to raise their awareness, understanding and 
practice of Sharia norms should be conducted diligently. 
In regard to the objective of Sharia, Ahmad Heryawan refers to the popular 
classical theory of maqhashid al-Sharia (purposes of Sharia), formulated and 
popularized by Shatibi (d. 1388) in his magnum opus, al-Muwafaqat. According to this 
theory, Sharia aims to protect unassailable interests of people, i.e. religion, life, mind, 
honor, wealth, which is known in Islamic legal theory as dharuriya al-khams (five 
fundamental necessities). Efforts and activities to protect these five principles are 
considered parts of Sharia implementation. In his capacity as a governor of West Java 
and based on this theory of maqhashid, Ahmad Heryawan gives detailed examples of 
how Sharia can be implemented in governmental level. In his opinion, government 
program of providing education for the future generation in such a way that they are 
able to manage the country and its abundant natural resource for the benefit, prosperity 
and advancement of the whole nation is a part of Sharia implementation.  
For Ahmad Heryawan, Sharia is also concerned with living a healthy life, both 
as individual and a community. While providing health services, which include 
hospitals, doctors, and medicines, is important for the health of people, in Heryawan’s 
opinion, it is the healthy environment and lifestyle that contribute a lot to the individual 
and communal health. Thus, Heryawan continues, every effort to educate people about 
healthy lifestyles, such as the program of clean water and rivers, and the obligation for 
Bandung civil servant to join morning exercise every week, is also considered a part 
of struggle on the path of Sharia. The same is true in the economic field, such as 
building the infrastructure to facilitate the quick and steady flow of people, goods and 
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services. Therefore, Heryawan concludes, it is safe to say that the whole government 
program of developing and building the country falls under the definition of struggle 
for Sharia implementation. 
The discussion above demonstrates that Sharia is understood by PKS as a 
blessing for humanity (rahmatan lil- ‘alamin); it is a universal norm that aims to 
preserve the five fundamental necessities of humankind. Any act, means or struggle to 
the realization of these necessities is certainly a part of Sharia. From a legal 
perspective, Muslims should follow all laws or regulations that are not in contradiction 
with the objective of Sharia, even if they are not referring to Sharia. Accordingly, PKS 
leaders are of the opinion that one is not at all becoming kafir, fasiq or zhalim merely 
by abiding oneself to the state law, as long as the laws are not legalizing the unlawful 
or prohibiting the lawful. In other words, the content is more important than, and 
should take precedence over, the label or name. If the content is good, the label or name 
is no longer relevant. Labels or names should not narrow universality of Islam. 
Framing Sharia 
Despite its popularity and wide acceptance in the world of business and 
economy, again the term Sharia in politics is quite a taboo. There still exists Sharia-
phobia among the people, including politicians. In the general public Sharia is 
associated with draconian rule, while in the politics Sharia is perceived as threat to 
democracy and modern legal system. The key for success in dealing with this situation 
is to present Sharia in such a way, which is acceptable in social and political realms. 
This section will examine the strategy of PKS in framing the Sharia. The main topics 
of discussion are, firstly, why the strategy of framing is utilized, and second how the 
party applies this strategy.   
a.   Sharia as a ‘Universal Goodness’ 
PKS understands Sharia as constituting universal goodness. In promoting the 
Sharia norm, PKS claims that it is not bombarding people with the term Sharia, since 
it will irk people. Therefore, instead of talking about Sharia, PKS prefers to talk about 
‘universal goodness,’such as health protection, social and economic justice, and 
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equality before law, in which people from all walks of life would agree. Besides, all 
goodness would be in line with Sharia, and the essence of Sharia is nothing but 
goodness. Therefore, in drafting, discussing and promulgating the regulation, PKS 
choses to focus on the formalization of common goodness that benefits the society as 
a whole.  
It has become a consensus among PKS leaders that Islam is revealed to deliver 
blessing, justice and prosperity for all humanity (rahmatan lil- ‘alamin), so any 
instrument or struggle that could lead to this objective is considered Islamic. The birth 
of PKS as a political party was partly driven by the concern that universal Islamic 
values, such as justice, transparency, accountability, equality, and egalitarianism, have 
not yet been delivered.343 Jamal Lulail believes that the struggle through the political 
arena (jihad siyasi) would enable the party to be involved in the process of policy 
making. Through the state instrumentalities, universal values of Sharia could be 
delivered to a larger segment of the people.  
PKS cadres in the legislative and executive branches are encouraged to 
implement Sharia norms utilizing the power and authority at their disposal. This is in 
line with the saying of the prophet (hadith) that “whosoever witnesses evil, change it 
with your hand.” Using the hand to call people to live according with Sharia norms 
necessitates power and authority to draft, promulgate and enforce the law. Sharia-
inspired Perda related to public order is the realization of the abovementioned hadith. 
The proliferation of Perda (regional regulation) in Indonesian provinces and 
municipalities is a product of unprecedented process of decentralization of the country. 
Initiated in 1999 during the B.J. Habibie administration, decentralization program in 
Indonesia’s political landscape is anchored in Law 32/2004 on Regional Government, 
which gives wider authority for regional administrations to self-government, except 
for matters which are held to be the exclusive powers of the central government, such 
as foreign politics, defense and security, court justice, monetary and religion. The Law 
is designed to meet popular demands for democratic reforms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 See the Declaration of PKS on 20 April 2002, and Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008.  
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PKS parliamentarians are fully aware that efforts to implement Sharia norms 
should be channeled through the process of legal drafting, without making direct 
reference to Sharia; it should be expressed in a neutral and universal language. Should 
the bill mention the term related to Sharia, it would be dropped right away during the 
hearing session of the parliament. With this in mind, Irsyad has an interesting insight 
that in order to be formalized, Sharia should be camouflaged and secularized. This 
strategy seems to downplay Sharia, and is not without disadvantage to the party image; 
the party was accused of being casual to Sharia. Responding to this criticism, Fahmi 
Fuad asserts: 
“Those who criticize us of being unfaithful to the cause of Sharia do not 
understand how the real politics works. Members of parliament would not pass 
any bill heavily loaded with Islamic terms in its wording. In order to convince 
them to agree with us in matters related to Sharia, we have to frame it in a 
neutral language that is acceptable to general people. Sharia norms should be 
carefully worded. Perda about Late Night Hour (Perda Jam Malam), for 
instance, has been promulgated; this Perda discourages women of coming out 
after dark in order to protect them from being molested. No doubt, this 
regulation is inspired by Sharia, but it is worded in terminologies acceptable to 
the people.” 
 
The PKS stance against alcoholic beverage, for instance, is a part of the struggle 
to promote Sharia norms for the benefit of all people, regardless of background or 
religion. However, when the bill of anti-Miras (Minuman Keras, intoxicated drink) is 
drafted and discussed, no reference to Sharia was made. In the struggle for Sharia 
norms, PKS avoids using Sharia label, because again the important thing is the 
substance rather than labels or names. For PKS, any bill that aims to protect public’s 
health is actually in line with Sharia injunction. Even without mentioning the rule of 
Sharia about Miras, people can figure out themselves about the negative impact of 
Miras for individuals and society. Having this in mind, PKS can save the bother of 
doing Sharia labeling in drafting a bill that PKS believes will bring good to the people. 
In other words, what is more important is the realization of the Maqashid of Sharia 
(the purpose of Sharia), rather than the label of Sharia. Therefore, according to Abdul 
Ghofar, all bills or regulations that are not in contradiction with Sharia should be 
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supported and followed by Muslims, even if they do not make direct reference to 
Sharia. 
PKS is among the staunch supporters of Perda Anti-Miras. As Fahmi Fuad 
explains in detail, some may accuse the Perda as a form of Islamization or 
Shariatization, which is truly a false accusation, because, he continues, sensible people 
would agree that unfettered distribution and consumption of alcohol will create 
problem for health. He refers to some secular European countries that strictly regulate 
the purchase and consumption of the liquor. He also points out that efforts have been 
made for so long to fight the damaging impact of alcoholic beverage; through the 
mosque pulpits, the preachers have delivered hundreds of sermons about the evil of 
alcoholic beverage, all but to no avail, and distribution of the liquor is still widespread. 
He concludes that it is only through legislation that Sharia rule on the liquor can be 
enforced more effectively.  
In some areas where the Perda Anti-Miras is promulgated and implemented, 
such as in Tangerang, Bogor, and Padang, PKS leaders of these regions are proud to 
see that bottles of alcoholic beverage are not available in all the shops throughout the 
municipalities. This local government also prohibited from selling the liquor within the 
vicinity of places of worship, schools, government buildings, and hospitals. In these 
municipalities, only at four-star hotels and above can people purchase and consume 
the alcoholic beverages. However, in Moluccas, distribution and consumption of the 
intoxicated liquor is still high. Most of the liquor, called shopi, is local made and home 
production, and widespread among youngsters. According to Sudarmo, PKS 
parliamentarian of Moluccas, uncontrolled consumption of alcoholic beverages is 
responsible for social disorders, such as inter-community fights, petty crimes, and 
juvenile brawl. Actually, Perda on Alcoholic Beverage Control (Perda Pengendalian 
Minuman Beralkohol) has been issued, but it only serves as a control mechanism; it 
does not prohibit the distribution or the consumption of the liquor, so people can easily 
find it in many places. The Perda cannot be implemented effectively without the 
intervention of the authority. To cope with this issue, the action has been taken by PKS 
mentioned in details by Sudarmo as follows:  
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“We cannot ask the provincial government to make Perda specifically 
implemented for Muslim population, because Perda is for all people in 
Moluccas regardless of religion. Accordingly, we are now struggling to break 
down the Perda on Alcoholic Beverage Control into district regulations, so they 
will be implemented in areas where Muslim composes the majority of the 
population. The Perda has been promulgated by the local parliament with no 
significant resistance from the people in general. However, it only controls the 
distribution; it does not prohibit the consumption. In this case, we imitate the 
approach of the Quran towards khamr (intoxicants). Quran teaches us the 
gradual steps of handling the khamr, the final end of which is to ban it 
altogether. In the first step, we have to educate the people about the greater 
harm of the liquor compared to the little benefit they might get from it. So, for 
now, we are still in the first stage towards prohibiting the liquor. The high 
consumption of liquor is parallel with drug addiction problem, which is 
trending up year by year. Unfortunately, I do not have accurate data about it. 
The misuse of drugs is followed by the spreading of HIV. If we do not have a 
swift, serious and massive response to the pressing issues of alcohol, drug, and 
HIV, the future of our generation will be at stake.” 
Unchecked distribution of alcoholic beverage in Solo also becomes the main 
concerns of PKS. In 2010, the city of Solo drafted a bill on Miras (Miras, an acronym 
for Minuman Keras, or intoxicated beverage). Abdul Ghofar explains that the draft 
triggered a heated debate among Solo’s parliamentarians. PDIP was reluctant to 
support the bill for the fear that it will become an opening gate to the prohibition of 
Miras all together. This fear is actually baseless, because in terms of hierarchy of 
legislative instruments, Perda is in subordinate position to the president instruction 
(Keppres, Keputusan Presiden) or ministerial regulation (Permen, Peraturan Menteri), 
and both Keppres and Permen only prohibit Miras containing 5 percent of alcohol and 
above. Accordingly, all varieties of Miras containing less than 5 percent of alcohol are 
not regulated and available in shops and malls. As Abdul Ghofar confirms, the bill was 
actually not different from Keppress and Permen; it did not regulate Miras containing 
alcohol below 5 percent. After some consultation with Muslim figures and religious 
leaders, Abdul Ghofar continues, PKS decided to struggle for the insertion into the bill 
some clauses that regulate Miras containing less than 5 percent of alcohol. After 
prolonged debate and discussion in the parliament, parliamentarians of all parties 
agreed to regulate all categories of Miras, and the distribution is limited only in high-
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class hotels and cafes. It is safe to say that, should this bill be promulgated into a Perda, 
Miras will not be available to common public in Solo.344 
However, Abdul Ghofar explains that some elements of Muslims disagreed 
with the bill and conducted waves of demonstrations. They demanded the total 
prohibition of the distribution of Miras, and argued that by regulating Miras and its 
distribution, the bill still gives room for Miras. For them, the bill contradicts the Sharia, 
because it permits something that is prohibited by Sharia, hence demand for the 
cancellation of the bill. They argued that all type of Miras is prohibited by Sharia. The 
fact that Keppres and Permen do not prohibit Miras containing less than 5 percent of 
alcohol will make it difficult for PKS to acquiesce to the demand of total prohibition. 
In this situation PKS applied the Sharia principle that “what we cannot achieve all 
together should not be left all together” (ma la yudrak kulluh, la yutrak kulluh), and 
while confronting two potential harms, we are obliged to choose the least (akhaff al-
dlarurayn). PKS failed to convince them that to drop the bill is tantamount to return to 
the status quo of Keppres and Permen; it only means that the wide distribution of Miras 
containing 5 percent of alcohol is unchecked. Finally, PKS was forced to give up to 
their demand for the fear of being accused of permitting the prohibited (menghalalkan 
yang diharamkan).  
In the issue of Miras in Solo, PKS proved to be in a difficult situation. The party 
had to face a two-pronged opposition from whose interests were not favorable to the 
success of the bill. In one hand, PDIP, a party of majority seat in municipal parliament 
of Solo, was reluctant to support the bill restricting Miras of less than 5 percent alcohol, 
and in the other, elements of Muslim organizations demand that the bill ban all types 
of Miras altogether. Interest and agenda of the two camps render the progress of the 
bill impossible, and in the end, it leads to the final drop of the bill. PKS had to drop the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Debate on Perda on Miras in Solo and its final decision was widely covered by media, 
including the following: Malam ini, DPRD Solo Ketuk Palu Raperda Miras Batal Jadi Perda, 
www.jateng-tribunnews.com/2014/03/05; LUIS [Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta] Tolak Pengesahan 
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bill in order to avoid unnecessary debate that would only create commotion within 
society. One of the important reasons for PKS final decision to drop the bill is given 
by Abdul Ghofar, as he relates it with the PKS political maneuver of supporting Jokowi 
and Rudy F.X. for the governorship of Solo, whose end result has tarnished the image 
of the party. This comment also hints the social and political predicament and challenge 
faced by the party in the effort to realize its political agenda.   
“We have already had a bad experience of being accused [by elements of 
Muslim organization in Solo] for supporting a non-Muslim leader in the local 
election. In 2010, Jokowi and Rudy F.X. were in their highest popularity for 
the governorship of Solo. PKS tried in vain to find a candidate from among 
Muslim figures to compete Jokowi-Rudy in the election. No one seems to 
prepare for the battle. PKS knew it for sure that even without the support from 
PKS and PAN, the two biggest Muslim parties in Solo, Jokowi-Rudy would 
win the election by a landslide. After long deliberation, we came to a decision 
that for the sake of parliamentary da’wa it is better for us to be inside the 
government. Therefore, PKS and PAN decided to join the winning team. In the 
media, we said we support Jokowi, without mentioning Rudy. We would like 
to send a message that our support is only for Jokowi and we are as reluctant 
as the Muslim elements in lending a support for a non-Muslim to be a leader. 
It was sad that PKS was held responsible for the ascension of a non-Muslim 
into governorship of Solo, especially after Jokowi left the office following his 
governorship of Jakarta and then the presidency of Indonesia. Interestingly 
enough, PAN is spared from any accusation.”  
Relating to the strategy of framing Sharia, Perda on KTR (Kawasan Tanpa 
Rokok, Cigarette-Free Zone) is also worth mentioning. PKS initiated the bill on KTR, 
in which the party does not make a direct reference to Sharia rules in convincing the 
parliamentarians about the harm of smoking. Preserving public health is the main 
reason behind the bill. In order to protect the public from the harmful impacts of 
cigarettes, smoking is prohibited in eight public areas, which includes working and 
recreational place, place of worship, kids’ zones, public transportation, schools, health 
facilities, and sport centers. These areas combined only cover hundreds of square 
kilometers out of approximately eleven thousand square kilometers of total area of 
Bogor. Najamuddin, PKS parliamentarian of Bogor, argues that the cost to cure 
cigarette-related sickness outweighs the government revenue from cigarette tax. He 
explains that the government earns around 7 billion Rupiah from cigarette tax, but has 
to spend around 12 billion Rupiah to combat the cigarette-related disease. The party 
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argument about the benefit of the bill for the public health convinced the 
parliamentarians, and Perda no. 12/2009 on KTR was promulgated. According to 
Najamuddin, this Perda is considered unique, because the majority of Bogor 
parliamentarians who issued the Perda are actually active smokers, so it is as if they 
have made themselves stop smoking.  
From the perspective of da’wa, the effectiveness of Perda in enforcing the 
Sharia injunction is much higher than the preaching on the pulpit. While the preachers 
can only reach hundreds of people and have no binding power, Perda can reach and 
bind millions. Living a healthy life is a part of Sharia teachings, and the legislation of 
Perda of Anti-Miras and Perda on KTR is one form of government intervention in 
promoting the public health. Promulgating Perda that will benefit people in general is 
a part of work of parliamentary da’wa. As Najamuddin proudly explains, under the 
umbrella of the Perda, the government can launch campaign against liquor and 
cigarette in every school to educate the students about the harm of its consumption. 
In the effort to legislate Sharia norms, PKS does not see any significance of 
Sharia labels on the Perda; there is no other consideration for this strategy but the 
preference of substance to labels. Sharia label will only narrow the room for maneuver. 
According to Mahyeldi, PKS leader and also major of Padang, West Sumatera, PKS 
capitalizes the culture of the society as a strategy to broaden the room for maneuver. 
In its effort to implement Sharia in West Sumatera, for instance, PKS utilizes the well-
known philosophy deeply entrenched in the cultural life of the Minang people (Minang 
is short for Minangkabau, a popular term used for a whole area of West Sumatera). 
The philosophy says: Adat basandi Syarak, Syarak basandi Kitabullah (Custom is 
based on Sharia, Sharia is based on Quran) and similarly, Syarak mangatur, Adat 
mamakai (Sharia guides, custom follows). These two expressions encapsulate the 
affinity between Sharia and cultural norms of the Minang society.  
According to Mahyeldi, Sharia norm has imbedded in the culture of Minang 
people. As a cultural norm, Sharia obligation of wearing scarf, for instance, is followed 
without resistance. Implementation of Sharia norms of dress code becomes easy 
because at the same time it is also culturally right. The regulation of Islamic dress code 
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at schools or government offices in West Sumatera is actually inspired by the cultural 
reality of the society. The regulation is only an accentuation of the culture. 
Furthermore, Sharia is considered the highest form of culture of Minang people, so as 
to become a measurement of people observance to the culture itself. Wearing scarf 
becomes a symbol of cultural attachment. Muslims woman without scarf in West 
Sumatera are considered ignorant about their Islamic cultural heritage. Thus, culture 
and religion in Minang society is like two sides of the same coin. It only comes natural 
for PKS that in the effort of inviting people to Sharia norms the party always refers to 
this philosophy, and to gain wider acceptance within the people of Minangkabau, the 
implementation of Sharia norms should be fashioned into adat (customary law). In 
short, Sharia norms should find root in adat. Due to the uniqueness of Minang society, 
PKS once proposed to the national parliament to give West Sumatera a special status 
as the special province of Adat Basandi Syarak. Marfendi, Vice of PKS Provincial 
Office (DPD PKS, Dewan Pengurus Pusat PKS) of West Sumatera, gives the reason 
for this unique proposal of PKS for West Sumatera Province: 
“We have already had Aceh, Jakarta and Yogyakarta as special provinces. 
Now, we want the same thing for West Sumatera, due to its unique social and 
cultural characteristic. If we can realize this idea, the issue of Sharia in West 
Sumatera will come to an end, because Sharia norms will be implemented as 
adat.” 
 
b.   Reaching a Common Goal 
PKS leaders believe that the struggle to realize goodness is not a monopoly of 
certain individual, group or party. Accordingly, PKS would welcome individuals, 
groups or parties who have the same vision to work together for the realization of this 
common goal; they could participate in promoting goodness for all. It is for this very 
reason that in 2008 PKS was declared to be an open party. With this new political 
platform, PKS hopes that people who share the same vision can work together. 
According to Jamal Lulail, this new platform is actually congruent with the nature of 
Islam as an open religion, in a sense that it offers blessing for all humanity (Rahmatan 
lil Alamin). He continues that Islam obliges all Muslims to spread the Prophet mission 
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of delivering rahma (blessing) to all people, regardless of their background, since they 
also have the same undeniable right to the blessing of Islam. Following the footstep of 
the Prophet, it is natural for PKS to be an open party since its inception. PKS was and 
will always be an open party. Jamal Lulail explains that people’s perceptions of PKS 
as a closed party mainly results from the fact that PKS cadres have distinct attitude and 
behavior, especially during the formative phase of Tarbiyah movement. It is for the 
purpose of removing this misperception that public announcement was made about 
PKS new platform as an open party. 
Due to the openness of the party and the universality of the Sharia, PKS is ready 
to cooperate with any party that shares the same political platform and action of 
delivering goodness to the people. For Marfendi, political achievement of the party is 
not measured merely by the numbers of the party cadres in the parliament, but by the 
breadth of the party’s ideals. He believes that due to its universality, Islamic value will 
gain wide acceptance of the people. This confident attitude toward the party platform 
and the nature of Sharia has translated into the eagerness of the party to form coalition 
with other parties, or cooperate with people of different backgrounds. As a sign of the 
maturity of the party, PKS is ready to share its goal and work together in realizing the 
ultimate goal of delivering social order, justice and prosperity. The struggle of PKS to 
prohibit anti-alcoholic beverage, for instance, will be discussed in length to provide an 
example of the joint effort between PKS and other parties of the same vision. 
Regarding the cooperation with others in achieving the goal of da’wa, 
Mohammad Yasin refers to the sirah (prophet’s life story) in which the Prophet was 
ready to cooperate with people of diverse religious and cultural background in his 
effort of spreading the message. He also mentioned that Ummayyad and Abbasid 
dynasties were known to have helpers from local non-Muslim subjects in running the 
administrative affairs of the state. With this in mind, PKS is supportive to the agenda 
of individuals, groups or parties that promote a bill that is in line with Sharia norms. 
For instance, when the Governor of Pontianak, West Kalimantan, drafted a bill 
prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverage, PKS gave full support for the bill, 
knowing that it will bring goodness for the people in general. The fact that the governor 
is a non-Muslim politician of PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan-Struggle 
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Indonesia Democratic Party) did not prevent PKS from lending its support. Regarding 
the support for goodness regardless the source, Marfendi asserts: 
“PKS support goes to the goodness … If we learn that certain political party 
proposes some bills which uphold Sharia norms, we should be happy and ready 
to lend support. Even if the party uses the bill for political purpose, such as 
garnering vote from the people, we still have to support them.”  
The case of Perda on Anti-Alcohol in Tangerang is another example of PKS 
support for goodness, regardless individual or party promoting it. Fahmi Fuad reveals 
that in 2005, Tangerang municipal parliament has successfully promulgated Perda no. 
7/2005 that limits the distribution of alcoholic beverage. The issuance of Perda No. 
7/2005 was made easy by the political will of the major. As a major, Wahidin Halim, 
a politician from Democrat Party, perceived that the bill on anti-alcoholic beverage 
could be capitalized for his political investment. Fahmi Fuad explains that the people 
in Tangerang felt a pressing need to tackle the issue of alcohol once and for all, so it 
has become the issue of high selling point for the incumbent. It would be politically 
incorrect to ignore the growing public demand. For political investment, he argues, the 
major should acquiesce to the popular demand. It only comes natural that the major 
finally felt urged to initiate the bill, bring it forth to the local parliament for 
deliberation, and make it legislated as Perda. As one can predict, the incumbent 
succeeded in capturing his position for the second term.  
As demonstrated above, political investment often becomes a strong drive 
behind the promulgation of Sharia-inspired Perdas. This phenomenon is perceived by 
PKS leaders as an opportunity to introduce more norms of Sharia into the legislation. 
In Padang, for instance, Perda Pendidikan (Perda on Education) was issued in 2011. 
As Mahyeldi explains in detail, the Perda maintains that students are obliged to have 
Quranic literacy, and the memorization of some Quranic chapters is considered an 
achievement and point of credit to admission for higher education. Under the same 
Perda, character-based education highly inspired by Islamic norms is promoted. Under 
the umbrella of character-based education, Islamic and local values can be introduced 
into the subject of studies. While teaching Physics, Chemistry or Social Sciences, for 
instance, teachers can insert local wisdoms or Islamic norms. Here, Mahyeldi 
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concludes, the integration of science and Quranic teachings is introduced and 
strengthened. It is important to note that there is no single Sharia term mentioned in 
the Perda; the word is deleted from the bill and replaced by the term commonly 
accepted by all members of the municipal parliament. With the word Sharia removed 
from the initial draft, all parties finally accepted the bill unanimously.  
The promulgation of Perda on Education and other similar Perdas, such as 
Perda on Zakat (Alms giving) and Perda on Cigarette-Free Zone, would not be possible 
without political cooperation. Not only Islamic parties, but also “nationalist parties” 
contribute to the promulgation of these Perdas. Mahyeldi believes that since all matters 
regulated in Perda are actually derived from Islamic universal values already practiced 
by the society, parties refusing to translate it into regulation will only put themselves 
at risk of losing their constituents. He further asserts that due to the universality of 
Sharia, any political party could promote Sharia value for whatever reason, including 
political investment. The case of “nationalist parties” in Padang shows clearly the 
political motive behind the promotion of Sharia norms. Sharia issues have been 
capitalized in securing the vote. As a da’wa party, PKS perceives this opportunistic 
approach as something positive for Sharia legislation. 
To achieve its goals in politics, PKS should build a good relationship with other 
parties. Forming a coalition becomes a necessity. Since the number of PKS cadres in 
the legislative body is relatively small, Najamuddin is certain that the key success in 
achieving its political agenda will depend very much on the ability to influence others 
and to create a common agenda. In order to successfully promulgate the bill of Diniyah 
Taklimiyah in Bogor, for instance, PKS takes the initiative of persuading others to 
support the bill. No quotation from Quranic verses is used to get the point across. PKS 
leaders of Bogor know too well that normally people despise of being told what to do. 
Instead, the party regards them as partners in discussing the issue, so that the bill 
becomes a common agenda. Jajat Sudrajat reveals the PKS approach towards the 
parliamentarians during the deliberation of Perda Diniyah Taklimiyah:  
“As parents, they [i.e. the parliamentarians] also need to see their children 
growing and becoming good and pious persons, and some might also have 
friends or neighbors who are the teachers in madrasah (Islamic school). So, our 
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duty is to convince them that their needs and interests are catered in the bill of 
Diniyah Takmiliyah. I have an opinion that PKS will not succeed in struggling 
Sharia norms without cooperating with other parties in the parliament. We are 
not talking about the success of PKS, but the success of all people. PKS 
president encourages us to build close relationship with other parties. For this 
purpose, we should improve the skill of team work and influencing others. We 
should be able to work together with other parties and avoid being selfish or 
becoming know-it-all type of persons. We invite people to participate in 
developing the society according to their position and capability. By doing it, 
we are exchanging our ideas. So, our ideas become theirs and vice versa.”  
PKS dubs the Perda of Diniyah Taklimiyah a “Perda of MURI” (Museum 
Record Indonesia or Indonesian Record Museum), because it undergoes a very long 
process of discussion and hearing in the municipal parliament of Bogor. And it takes 
PKS an extra effort to convince 45 members of parliament of Bogor, most of whom 
have no madrasah background, and some are non-Muslims. Najamuddin explains that 
as the initiator of the Perda, PKS has to explain to other parliamentarians that the bill 
of DT does not give preference to Islamic education, or discriminate other religious 
education. Through the Perda, he said, PKS is trying to get the government involved 
in the development of madrasah. He adds that other parliamentarians are free to draft 
similar bills for their religious education. Whether or not the bill will be accepted and 
promulgated is dependent upon the success in building political communication.  
The key to success in politics is communication. As long as PKS can build good 
communication, the party can achieve its goal in politics. According to Najamuddin, 
parliamentarians in Bogor are not at all a priori with the implementation of Sharia 
norms. However, he explains in detail that efforts to promote Sharia should be done by 
formulating Sharia norms in a language that is friendly to the people. Besides, the bill 
should not be in conflict with the Constitution or the regulations of higher rank. Before 
bringing the bill to the discussion and hearing session, PKS parliamentarians will 
conduct numerous informal communications with all their colleagues in the parliament 
to formulate a better draft. During this informal meeting, any suggestion for the 
betterment of the draft will be cordially welcome. According to Najamuddin, at that 
time, PKS of Bogor constituted only 11 percent of the total seat (5 out of 45). But, due 
to good communication and relationship with majority of parliamentarians, the quality 
of PKS political bargaining in the local parliament surpasses the quantity of its 
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parliamentarians. The power of communication, he concludes, has multiplied the 
nominal numbers of PKS parliamentarians by three times or more, as if PKS shares 
half plus one of the total seats in the parliament. 
It is common for PKS cadres to work together with parliamentarians from other 
parties in similar issues relating to public affairs. Agenda or action might be the same, 
but the mindset would vary. Jajat Sudrajat makes an analogy of the mindset behind 
PKS actions and those of others that might be different:  
“The act of removing a branch from the street might look the same. However, 
some do it as an act of following the sunna of the Prophet, which is an act of 
ibadah, while for others it is merely an act to clean the road. So, while the 
motive is different, the result is the same.”  
The initiative to eradicate the poverty, for instance, has been successfully 
formalized into a Perda. According to Jajat Sudrajat, PKS cadres in municipal 
parliament of Bogor conceive the program of eradicating poverty as an act of helping 
dhu’afa (the poor) as commanded by God and His Prophet, while others might have a 
different motive. In this case, the program has become the common issue, the result of 
which is a regulation namely Perda K3 (Kebersihan, Keamanan dan Ketertiban or 
Cleanliness, Security and Order). 
According to Thohari, outwardly, as a party, PKS might look similar to other 
Muslim parties, such as PKB, PAN, or PPP. He explains that what makes PKS different 
from other parties is that the party has a well-structured training program (tarbiyah)that 
includes the supervision of their religious observance and social activities. PKS 
caderization department issues a small book of 158 pages consisting of some guideline 
for the party cadres. The book is divided into seven chapter delineating practical seven 
desirable character of PKS cadres, namely (1) strong and independent, (2) dynamic, 
creative and innovative, (3) specialist and global-oriented, (4) productive supervisor, 
(5) diligent and excellent in collective action, (6) agent of change and (7) community 
leadership. In each of the chapter is list of indicators for each character, followed by 
some questionnaires and practical tips and solution to improve the performance. To 
give a glimpse of what the book intends to achieve, here are some examples. One of 
indicators for the first character is to be sincere in conducting da’wa, to which attached 
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some questionnaires of list of activities relevant to the character discussed. The 
questionnaire box is to be filled voluntarily and honestly by a cadre within the scale of 
four, namely very rare, rare, often, and very often. Then tips and steps for the 
improvement is provided after each questionnaire evaluation. 345  The cadres are 
grouped based on a training level, and they have to pass the test to proceed to a higher 
level. Weekly tarbiyah aims to maintain the loyalty and militancy of the cadres. PKS 
makes training program (tarbiyah) a serious business of the party, because the party 
believes that the change of a nation and country necessitates the change of individuals. 
Through tarbiyah, PKS is trying to implement Sharia norms in the cadres’ daily life, 
starting with themselves and their families. Thohari believes that implementing Sharia 
outright within the state level would be a long and difficult process. The time has not 
come yet. Partly due to the gradual approach of implementing Sharia that requires a 
slow but systematic process of da’wa, some people often accuse the party of not being 
serious with implementing Sharia. According to Thohari, this accusation is neglecting 
the fact that PKS has been practicing Sharia in a daily life of the party cadres. 
C.   Perda: A Means of Shariatization  
As autonomous regions, provincial or municipal administrations have the right 
to issue regional regulations to implement their autonomy. Art 136(3) of Law 32/2004 
provides that the purpose of Perda is implementing and refining higher-level 
regulations in line with individual characteristics of the region.346 However, despite its 
mission of empowering previously weak local government and society, art. 136(4) of 
Law 32/2004 states that Perda is not allowed contradicting the public interest and/or 
regulation of higher hierarchy. In case of the breach, mechanism to review and 
invalidate Perda is elaborated in the Law. Two main avenues for evaluating the Perda 
include the executive review by the government and the judicial review by the courts.  
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It is widely reported that thousands of Perdas have been reviewed and finally 
annulled by the central state institutions, either the executive or judicative. 347 
Interestingly enough, there are only 2 Perda Sharia under serious review and then 
abrogated by the government. On 11 September 2006, regent of Pasuruan enacted the 
Perda 4/2006 on Opening Hour of Restaurant and Kiosk during Ramadan, the fasting 
month. The Perda requires restaurants and kiosks to close during the day of Ramadan 
and only open after 5 in the evening. Five months later, the provincial government 
stated that the bill potentially contravenes Art 6(1) of Law 11/2005 on The Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, to the effect that it should be annulled. The reason for the 
annulment is given in a letter signed by the governor secretary, Soekarwo, on 2 
February 2007. The letter states that Pasuruan locates strategically in the national road 
of Bali, Surabaya and Malang that makes it an important transit city with economic 
significance. Therefore, implementation of the Perda will potentially hamper economic 
activities of the people.348 
The case of Qanun 3/2008 of Aceh province on Local Political Party is also 
under review of Ministry for Internal Affairs.349 The Qanun obliges parliamentary 
candidates in 2009 election to have proficiency in Quranic recitation. The Minister did 
not revoke the Perda altogether, because provincial parliament of Aceh is invested with 
the legislative powers. However, he compels to revoke the art 36 of the Qanun, which 
stipulates that nominees should take the Quranic proficiency test to be eligible for the 
election. According to the Minister, this stipulation contravenes the Perda with Law 
10/2008 on the General Election. As this paragraph demonstrates, the reason for the 
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annulment of these two Perdas involves the breach with the regulations of the higher 
hierarchy. How the Perda Sharia is formulated so it could survive the judicial and 
executive review will be examined in some paragraphs below.  
There are around 78 Sharia-inspired Perda enacted in 52, out of more than 500, 
districts.350 Provinces with vast Muslim majority population and strong roots of Islam, 
such as West Java, West Sumatera, and South Sulawesi, have promulgated more Perda 
Sharia than provinces with more religious plurality or syncretism. The reason is very 
clear. For territories with mixed-religious affiliation and syncretic traditions, 
politicians are likely disinclined to enact the Perda that could displease non-Muslims 
or less-devout Muslims. Therefore, we have very few cases of Perda Sharia in 
provinces of North Sumatera, Maluku, or Central Kalimantan. In the first territory, 
enactment of Perda Sharia will boast a pious image on the drafters in executive or 
legislative branches of the state. By acquiring a more devout image, they could gain 
support from the vast majority of Muslims.351 Perda Sharia often becomes a vehicle to 
build up Muslim support for electoral purposes; it is used simply as a strategic move 
for political upward mobility.352 Any sign of reluctance to support or promote Perda 
Sharia will thus jeopardize their political goals. Furthermore, by promoting religiosity, 
piety and morality enshrined in the Perda Sharia, career politicians and government 
officials could drag the intention of the public from the government failure in social 
and political issues, such as economic injustice, corruption practice, public service 
mismanagement, and bureaucratic inefficiency, to mention only a few. In short, Perda 
has been effectively used as a protective shield against any popular criticism, by 
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transferring the blame for social and political crisis from the government officials’ 
inability to the morality and religiosity of the people in general. Looking from this 
perspective, it is safe to say that the primary beneficiaries of the Perda are the 
politicians of Perda Sharia proponents and government elite in the executive and 
legislative body of the state.353 
The so-called Perda Sharia is a legal instrument issued by provincial or 
municipal administrations that contains element of Sharia norms of morality, ethics 
and religiosity. However, in presenting such a Perda, regional governments often label 
it as public order regulations rather than as stipulations of Sharia law. In this way, the 
Perda manages to conceal its religious tone in both the title and the text, suggesting 
that it does not interfere with the exclusive authority of central government on matters 
relating to religious affairs. The Perda Anti-Alcoholic Drinks, for instance, delineates 
in its preamble that the reason for its enactment is to anticipate the unfettered 
distribution of alcohol, which cause a bad effect on the peace and order of the 
community, and especially the health and morality of the youngsters. Most Sharia-
inspired Perdas are designed in a similar fashion, with the goal of preserving public 
order taking precedence over the application of Islamic law. Accordingly, these so 
called Perda Sharia cannot be put under the classification of religious legislation. The 
authors of this Perda argues that prostitution, gambling, sale as well as consumption of 
alcohol are also legally regulated in most countries, disregard the religious conviction 
of the majority population. Like any other similar regulation in other countries, be it 
Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, secular or atheist, Perdas of anti-vice (Perda Anti-
Maksiat) are aptly perceived as an exercise of the public order. PKS leaders believe 
that to save the Perda from the potential conflict with art 10 of Law 32/2004, Perda 
Sharia should be packaged as public order directives or should refer to sources other 
than Islamic law. By concealing its Islamic character and by referring to national 
legislation, Perda Sharia succeeds in strengthening its legitimacy within the legal 
system of Indonesia.  
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Perdas with heavily Islamic tones often try to anchor themselves in legislative 
instruments of higher rank. In the case of Perda of Education in Padang, for instance, 
in justifying the provision that students are required to obtain Quranic reading 
proficiency, art 3-6 on the Basis, Function and Aims of Perda 5/2011 on Education 
referred to the goal of education as stipulated in the Law 20/2003 on National 
Education System, art 3 of which provides: 
“National education, besides having the aim of developing skills and building 
character of dignified nation and enriching the intellectual life of the nation, 
also has the aim of nurturing students to become individuals with faith and piety 
towards Almighty God, excellent character, healthy, knowledgeable, astute, 
creative, independent, democrat and law abiding citizen.” 
Reference to the superior legislative instrument allows the parliamentarians to defend 
their Sharia-inspired Perda as legitimate contribution to the development of morality 
and religiosity of the student.  
As demonstrated above, Sharia rules cannot become a basis for legal 
consideration. With this in mind, the regent of Bogor, for instance, issued an edict 
stating that public servants are obliged to perform their pray on time. According to 
Fahmi Fuad, the legal reasoning for the edict is not to enforce the religious observance 
of praying, but simply to improve the performance of public servants. Many public 
servants of Bogor, he says, often abandon their office on the pretext of praying. To end 
this belligerent attitude, the regent promulgated an edict about the punctuality in 
praying. By this edict, it is now unacceptable for the government employees in Bogor 
to pray late at the expense of public service. In other words, praying is no longer an 
excuse for them to abandon the office during working hours, hence negligence of 
public service. 
The vulnerability of the Perda Sharia of being challenged and finally abrogated 
due to its interference with the exclusive right of the central government on religious 
matters has forced some regional administrations to frame their Perdas as regulations 
guided by local custom, or adat.354 Various regencies in West Sumatera, for instance 
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Solok (Perda 6/2002), Sawahlunto (Perda 2/2003), Lima Puluh Kota (Perda 5/2003), 
Pasaman (Perda 22/2003), Pesisir Selatan (Perda 4/2005) and Agam (Perda 6/2005), 
have formalized Islamic dress code into Perda. The Obligation to wear Muslim 
clothing is anchored into the customary principle of Minang people: Adat Basandi 
Syarak. In this way, the religious content of the Perda is intermingled with the local 
custom. By linking Sharia norms with adat, the regency has buttressed the Perda from 
the potential challenge against its legal validity. Furthermore, Law 32/2004 also 
provides living adat a legal protection. Article 2 (9) of the Law asserts that the state 
acknowledges and respects local adat communities and their traditional rights as well, 
as long as they are in accordance with the principles of Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia. Under art 2(9) of Law 32/2004, customary law derived from Islamic 
norms and values deserves protection. Based on the principle of preserving adat, 
prevalence of Islam as a cultural norm and local tradition of many Indonesian regions, 
especially in West Sumatera, has been exploited to pursue PKS political agenda of 
legislating Sharia norms in the form of regional regulations.   
Regarding PKS political stance on Perda Sharia, it is important to state that the 
so-called Perda Sharia is not known in PKS political platform.355 In his interview with 
Republika, Jazuli Juwaini, Deputy of Commission VIII of Deliberative Assembly from 
PKS, gives some response following the polemic of Syaria by-laws that in Indonesia, 
“Perda Syariah” is not known in Indonesian legal nomenclature, because Indonesia is 
not a country base on particular religion. In his opinion, the first article of Pancasila 
(Indonesian ideological basis, consisting of five principle, the first of which read the 
Oneness of God), sanctions the norms and values of all religion adhered by Indonesian 
citizen. He explains that Sharia is blessing for humanity; it is not to scare people. 
Therefore, some controversial by-laws suspected to be discriminative toward certain 
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segments of the population or in violation of public interest are not to be associated 
with Sharia.356 
However, the so called Perda Sharia can be promulgated only in the regions 
where the people have already had high awareness of Sharia and are prepared to 
implement it. According to Jamal Lulail, enforcing Perda Sharia to the people who are 
not ready to accept it will be counterproductive. He explains that Sharia-inspired Perda 
would only create havoc if it were promulgated without taking into consideration the 
level of people awareness and understanding of the Sharia norms. It is very situational; 
it is applied only for the people who need it. Therefore, Perda Sharia in Aceh Province 
raises some concern among PKS circles. According to Jamal Lulail, the large 
population of the country does not yet demand Perda Sharia. Giving some reasons for 
his opinion, he says that the majority of the people are still living below poverty line, 
so their biggest concern is how to fulfill the basic needs, such as seeking a job and 
feeding their family. Therefore, he argues, it would take a long way before they could 
reach enough level of awareness to implement Sharia law; it is not the time yet to 
implement Sharia outright. He believes that it is mainly for this reason that the 
implementation of Perda Sharia in Aceh meets with public resistance and protest. Lack 
of understanding and awareness of Sharia, people in Aceh are not ready yet to submit 
themselves to Perda Sharia. Accordingly, Sharia becomes a social nuisance in Aceh.  
Some concern about the promulgation of Perda Sharia in Aceh is also voiced 
by Ahmad Heryawan, in which he says that: 
“Unlike other province, Aceh has a Perda that obliges women to cover 
themselves. As a province with special status of autonomy, Aceh is permitted 
to have such regulation, as long as it has been socialized to the public, and the 
people are aware of their obligation. Public awareness and education should be 
in place before the rule is implemented. However, for the initial stage, it is fine 
to use the law to manage, encourage and even force people to abide by the 
religious obligations. It has become the nature of the law to manage, control 
and force people. Even though the women in Aceh are now wearing the scarf 
as an obligation by the law, at the end it is hoped that they would wear it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Politisi PKS: Perda Syariah Tak Dikenal di Indonesia, www. 
republika.co.id/berita/nasional/ hukum/13/01/10. 
	  	  
	  
165 
voluntarily as a religious obligation whose reward will be given in the 
hereafter.” 
PKS concern of Perda Sharia in Aceh informs us that forcing people to 
implement Sharia comprehensively would not be wise, due to the fact that people have 
a diverse understanding about Sharia. Moreover, the majority of the people are not well 
educated in Sharia; only a small number of people have good awareness and 
understanding of Sharia. However, PKS is supportive to the effort of Aceh Province in 
realizing Sharia as the law of the land.357 Perda Sharia in Aceh is considered as a form 
of local consensus and has been approved by the state. Due to the special status of the 
province, the executive and legislative powers of the region have been invested the 
authority to issue their own Perda which could represent entrenched Acehnese Islamic 
identity. 
From the above discussion, it is safe to say that the implementation of Sharia 
norms through Perda Sharia should not be counterproductive. Thorough public 
education about Sharia norms should be introduced, provided and propagated before 
Sharia is made obligatory for the people. In other words, the emergence of Perda Sharia 
should be the natural step of the ongoing process of gradually increased public 
understanding of Sharia. 
For PKS, Perda Sharia is not a goal in itself. It is only an instrument to direct 
the people to live their life according to the Sharia norms. In other words, Perda is 
needed to force people to implement Sharia norms in their daily life. Upon the issuance 
of the instruction of regents on the obligation to wear scarf, for instance, it is now a 
common phenomenon to see Muslim women wearing a headscarf to work and school. 
They feel obliged to wear it only at work and school. For Marfendi, this mindset should 
be changed. Since Perda Sharia is only a means of realizing Sharia norms, a mere Perda 
is not enough to Islamize society. In his opinion, da’wa to the people still needs to be 
done diligently so they will abide by Sharia norms voluntarily.  
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In disseminating Sharia norms, PKS uses a dual strategy: horizontal da’wa and 
vertical da’wa.358 The former consists of the effort to disseminate and instill Islamic 
norms within Muslim community so that they will have solid awareness that Islam 
provides the most viable norms for managing their daily life in individual, societal and 
governmental level. This form of da’wa aims to provide social basis for Islam. This 
strategy of da’wa consists of the struggle of the cadres outside political party. They 
work in mass organizations, educational institutions, and other professional institutions 
to enhance religious awareness among the people. The latter consists of the effort to 
prepare and enable the cadres to capture strategic position in government. With the 
authority and power in their disposal, they could break down Islamic norms into 
regulation or policy. This strategy involves PKS engagement in politics by supporting 
or initiating some regulations accommodative to the operation of Sharia norms. These 
two strategies are going hand in hand and create an integral da’wa; in government level 
PKS prepares the regulation and policy favorable to the Sharia norms, while in social 
context PKS creates a condition favorable to the implementation of Sharia. Arif 
Ramdani explains that da’wa activists used to debate on the strategy of Islamizing the 
state; whether they should start with working in government or start the basis in 
society. PKS chooses to work in both areas simultaneously, namely by active 
involvement in government and also by social engagement, because both realms should 
not be separated. 
Conclusion 
PKS cadres are constantly in the process of learning, and in the course of time, 
their understanding about Sharia grows and becomes more mature, in parallel with the 
wider knowledge and experience they gain after years of social and political 
engagement. Ideologically, the PKS cadres’ understanding of Sharia has shifted, and 
institutionally, the party has declared itself to be open to social and political 
imperatives. This openness is reflected in the way the party realizes its political goal 
of implementing Sharia. PKS is fully aware that focus on the label of Sharia will only 
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narrow the room for maneuver. PKS believes that any bill that contains or refers to 
Sharia, for instance, will not pass the parliament’s approval. Sharia phobia still 
prevails. Therefore, the party is now focusing on substance of Sharia that would 
provide wide room for maneuver. By presenting Sharia as a universal goodness, for 
instance, PKS is ready to cooperate with any party that shares the same programs and 
agendas of delivering goodness to the people. PKS believes that due to its universality, 
people from all walks of life will accept Sharia norms, such as justice and prosperity, 
transparency and accountability, or public health and education. The struggle to realize 
this universal goodness is considered by the party as the struggle for Sharia 
implementation.  
To successfully incorporate Sharia norms into the state legislation process, the 
PKS leaders argue, Sharia should be formulated in a neutral language. It should be 
carefully worded. In its effort to implement Sharia norms, PKS does not make a direct 
reference to Sharia because some people may carry a priori bias against the term. 
Besides, any bill that contains or refers to Sharia, they argue, will not pass the 
parliament approval. PKS will also support any legal draft or regulation that is in 
agreement with the teaching of Islam even though if it makes no reference to Sharia. 
The most importance for PKS, the leaders say, is the realization of the substance. With 
this in mind, PKS supports Perdas regulating morality and public order, such as Perda 
on Anti-Miras, KTR, or Muslim Clothing, as a part of commanding right and 
forbidding evils (amr al-ma’ruf wa-nahy ‘an al-munkar).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SHARIA AND THE STATE 
 
This chapter discusses the political history of Islamic law and its institution 
during the New Order and the early Reformasi era. Divided into three sections, the first 
two sections of the chapter examine the relation between state and political Islam 
during the New Order period. How the new-breed of Muslim intellectuals and activists 
coped with this issue is discussed in the first section, and followed by a discussion on 
accommodative stance of the state towards the Muslims’ interest as a fruit of decades 
of effort to establish viable synthesis between Islam and the state. This accommodative 
Islamic policy of the regime as strong evidence of the relaxing relation between state 
and political Islam is discussed in second section. This section also provides discussion 
about the legislation of Islamic family law, as the heart of the Sharia and the major area 
of Islamic law that has remained largely applicable in Muslim countries of today. The 
last part of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of constitutional debate on Sharia 
and Jakarta Charter359 in the early of Reformasi era, which shows the initial attitude of 
the PKS toward the implementation of Sharia in democratic Indonesia.   
A.   Islam-State Relation in the New Order 
An abortive coup of the Communist Party, PKI, in 1965 resulted not only in 
the suppression and the proscription of the party, but also in the end of the Old Order 
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period and the beginning of the New Order period. In spite of the tremendous role of 
the Muslim community in general and Muslim political parties in particular in crushing 
the communist supporters throughout the country, Muslim political leaders and 
activists, especially those with Masyumi origins, soon discerned that their hope of 
regaining great influence in the discourse of national politics was far from a reality. 
Feeling abandoned and rejected, at the meeting of reformist Muslim leaders on June 1, 
1972, Natsir was reported to have said that the military dominated government of the 
New Order had treated them like ‘kucing kurap’ (cats with ringworm).360 The new 
ruling government seemed to follow the policy of the previous regime in consistently 
undercutting the Muslim political power. They were determined to prevent Muslims 
from ever again becoming an independent political force.361 
The successive events following the accession of the New Order regime 
suggested that in dealing with the ideological and political articulation of Islamic 
groups, the New Order regime had the same wariness as did its predecessor. In the 
wake of the release of many Masyumi leaders who had been detained by the Soekarno 
regime for their alleged involvement in 1958-1959 PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic) rebellion in 
Sumatra, a great hope of rehabilitating the Mayumi burned briefly among its former 
leaders. To their dismay, in early 1967 Soeharto and the military generals on whom he 
relied firmly rejected the resuscitation of the party.362 Adopting an even harder line, 
the government then barred the former Masyumi leader Mohammad Natsir from 
occupying a position of leadership in the newly established Parmusi, a party formed 
by Natsir in 1968 and intended to be an electoral voice for modernist Muslims.363 
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These measures were taken to contain Islamic politics becoming established in 
the New Order period. Clearly, the military-backed regime remained suspicious 
towards political Islam. Armed encounters with several Muslim-inspired regional 
rebellions in the past led the ruling elite to adopt a hostile attitude towards any form of 
political Islam. 364  Further deliberate attempt to contain Islamic political idealism 
occurred during the session of MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, 
Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) in 1968 when the government resolutely 
refused to recognize the Jakarta Charter as the preamble of the national constitution, 
thereby dashing Muslim hopes that the state would be obliged to implement Islamic 
law among its Muslim citizens.365 
An remaining support for political Islam was seriously eroded by the results of 
the 1971 general election,366 in which the total number of votes cast for Muslim parties 
considerably decreased in the wake of the heavy-handed government interference in 
influencing the outcome of the election. 367  In the two years following the 1971 
election, the government again took a further step to contain the political Islam by 
coercively consolidating the existing nine political parties into two new parties, one of 
which was supposed to represent the interests of Muslim constituents. By 
reconstructing the party system, the government calculated that the internal conflicts 
and rivalries within the parties would result in weakening political Islam, and the 
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scheme was quite successful in this regard. In the ensuing years, the political 
performance of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP) 
was plagued by internal disputes. Accordingly, the ability of PPP to attract voters, 
especially during Djaelani Naro’s tenure, was significantly in decline.368 
The hostility of the Muslim community towards the state was reinforced by a 
number of government’s policies deemed to be offensive to their religious beliefs. It 
was during the legislative session in 1973 that the government proposed the elevation 
of traditional mystical belief systems (aliran kepercayaan) to the same status as the 
five officially recognized religions. In the same session, the government also 
introduced a bill on the Marriage Law. These proposals met with strong opposition 
from the large segment of the Muslim community because they were seen as being 
contradictory to the legal and theological teachings of Islam. Finally, debates over 
these contentious proposals ended in a compromise which conceded to the Muslim 
demands.369 By these incidents the Muslim leaders and activists could only conclude 
that the New Order policies were designed not merely to restrain Muslim political 
power, but to challenge against their religious beliefs as well. 
The final blow to political Islam came in 1983 when the government enforced 
the state ideology Pancasila as a sole basis of all the social and political organizations. 
The government considered the existence of a rival ideology to Pancasila as potential 
threat to national consensus. This ideological pressure left all the existing political 
parties and social organizations no choice but to endorse state philosophy of Pancasila 
as their ideological basis. All non-complying organizations would by then have been 
illegal and had to dissolve themselves. The imposition of Pancasila as the only 
appropriate ideological foundation deepened the discontent among the Muslim 
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community.370 Many perceived the program as undermining Islam. Only a few years 
before, the government had launched massive campaigns to socialize Pancasila 
indoctrination program. Formally approved in the 1978 session of MPR, the mass 
indoctrination of Pancasila was undertaken by means of training courses and its 
obligatory integration in the educational curriculum.371 This program was not accepted 
without opposition in the 1978 Assembly. It was reported that the NU members of the 
PPP walked out of the Assembly as a protest against the program. 
It suffices to say that the implications of these political developments were far 
reaching. In the first place, mutual distrust and hostility between the leaders and 
activists of political Islam and the ruling elite worsened. The former perceived the latter 
as gradually secularizing the country and relying increasingly on Christian leaders. The 
latter considered the former support for Pancasila as tactical, expedient and suspect. 
For all of the above-mentioned reasons, it was not surprising that the major opposition 
to the New Order regime frequently came from the leaders and activists of political 
Islam. This uneasy relationship often provoked violent incidents associated with 
Muslim activists in the 1970s and up to the mid-1980s. Violent expressions such as 
Komando Jihad in Sumatra (1977), Tanjung Priok case (1984), and Warsidi movement 
in Lampung (1989), to mention only three incidents, were among the most shocking 
examples of the Muslim radical dissent which were bloodily suppressed by the army 
as a symbolic message that no dissent was to be allowed.372 
Antagonism between political Islam and the state in the first decades of the 
New Order period was largely due to the former’s legalistic and formalistic idealism 
and activism.373 Numerous political episodes throughout the course of the modern 
political history of Indonesia have indicated that efforts to establish a formalistic and 
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legalistic relationship between Islam and the country’s political system ended up in 
corrosive ideological and political enmity. In spite of the fact that the problems 
confronting political Islam emerged in the practical domain of politics, the crux of the 
matter related mainly to a typical understanding of Islam common among many 
Muslim political thinkers and activists. They adopted an organic approach to the 
holistic nature of Islam which led them to establish the relationship between Islam and 
all aspects of life in a legal and formal manner. Moreover, as a divine instrument 
through which to understand the world, Islam is often conceived of as more than 
religion. This notion has led them to believe that Islam is a total way of life, the 
embodiment of which is expressed in the Islamic law (Sharia). Islamic law is believed 
to govern all aspects of life. This particular viewpoint inculcated the understanding that 
Islam recognizes no separation between the spiritual and temporal realm. Furthermore, 
they believed that Islam furnished its adherents with a fully-fledged concept of state or 
system of governing. They maintained that the state is an integral part of religion 
(Islam). It was on this religio-political stance that many leaders and activists of political 
Islam pursued their social and political agendas. Accordingly, they insisted that it was 
imperative that they propose Islam as the ideological basis of the state. 
The rigid orientation towards politics and religion left the defenders of political 
Islam an inadequate room for maneuver. When the position of political Islam appeared 
to be worsening, particularly following the New Order’s political scheme of 
restructuring the political format of Indonesia, many of its leaders grew increasingly 
reactionary. This attitude proved the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists 
to give intelligent religio-political responses to these new challenges. In the view of 
some younger Muslim leaders and activists, the early generation of Islamic political 
elites had suffered from inflexibility and were almost dogmatic in their responses to 
practical consideration.374 They argue that unless such a political orientation becomes 
more flexible, it seems unlikely to establish a viable synthesis between Islam and the 
state. 
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Emerging from the weakening situation of political Islam and attempting to 
remedy the discouraging relationship between Islam and state, since the early 1970s 
the new generation of Muslim thinkers and activists sought to develop a new format 
for political Islam in which substance, rather than form, serves as the primary 
orientation. Their intellectual endeavor revolved around three important areas: (1) 
theological renewal, (2) bureaucratic reform, and (3) social transformation.375 Even 
though these three spheres of renewal operated in different arenas, they combined in a 
serious campaign for a new enunciation of Islamic political ideas and practices. So far, 
these attempts have been carried out mainly through the articulation of new Islamic 
political thoughts and actions which are perceived to be more compatible with the 
diverse characteristics of the socio-religious structures of the archipelago as well as 
with its political orientations.  
The new generation of Islamic thinkers, particularly those operating in the 
theological renewal, also believed in the holistic nature of Islam, but they asserted that 
it does not necessarily require a mixture between the divine (i.e. Islamic values) and 
the profane (i.e. state, party, ideology, etc.). Nor does it imply that these two different 
realms should be placed on the same level, since doing so will only lead to confusion 
in the structure and hierarchy of Islamic values. This new theological underpinning of 
political Islam has often been associated with Nurcholish Madjid’s idea of 
secularization. His fundamental viewpoints stem from his radical understanding of the 
concept of tauhid (oneness of God), that only God who possesses absolute 
transcendence and divinity. Consequently, Muslims should liberate themselves from 
the tendency to transcend values which are supposedly profane into the domain of 
divinity. In other words, they should perceive the world and its temporal affairs as they 
are, for to view them in a sacred and transcendental manner is considered theologically 
contradictory to the concept of Islamic monotheism. This theological stance has 
significant implications for the political ideas and practices of the new emerging 
Muslim thinkers and activists, especially with regard to their strategies and tactics. 
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After critically examining the stipulations of the Qur’an and Sunnah, the newly 
emerging generation of Muslim intellectuals found no clear indication that Islam has a 
profound interest in regulating issues pertaining to the affairs of the state. In the 
absence of the Quranic and Sunnaic precepts about this specific issue, they opined that 
Islam does not oblige its adherents to establish a state.376 Even though a fully-fledged 
concept of the state is absent in Islam, Islam does provide a set of ethical values of 
political principles, such as justice (‘adl), consultation (shura), and egalitarianism 
(musawa). Since the current form of the Indonesian nation state, with Pancasila as its 
ideological basis, is sufficient to accommodate the realization of those Islamic socio-
political injunctions, defenders of the new Islamic intellectualism believe that the 
Indonesian nation state deserves religio-political legitimacy from and acceptance by 
Muslims. The fact that these principles have not been fully realized should not be a 
reason to transform the national unitary character of the state. Efforts to reinstate those 
principles should be carried out within the framework of the present ideological 
construct of the state.377 Furthermore, the concern of the state with the implementation 
and development of religious values is considered to be the gradual evolution of the 
state into a “religious state” without having to become a “theological state” which is 
constitutionally base on certain formal religious institutions. Their acceptance of the 
current form of the state has also been strengthened by their perception of Pancasila 
and the 1945 Constitution. Both the ideological and constitutional foundations are 
perceived to reflect the substance of Islamic teachings. 378  A number of Muslim 
intellectuals have even argued that Pancasila is comparable to the Constitution of 
Medina in that both substantively recognize the relationship between religious values 
and the affairs of the state, and functionally represent common flat forms for socio-
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religiously diversified political communities.379 As has been discussed previously in 
the introduction, the Muslims’ acceptance of Pancasila as the asas tunggal proved to 
be beneficial to their strengthening political influence. According to Nurcholis Madjid, 
in the post-asas tunggal period “Muslims cease to ask whether this [Pancasila] is valid 
or not. It is valid, but how do we interpret it?” He continued that Muslims are more 
confident and self-assured and they see that Pancasila does not need to be 
problematized.380 Muslim abandonment of the opposition to Pancasila was possible 
partly because it became apparent that through the asas tunggal Pancasila was 
guaranteed by the President that it will not become a civil religion or turn Indonesia 
into a secular state.381 
In contrast to the theological renewal stream of the new Muslim intellectuals 
who to some extent indulged themselves in the theoretical discourse of Islam, those 
who operated in the pragmatics of bureaucratic reform are more apt to be involved in 
the state and its bureaucratic institutions. They believe that the problem of an easy 
relationship between political Islam and the state, which was partly responsible for the 
dismal condition of political Islam, can gradually be eradicated by becoming directly 
involved and participating in the mainstream of political and bureaucratic process of 
the state. In this context, the proponents of this intellectual stream can be regarded as 
the political arms of the theological school. 
Commenting on the bureaucratic participation of political Muslims, they have 
argued that political Islam, with the exception of the 1950s era when many of its leaders 
were appointed to head cabinets and a number of important bureaucracies, has played 
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no significant role in state bureaucracies.382 This feeble tradition of governing explains 
the peripheral position of activists of political Islam in the state institution and their 
detachment from the state in the first decades of the New Order regime. The proponents 
of this intellectual stream have argued that to cultivate the tradition of governing as 
well as to eliminate the myth of santri detachment from the state, it is necessary for the 
activists of political Islam to keep in contact with the political and bureaucratic 
institutions. Only by entering the formal bureaucratic institutions will the activists and 
leaders of political Islam become effectively involved in the decision making of the 
state. In the view of this intellectual current, these approaches will ensure the 
administering of Islam in the nationally accepted socio-political framework. 383 
Furthermore, by working within the state bureaucracies, the proponents of this 
intellectual group could strive for the integrated socio-political aspirations of Islam 
without being suspected of being outsiders or as representatives of treacherous political 
and bureaucratic agendas. In other words, these endeavors would contribute greatly 
towards Islamizing the bureaucracy. 
Like their counterparts in previous streams, proponents of the social 
transformation school have been acutely aware of the marginal position of political 
Islam. However, they do not consider the issue of the uneasy relationship between 
Islam and state as being their primary intellectual concern. Instead, they are more 
interested in the socio-political and economic policy of the regime which gives high 
priority to stability and growth at the expense of popular participation and equity. In 
this regard, the substance of their socio-political programs is in line with the concern 
of Indonesian society at large, such as social emancipation, popular participation, and 
economic equity.384 Given the populist nature of their concern, their activities could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382  For further account on this issue, see Donald K. Emmerson’s “The Bureaucracy in Political 
Context: Weakness in Strength,” in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (ed.), Political Power and 
Communication in Indonesia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 83-136. See also his 
Indonesia’s Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
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Administration of Islam in Indonesia, Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1978. 
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not be implemented through a partisan approach. Rather, the success of this intellectual 
breakthrough was determined by their ability to muster the support necessary from 
various institutions as well as individuals. Accordingly, this intellectual stream called 
for adherence to a broader meaning of politics by abandoning the party politics as the 
sole avenue for the articulation and realization of Islamic socio-political objectives, 
and trying to broaden and diversify programs, strategies, and playing fields.385 
It is through these various routes that the new generation of Muslim activists 
has struggled to achieve the articulation and realization of Islamic socio-political 
ideals. Their primary purpose has been to transform the earlier outlook of political 
Islam, from formal legalism to substantialism. With regard to the original aims of this 
renewal, viz. developing a viable relationship between Islam and state as well as 
redeeming the political role of Islam, it can be said that this new Islamic political 
activism has brought about many positive results. It has been widely noted that since 
the last two general elections, more Muslim political thinkers and activists have 
occupied important ministerial posts as well as substantial seats in the executive and 
legislative body.386 This means that they can fully participate in the process of policy 
decision making. 
Evidence of this new development has been the political reconciliation between 
Islam and state which is signified in the latter’s agreement to implement a number of 
policies considered necessary by the former’s socio-cultural and political interests. 
Included in this accommodative actions are the passing of education law which 
stipulates the obligatory nature of religious instruction in state as well as private 
schools (1988), the passing of religious court law (1989), the establishment of ICMI 
(1990), the Compilation of Islamic law (1991), a joint ministerial decision concerning 
the zakat (religious alms) collection and distribution agency, Bazis (1991), the holding 
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HMI activists have occupied ministerial posts. They included Saleh Afif, Azwar Anas, Hasrul Harahap, 
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of an Islamic festival, Festival Istiqlal (1991), the reversal of jilbab (scarf) policy 
(1991), the establishment of an Islamic bank, BMI (1992), the rescinding of national 
lottery, SDSB (1993), the development of religious infrastructure, the teaching of 
Arabic language on national television, and the sending of Muslim religious preachers 
to the remote transmigration areas. 
B.   Sharia in a National Context 
Along with strong rejection of the demand of the Muslim leaders to give an 
official status to the Jakarta Charter, the New Order government stated that Indonesia 
was neither a theocratic state nor a secular one. This meant that religion provided a 
spiritual, ethical, and moral basis for national development. In this context, Islamic 
values have a fair chance in coloring the process of the policy making of the state. 
Simply by virtue of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the country’s inhabitants 
are Muslims, they argued, the basic contours of the state governing principles are in 
tune, if not influenced by, Islamic values. Within this framework, at least theoretically, 
the state will not implement laws and policies which are in direct conflict with Islamic 
teachings. Although Islam is not mentioned in the Constitution, it has undoubtedly 
become one of the important inputs in the process of public policy making. 
The government’s refusal to ratify the Jakarta Charter does not necessarily 
mean that the Muslim leaders have dropped their intention to enhance the 
implementation of Islamic law in everyday life. In their eyes the Presidential Decree 
of July 5, 1959, concerning the return to the 1945 Constitution, in which it was 
mentioned that the Jakarta Charter “inspired the 1945 Constitution and it linked in 
unity with that Constitution”, has guaranteed that observant Muslims are free to 
practice Islamic law in their daily lives. Mohammad Roem is of the opinion that 
whether or not the Jakarta Charter was included in the Preamble to the Constitution or 
in the President Soekarno Decree, Muslims are obliged to observe Islamic law. It is 
“an obligation not in a ‘legal’ sense, with legal consequences which could be enforced 
but an obligation in the religious sense.” In this sense, the Jakarta Charter is of no legal 
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consequence, but it has “the permanent religious significance” which explicitly 
reminds the Muslims of their responsibility to keep Islamic law.387 
As was said above, many Muslim leaders now no longer strive for an official 
Islamic state. They are working from a different angle, by infusing society with Islamic 
precepts and moving towards a gradual Islamization of the country. Moreover, 
nowadays many of them no longer speak of Islamic law in general, but only of the 
partial realization of it, i.e. of certain elements of Islamic law, through regulations 
issued by the government. Traditionally priority is given to the area of family law. 
With the exception of family law, they do not actually make any demands that Islamic 
law be legislated explicitly. Most of them seem to consider that the implementation of 
Islamic law can be accommodated without formal legislation. It is enough to integrate 
its principles into national law. Considering that the national legal system is still in its 
formative stage, it is perfectly feasible that Islamic principles may be introduced into 
national law. As a previous minister of justice, Ismail Saleh, said, the national legal 
system is an open system in that it considers any existing laws in the world as its raw 
materials as long as they are not contradictory to the Pancasila values, the 
Constitutional norms, and national interests as well as being in line with the legal need 
of Indonesian state and nation.388 
Islamic law as expounded in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) literature and 
consciously practiced by the Muslim community has been accepted and has been 
successful as one element in the legal sources for the formation of national law. Even 
though a greater part of it has become a living law in the legal consciousness of its 
adherents, only Islamic family law has gone through the mechanism of becoming 
national positive law. In order to become a positive law, Islamic law has to go through 
the mechanism of national law-making. The first efforts are directed towards finding 
out the universal norms of Islamic law so that they could be transformed into a national 
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1971, p. 161. 
388  Ismail Saleh, “Eksistensi Hukum Islam dan Sumbangannya terhadap Hukum Nasional,” in 
Zuffran Sabrie, Peradilan Agama dalam Wadah Negara Pancasila: Dialog tentang RUUPA, Jakarta: 
Pustaka Antara, 1990, p. 132. 
	  	  
	  
181 
legal order acceptable to every segment of population. To the extent that there are 
differences between Islamic law and other sources as the common denominator among 
these sources has to be found. Failing either of these efforts, the concept of Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) should be adopted to subject each discrete group to 
its own distinctive law without making the others subject to it.389 
The enactment of the Marriage Law in 1974, Religious Court Law in 1989 and 
Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam) in 1991 indicate an obvious 
recognition by the state of the validity of Islamic law and its judicial institutions. The 
success in adopting some elements of Islamic law into national positive law is partly 
due to favorable political conditions. The contribution of Muslim bureaucrats and 
professionals who are generally not conversant with traditionally formulated Islamic 
law is also critical in this process.390 Mutual co-operation and constructive dialogue 
between these proponents of Islamic law are both required to invigorate Islamic law as 
an actual legal system that can meet the demands of a modern society. 
Demand for marriage law reform had been an issue since the mid-1950s. 
According to Lev, these demands arose from a growing intellectual liberation of upper- 
and upper-middle class women, an easing of control over women in urban society, the 
impact of egalitarian ideologies, and the influence of foreign examples.391 Enacted 
after becoming a fierce political issue between the Muslim and other groups in 
parliament, the Marriage Law of 1974 gives Indonesian Muslims a clearer picture of 
their marital rights and responsibilities. Many of the original provisions which were 
considered contrary to Islamic law were dropped, including provisions that required 
use of a civil rather than an Islamic court by Muslims for some purposes, demanded 
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registration to validate a marriage, allowed mixed marriages, and had given legal status 
to an engagement.392 
In the early New Order period, the government enacted the Law no 14/1970 
concerning the Basic Rule of Judicial Power (Undang-Undang tentang Ketentuan-
Ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman) in which the authority of the Supreme Court 
was extended to religious courts. Even though the law stipulated that appeals cases 
against before the religious courts may be taken to the Supreme Court, its application 
was hampered by the absence of appropriate procedural laws. Consequently, the status 
quo of the colonial regulation, which stated that the decisions of appeal from the high 
religious court were final, continues to be in force. This situation has contributed to the 
weak position of religious courts in relation to other judicial institutions in the 
contemporary Indonesian legal system. 
The passing of religious court legislation (Undang-Undang Peradilan agama, 
UUPA) in 1989 restored and strengthened the status and function of the religious court 
in adjudicating marriage, inheritance, and religious endowment for Muslim citizens. 
From the perspective of history, there is nothing new with respect to the enactment of 
this law, since in their simplest form and function, religious courts have existed in the 
archipelago for centuries. Through these religiously-based judicial institutions 
indigenous Muslims have generally settled their disputes on matters related to family 
law including inheritance and endowments. In spite of their long-standing, religious 
courts have suffered from a number of critical defects. These major defects include (1) 
the lack of legal autonomy,393 (2) administrative discrepancy,394 and (3) the absence of 
a unified legal reference.395 
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Basically, the passing of the Religious Court Law of 1989 was designed to 
remedy those defects by providing the legal autonomy necessary to religious courts so 
their decisions are final and binding, and a validation from civil courts is no longer 
needed to execute their rulings. While the Compilation of Islamic law (Kompilasi 
Hukum Islam) was aimed to equip religious courts with a unified legal reference, 
consisting of three books on matters related to marriage, inheritance, and endowment 
upon which judges in religious courts can base their decision.  
Indubitably, the passing of these three pieces of legislation pleased the Muslim 
community, but it also generated alarm among non-Muslims and nationalist circles. 
The fundamental concerns which underlay their objection to these laws are twofold. 
First, given the very nature of these laws which regulate the legal interests of Muslims 
only, these legislations are deemed to violate the principle of the unification of law in 
Indonesian legal system. Second, the compilation of the laws is considered to be a 
cloak for the Jakarta Charter which obliges the state to implement Islamic law (Sharia). 
Their opposition to these laws has nothing to do with the substance of the laws, but it 
is related to their traumatic experiences with the political Islam in the past, when its 
overriding purpose was to create an Islamic state. 
It also has to be said that the relaxation of political tensions between ‘Islam and 
the state’ also contributed to the legislation of the Compilation. The process of state 
accommodation towards Islamic interests can be traced back to the 1970s when the 
government appointed a handful of Muslim activists to post in state agencies. As the 
beneficiaries of the progress of the modern education and economic development 
during the New Order era, many Muslims occupied the country’s middle and 
professional sectors. Because of this social mobility, they could no longer be perceived 
as representing a backward and marginal group. As a new emerging socio-political 
group, they need structural avenues to channel their interests. Their socio-political 
agendas have been reformulated in the framework representing the interests of the 
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whole nation, such as the realization of justice, participatory, and egalitarian 
construction of the state. Their political approach is no longer partisan.  
This sociological and political shift of Muslim Politics has reduced the 
suspicion of the state towards political Islam and this has led the former to provide the 
necessary structural mechanism to enable the latter to express and realize their 
interests. Then, in the mid 1980s, Muslim activists were assigned to a number of 
important political and bureaucratic posts, providing a relatively easy access to power 
pertaining to the realization of Islamic interests. 396  Since then, this structural 
accommodation has grown in numbers and substance. Not only were more Muslim 
activists recruited into the bureaucratic and political machineries, but they were 
promoted to the higher posts which culminated in the aftermath of the 1992 election, 
when a large number of Muslim leaders and activists were recruited into the 
parliament, although not necessarily via an Islamic party.397 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the recent increasing representation of Islam 
in parliament and the cabinet is largely due to the diversifying approach of the new 
generation in articulating and realizing Islamic socio-political interests. Considering 
the nature of the political relationship between Islam and state in the past, these 
accommodative ventures undoubtedly serve as important indications, however 
symbolic it may be, of the declining hostility of the state towards political Islam. 
The changing nature of the state in favor of Muslim interests leads us to the 
question about the main forces driving the state to initiate these accommodation moves. 
As a part of the accommodative moves of the state, the legislation of the Compilation 
has often been seen in terms of a personal rule type analysis, rather than in a broader 
sociological and political perspective, in the sense that it is perceived simply as 
Soeharto’s political project, designed primarily to cultivate Muslim political support. 
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More specifically, it was intended to boost his position in the run-up to the 1993 
presidential election.  
There are at least two important arguments to substantiate this viewpoint. 
Firstly, the initiative to undertake these accommodative enterprises evolved over a 
five-year time span, a period which was characterized by the growing concern about 
the presidential succession. Moreover, the fact that in September 1989 and May 1992 
a number of prominent Muslim figures and Islamic socio-religious organizations 
echoed unequivocal support (kebulatan tekad) for Soeharto’s sixth-term presidency 
in1993 only reinforced this sort of analysis.398 
Secondly, there was a notion of the weakening Soeharto’s grip on the military 
which has long been the backbone of the New Order. As Liddle states, the first 
important evidence of the declining control of Soeharto over the military came in 
March 1988, when the former’s nominee for vice-president (Soedarmono) was 
publicly and angrily opposed by the latter during a tumultuous session of the assembly. 
The military’s tacit insubordination towards his leadership had cast serious doubt on 
their traditional support for his presidency. This viewpoint went on to argue that to 
offset the decreasing backing from the military, the president extended a hand to an 
old adversary, Islamic political groups.399  The legislation of the Compilation was 
perceived as one of these political moves to cultivate Muslim political support. In 
addition, the fact that the issuance of the Compilation happened just before Soeharto’s 
leaving on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991, an action hailed at that time as a sign of 
the government’s new attitude towards Islam, gives weight to the view that those 
shifting attitudes of the state were merely deliberate attempts to seek Muslim political 
support for his presidential office. 
These two factors put forward by the line of argument above seem to be more 
complementary explanations rather than determinant ones in relation to 
accommodative attitude of the state toward Muslim interests. It is possible for us to 
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analyze this enterprise in a broader sociological and political perspective, in a sense 
that it was driven by political necessity in response to the development of the country’s 
societal dynamism.  
There has been some mention earlier of the fact that Indonesia’s economic 
development and the broadening access to modern higher education during the New 
Order regime meant that Muslims have experienced a rapid process of socio-economic 
and political mobilization, which in turn have transformed them into an “intermediate” 
entity, socially, economically, and politically. As a new emerging middle class, they 
have carved themselves a niche in the state bureaucracy and professional sectors,400 
and also share certain aspirations that require appropriate responses from the regime 
which are in fact relevant to the enhancement of its own legitimacy. It is in this context 
that the state initiated those forms of accommodation. Reluctance to accommodate 
societal demands will eventually undermine the legitimacy of the regime, but to be 
responsive to the needs of the society will boast its legitimacy. Moreover, considering 
that the legitimacy of the New Order government was built primarily upon the success 
in the country’s economic development and national political stability, accommodating 
Islamic interests would provide it with the necessary political legitimacy.  
In addition to the societal dynamism, another decisive factor behind the 
undertaking of such forms of accommodation by the state has been the Muslim 
intellectual transformation that has succeeded in developing a viable political 
relationship between the state and Islam. The new format of political Islam, which 
emphasizes substantialism over legal-formalism, has contributed greatly towards 
eliminating the suspicion felt by the state about the Muslim political activities; hence 
a political relaxation between Islam and state was established. This new development 
has rendered it inappropriate to exclude political Islam from the country’s political 
process. Accommodating the transformed ideas and practices of political Islam thus 
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becomes an imperative task for the state in effort to avoid tensions and to enhance its 
legitimacy. 
C.   Constitutional Debate on Sharia  
The post-New Order era, or Reformasi Era as it is popularly known, witnessed 
the struggle of both Islamist and secular nationalist parties to foster democracy and 
combat corruption. The parties from all political spectrums considered these issues as 
their paramount agenda and having great popular appeal. Due to this shared conviction 
of defending reformasi ideals, for the first time in Indonesian political history, 
ideological differences between “left- and right-wing” of the political spectrums were 
blurred. For the Islamist parties, the reformasi movement led by the students did not 
give them a blank cheque to Islamize the state or pursue their Islamist agenda.  
Therefore, in the initial stage of the reformasi era, no Islamist party had an 
official stance and a full pledged strategy on Sharia. Instead, their agenda was very 
much focused on a broader reform. The democratic euphoria of the masses very 
definitely dictated the policies and strategies of the Islamist parties; it was clear that 
they needed to avoid any controversial issues that would bring their democratic 
credentials into question. The Sharia issue is undoubtedly neither appealing to the 
majority of the voters and nor an agenda of reformasi. The lack of voters’ response 
was the obvious reason for the Islamist parties to downplay Sharia agenda and focus 
instead on issues of broader political reform. So, it is combination between political 
survival and sectarian issues that led the Islamist parties to momentarily avoid 
accentuating Sharia issues. 
The popular demand during the early reformasi era was the Constitution 
amendment. There was a popular belief that the New Order regime was successful in 
maintaining the power due to the vague of 1945 Constitution; it enables the 
preservation of authoritarian rule and the breach of checks and balances which is 
central to the establishment of democratic governance. The public and press mounted 
strong pressure to the parties to empower the legislative body of the state by 
strengthening its power to conduct its function of checks and balances. Other popular 
demands include direct presidential elections, establishment of regional 
	  	  
	  
188 
administrations autonomy, removal of military participation in parliament, known as 
dwifungsi ABRI (Army force dual function) and protection of human rights. Islamist 
agenda items such as the insertion of Jakarta Charter into the Preamble of the 
Constitution were excluded during the immediate reformasi era, just as the unitary state 
of Indonesia, presidential system and Pancasila as state ideology. By highlighting the 
non-Islamist agenda, the party aimed to preserve the religiously neutral characteristics 
of the political system.  
The memory of parliamentary deadlock during the constitutional debate on 
Konstituante in 1969 (Constituent Assembly) that resulted in the end of the era of 
Parliamentary Democracy (Demokrasi Parlementer) also contributed to the Islamist 
party readiness to postpone the debate on Preamble of Constitution; resuming it will 
surely open the can of worm. Disputes over installing the Jakarta Charter into the 
Preamble were sure to be politically counter-productive.401 Instead of debating the 
Preamble, the Islamist parties proposed the changes regarding Paragraph 29 on 
“religion.” These changes were proposed on the parliamentary session of June 2000, a 
year after the first post-New Order democratic election on June 1999, during which 
Islamist parties proposed two different clauses into Paragraph 29 of the Constitution.402 
The first proposal made by the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United 
Development Party) and the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Star Crescent Party) which 
maintained the original wording of Jakarta Charter, Negara berdasarkan Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi para pemeluknya 
(the State is based on the One All-Powerful God with the obligation to carry out Sharia 
Islam for its adherents). This clause gives exclusivity to the Muslim population of the 
country (henceforth called Sharia-minded Clause). The second clause was proposed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401  Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002 (first quote) and A.M. Luthfi 
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the PK and PAN (Partai Amanah Nasional, National Mandate Party), which together 
form one fraction, the Fraksi Reformasi (Reform Faction). The clause took a pluralist 
variant of the first clause (henceforth called Religiosity-based Clause), emphasizing 
the “religious teaching” (ajaran agama) in the place of “Sharia Islam”. It reads: Negara 
berdasarkan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan ajaran 
agama bagi para pemeluknya (the State is based on the One All-Powerful God with 
the obligation to carry out religious teaching for its adherents). 
In its apparent support to the reformist agenda, PK remained staunchly devoted 
to double-track approach in politics: Islamist ideologically and pragmatist politically. 
More than the other Islamist parties, PK neatly separated its ideology from political 
commitment. While supporting reform and democratization, the party struggled to 
achieve its Islamist ideal to Islamize society. This Islamization process is deliberately 
incremental in nature, the ultimate goal of which is the voluntarily popular embrace 
and support for the Sharia rule so that any election results will automatically lead to 
the Islamist parties’ hold of power. For the meantime, the party will not see ideological 
accomplishment any time soon. The best possible achievement would be a minor share 
of the vote. This is the obvious reason for the party to give priority to establishing long-
term partnerships with other political camps. 
Creating political relationships with other parties entailed ideological 
adjustment and focusing more on shared commitment, hence, the avoidance of 
quarrelsome themes and controversial issues. Islamist stereotypes, the PK leaders 
argued, such as fanaticism and radicalism, could be brushed aside, and in their place 
moderate, temperate, and accommodative attitudes should prevail. It is not a 
coincidence that the party’s statutes quote a hadith highlighting moderation and 
accommodation. The hadith reads: 
Make things easy and do not make things difficult. Give glad tiding and do not 
make people running away from you.403 
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The approach highlighted in the hadith inspired the party to conduct a gradual 
approach toward Sharia implementation. The party’s gradualist attitude explains its 
reluctance to support the insertion of Sharia-minded Clause into the Constitution, 
considering that the Clause contradicts the injunction of the hadith to apply a moderate 
path in the effort of implementing Sharia rulings. Despite its conviction that the state 
is obliged to implement Sharia, the party was skeptical about the wisdom of hasty 
inclusion of Jakarta Charter into the Constitution. Looking back PK/PKS leaders say 
that the party was convinced that the promotion of Sharia and the Jakarta Charter clause 
by PPP and PBB was done with no plan for their realization; the Islamists only gained 
a minority seat, accordingly the promotion of Sharia-minded Clause would be rejected 
and defeated in the parliament. A plain reason for this defeat was the lack of Islamist 
political power in the parliament. The reluctance of PK to support the Sharia-minded 
Clause was also driven by its political commitment to avoid any conflict with other 
groups that would tarnish the party’s self-claimed image as a national unifier. 
Therefore, should the Clause potentially bring the party in conflict with other groups 
and endanger the common commitment toward broader political reform, it was argued, 
it was best for the party to drop it from its agenda.  
Due to the persistence of the party toward its strategy of moderation and 
facilitation in regard with Sharia issues, accusations were spread that the party has 
ceased fighting for Sharia. To the party, this charge was tantamount to slander and was 
very misleading; it was, they said, as if to say that Jakarta Charter is a divine inspiration 
that is fixed, flawless and undebatable.404 The party claimed that reluctance towards 
supporting the Sharia-minded Clause should not be understood as being unsupportive 
toward the implementation of Sharia. To back up its claim as a staunch supporter of 
Sharia, the party listed its commitment to the broader Islamic issues such as the 
inclusion of zakat (alms) into the tax system, the fight against corruption, and its 
support on the pornography bill. More than anything else, the party pointed to their 
persistent implementation of Islamic teachings in their individual and family life as a 
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central argument for its commitment to Sharia.405 For that reason, the party urged the 
people to fairly observe and assess the dedication and commitment of the party toward 
Sharia from the everyday life of the party elites.406 Regarding the party’s dedication 
toward Sharia implementation, one of PKS leaders explained that people needed to see 
examples from Muslims whether they observe Sharia in everyday life or just pay a lip 
service and turn Sharia into merely a political rhetoric:  
“We observe it [i.e. Sharia] first, only then we preach it. We deal it first in our 
families, only then we speak it in public. There is no point talking about Sharia 
if our families are not observing it. If people find the family member of Muslim 
leaders smoking, committing drug abuse, or removing their headscarf, what is 
the point of talking about Sharia? In that case, we only set a bad example to 
society. We can only talk but do not walk the talk. It is exactly for this reason, 
that people including Muslims have little belief in Islamic leaders.”407 
 
To boast its claims that the party elites understand the importance of Sharia and 
know how to implement it, the party point to the fact that a large number of party 
leaders have graduated from the Middle East with degrees in Islamic studies.  
Often acting from a position of moral superiority and self-perceptions of being 
the only true defenders of Sharia, the PKS leaders tended to take a cynical view towards 
the other parties’ motives of implementing Sharia. For instance, regarding the people 
who often talk loud about Sharia and proclaim that “Sharia has to be implemented 
now”, Tate Qamaruddin wrote that in fact they are neither well-versed in Sharia nor 
knowledgeable on how and where to start.408 
The party’s coalition with PAN, a Muslim party but not an Islamist party, with 
pluralist platform, further strengthened the political commitment of the party regarding 
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the Sharia agenda. The coalition with PAN was a calculated strategy of the PK to 
downplay its Islamism, and it helped to soften the party’s doctrinaire image. From a 
different perspective, the party elites considered PAN’s stance of pluralism as being 
based on pragmatic reason, not driven by conviction. For example, in applying 
pluralism, PAN did not go so far as giving up the party leadership to non-Muslims, 
despite their equal status within the party. Discrepancies between claims of pluralism 
and their actual application, the PK leaders said, provided strong indication that PAN 
would not “deviate too far” from Islam or sacrifice its deep relationship with the 
biggest reformist Muslim organization in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah, as the party 
origin. So, according to the PK leaders, the difference between the PK and PAN was 
only a matter of “political expression,” not on the principle tenets of Islam. 
The coalition between PKS and PAN made the Jakarta Charter agenda nearly 
impossible to implement, because of the latter’s claim to represent religious diversity. 
Both parties are of the opinion that Religiosity-based Clause suits best to Indonesian 
plural society. This clause is considered as respecting religious plurality, arguing that 
the Sharia-minded Clause is flawed because it was only concerned with the religiosity 
of Muslim citizens. The Clause offered by the Reformasi Coalition was considered by 
the party to do more justice to all religions, because the special status for Islam was 
lifted and thus it put other religious communities on the same footing. Above all, the 
Clause obliged adherents of all religions to implement their religious teachings. It is an 
act of injustice to enforce religious observance only upon Muslims, the PK leaders 
said, while leaving other religious communities free to obey or disobey their religious 
teaching.409 
The party claimed that the Reformasi coalition proposed a middle way because 
all religions were explicitly included in the Clause. The Religiosity-based Clause also 
recognized the implementation of Sharia while ensuring the rights of other religious 
communities. Furthermore, the Clause reflected the identity of Indonesia as a religious 
nation and mirrored the spirit of Pancasila as a “word of concord” (kata persamaan, 
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kalimah sawa). For this matter, the party maintained that since the majority of people 
are Muslims, the implementation of Sharia should be given a chance. It does not have 
to be in the formulation of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter, but in a wording 
whose substance is similar but acceptable to all religious communities. Therefore, the 
party claimed that they have consulted with representative of other religious leaders, 
especially of Christian organizations, and they had lent support for the proposed Clause 
because its wording concerned the piety of all religious communities.410 
The justification for the Clause was characteristically Islamist; the state must 
encourage piety and morality, by ensuring that all people of different religions observe 
their religious teachings. Maintaining the morality of individuals and the general public 
is the key to overcoming the nation’s problems. Both parties’ leaders of Reformasi 
Coalition argued that if people obey their religion, there is a big chance that they will 
also obey the law, and avoid committing big scale crime, such as corruption, collusion 
and nepotism. The two parties have a common commitment to fight corruption, calling 
the corrupt “national traitors” or “rats of the state” that needed to be “eliminated”.411 
The party believed that one of the best ways to eliminate corruption was to increase 
individual piety. Therefore, to ensure that religious life develop well and to remind the 
people that adherence to religious teaching is an obligation, the Reformasi Coalition 
suggested that the Religiosity-based Clause mention the obligation on the state to 
realize it as a fundamental sentence within the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that due to their organic approach to the holistic nature 
of Islam, the proponents of political Islam experienced great difficulty in synthesizing 
their theological or philosophical foundations with the existing socio-cultural and 
political realities of their time. Their idea that Islam be adopted as the state ideology 
along with its socio-political ramifications was challenged and rejected by large and 
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powerful political groups who concern mainly with the nature of the nation state of 
Indonesia with Pancasila as the national philosophy and the state ideology. In the early 
New Order period of late 1960s, political Islam became a target of ideological-political 
distrust and was consequently curbed by restrictive policies as is clearly seen in the 
government rejection of the Islamic group’s political agendas, i.e. legalization of the 
Jakarta Charter, rehabilitation of the proscribed Masyumi, and involvement of the 
former Masyumi leaders in Parmusi.  
The rigid orientation towards politics and religion left the defenders of political 
Islam with inadequate room for maneuver. When the position of political Islam 
appeared to be worsening, particularly following the New Order’s political scheme of 
restructuring the political format of Indonesia, many of its leaders grew increasingly 
reactionary. This attitude proved the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists 
to give intelligent religio-political responses to these new challenges. In the view of 
some younger Muslim leaders and activists, the early generation of Islamic political 
elites suffered from inflexibility and was almost dogmatic in their responses to 
practical consideration. They argue that unless such a political orientation becomes 
more flexible, it seems unlikely to establish a viable synthesis between Islam and the 
state. 
By the late 1980s a changed political context had induced the regime to shift 
its posture toward Islam by adhering to a number of policies favorable to Muslim 
interests. Although the government’s attitude towards official Islam had seemingly 
been reversed, its accommodative enterprises have not actually represented a decisive 
break with the policies of the early New Order. The government was still adamant 
about political Islam. Through the course of its governmental career, the New Order 
regime remained essentially obsessed with depoliticization programs as a means of 
preserving rule. Rather than competing with Islam for legislative authority, the 
government is seeking to appropriate the power to declare Islamic law. Instead of 
defeating Islam, the New Order regime has decided to confiscate it. 
The collapse of the New Order regime brings a new hope for Muslim activists 
to achieve their vision of society. Some chose to establish political parties based on the 
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Islamist platform, in which the enforcement of Sharia became one of the main political 
aspirations. The result of several elections showed that there was a gulf between the 
Islamist ideals and the political reality. The little support they could get from most 
Indonesian Muslims gave a strong signal for them to reevaluate their strategies. The 
electoral share of lslamist parties in 1999 election strongly suggested that the majority 
of Indonesian Muslims did not support the Islamist agenda, especially their ideals to 
Islamize the state and the Constitution. Realizing the limited popular support and 
insignificant seat in the parliament, PK withheld the Sharia agenda and focused more 
on reformist issues, which could have broader popular appeal, such as amending the 
Constitution to strengthen parliamentary powers, enhancing economic growth, 
combating corruption and removing the army’s political role.  
The reluctance of the party to support the Sharia-minded Clause during the 
constitutional debate in 2000 was a calculated strategy to appear pluralist and 
moderate. Together with PAN, the party formed a coalition to overcome the 
controversy around the insertion of Jakarta Charter into the Constitution, by proposing 
an alternative wording that omitted Sharia terms from the Clause. The party’s policy 
of downplaying Sharia did not necessarily mean that it has abandoned its Islamist 
ideology. While being faithful to its ideals of bringing about Sharia rule, the party 
decided that it should adjust its behavior in accordance with political circumstances.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PKS’ LONG-TERM STRUGGLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF SHARIA 
 
 
This chapter draws together and consolidates the analysis of the preceding 
chapters about PKS’ long-term attitude towards the implementation of Sharia in 
Indonesia. It starts with revisiting what we know about the Islamist movement and its 
underlying ideology. This first section of the chapter provides the context of the PKS 
motive in struggling for Sharia implementation in Indonesia. The challenges from 
internal umma as well as from external forces toward the Sharia implementation, and 
how the party responds to them are discussed in the second section. The next section 
discusses how the party implements its approach on Sharia, or Sharia politics, in socio-
political context of the country. And the last section provides the discussion on the 
nature of the PKS as both a party and a movement that gives a significant influence to 
the attitude of the party toward the implementation of Sharia.  
 
A.  Sharia at the heart of Islamist Movement 
In the first decade after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia witnessed a 
rising tide of Islamist activism, whichshared a common ideal of promoting the 
implementation of Sharia. According to Islamist ideology, Sharia is the highest law 
and, ultimately, the sole source of all legislation. As divine law, Sharia, for the 
Islamists, provides a comprehensive and universal guide that gives solution to every 
problem the human being faces. Consequently, the Islamists believe that they have to 
continuously strive for the nation to implement Sharia. In their mind, the application 
of Sharia is a panacea that will liberate people from materialism, capitalism and 
secularism that have created prolonged crises.  
In order for the Muslims to reclaim their glory, the Islamists believe, there is 
only one path to take: the return to Sharia as the only Islamic system of life. Implicit 
in this Islamist ideology is the denial and removal of any other system that contradicts 
Sharia. They point to the rampant corruption and injustice that prevails in Indonesia, 
and the nation’s dependence on Western countries as a valid proof of the failure of the 
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existing secular system, and accordingly called for a return to the path of God, i.e. the 
implementation of Sharia in personal, communal and national life. “Save Indonesia 
with Sharia” becomes their popular jargon and outcry when they take to the streets to 
demand the comprehensive implementation of Sharia.  
While their ideas and activism can manifest in a variety of groups or 
movements, the Islamists have shared common ideas. Firstly, they believe that 
Muslims should implement Islam ‘in its literal form as set out in the Quran and Sunnah’ 
(Islam kaffah). Emphasis is given to the Quranic teaching on devotion (ibadah), social 
relation (mu‘amalah), and criminal punishment (hudud) which should be carried out 
to the letter. Secondly, they display hostility toward ideas, practices, or institutions 
deemed contradictive to the fundamental teaching of Islam, and through the slogan of 
da’wa and amr ma‘ruf nahy munkar (preaching Islam by commanding the good and 
forbidding the evil), they prepare to uproot the status qua and in its place rebuild the 
new society and state. Islamist groups do not necessarily resort to violence to realize 
their ideas; some are known to use non-violent and incremental approachs to achieve 
their long-term goal. Despite their distinct interests and varying points of agenda, the 
twin-issues of establishing an Islamic state and implementing Sharia constitutes the 
heart of the lowest common denominator shared consensus.412 
All of the Islamist groups have the same broad diagnostic framing about the 
current situation of Muslims in the country and the Muslim world in general. One 
excerpt from long opening speech by Irfan S. Awwas during the first congress of 
Mujahidin portrays the common state of mind among the radical Islamists regarding 
the interconnectedness between the Sharia and the fate of umma in which Sharia being 
the remedy for the current situation of the Muslims. 
“Muslims comprise the majority of the entire population of Indonesia, but the 
injustice and humiliation alternated relentlessly and insistently upon Muslims. 
Yet, until now, there is not a single effective and representative Islamic 
institution functioning as an umbrella for protecting Islam and Muslim from 
being insulted. Therefore, there are at least three reasons why this congress of 
Mujahidin favors a major theme of Sharia enforcement. Firstly, from the 
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ideological (aqidah) perspective, every Muslim with a straight aqidah indeed 
has a desire for the implementation of Sharia as a natural consequence of their 
declaration as Muslims, in order that they will be free from disaster, calamity, 
devastation and destruction. Secondly, from historical (sirah) reason, the 
history of the umma since the time of the Prophet to the era of the rightly-guided 
caliphs until the demise of Ottoman empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 
1924, shows that Muslims lived in an Islamic system of government, namely 
caliphate, that enable them to preserve the unity of umma (nation) and imamah 
(leadership). Approximately 76 years to this day, Muslims no longer feel the 
pleasure of living in one leadership, under a caliphate, but they instead engineer 
their own lifestyle by creating separate communities (jamaah) and group 
(firqah) or factions that take proud for what they have. Thirdly, from the 
[perspective of] today’s reality, Muslims suffered from the protracted multi-
dimensional crisis. It is the time when Muslims are required to be more 
determined to offer the gems of the Quran and Sunnah without any hesitation 
and insecurity as a solution to all sort of problems that afflict mankind. Now it 
is the time for Muslims to involve in maintaining national agenda, namely 
continuing the reformation process, upholding the supremacy of Sharia for the 
sake of truth and justice, and preserving peace, order and security within the 
communities to create political stability in the country, improving national 
vigilance against any possibility of economic, politic, social and military 
intervention of Neo-imperialism, Neo-colonialism and Neo-communism that 
clearly threatens the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Based on 
the above reasons, the need for the enforcement of Sharia is absolute. What we 
still need to be defined further are the technical aspects of the implementation 
of Islamic Sharia in the midst of the roaring storm of secularism.413 
 
The fact that the various Islamist movements use diverse strategies for 
implementing Sharia does not necessarily mean that they lack a point of agreement; 
indeed, they share the same ideas of the mandatory implementation of Sharia. They 
believe that only the establishment of an Islamic government can bring genuine 
prosperity, justice and order. However, they carried out their agenda utilizing a variety 
of methods, ranging from regional Sharia regulations, as employed by KPPSI; 
influencing public policy and participating in the parliament and in the law-making 
process, as pursued by PKS, PPP, and PBB; or taking to the street and sweeping and 
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raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels, and other reputed dens of iniquity, as 
practiced by FPI. 
All Islamist activists agree with the diagnosis that Indonesian Muslims and the 
Muslim world are caught in an economic, political, cultural, and moral crisis, and they 
have identified the same perpetrators that should be taken care of. Firstly, the “infidel” 
(kafir) Western power is portrayed as the main source for the crisis; they have used 
their economic and military power to subjugate, exploit and enfeeble the Muslim 
communities.414 Western domination of the Muslim states is cast in terms of a global 
Jewish and Christian conspiracy, driven by an innate hostility toward Islam and 
Muslims. Secondly, the Muslim community is also responsible for the onslaught of the 
West, by their straying from the true teaching of Islam set out in the Quran and Sunnah. 
In this context, the blame is directed more to the Muslim leaders who are deemed to 
have betrayed their fellow Muslims by siding with the Western power for the sake of 
preserving their own interest at the expense of the umma. Thus, Islam is seen as facing 
dire challenges from enemies within and without. 
Despite their different approaches to rectifying this situation, all of the Islamist 
movements come to develop the same prognostic framing to providing a solution to 
the problem, which is redirecting Indonesian Muslims to return to Islamic sources (al-
ruju‘ ila al-Quran wa al-Sunnah) as practiced by the al-Salaf al-Salih or “righteous 
ancestors”, who gained their Islamic knowledge directly from the Prophet Muhammad, 
so their practice was considered pure, pristine, and authoritative. Muslims of later 
generations should look to them for the “purer” form of the faith, because Islamic 
practices now have been increasingly contaminated by foreign elements, resulting in 
Muslims going astray from the true path of God.  
This desire to recapture the true essence of Islam is widely known as 
Salafism,415 which is now used to describe a broad range of organizations, ranging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 48 
415  Salafism is an Islamic movement of the modern era that claims to emulate the pious 
predecessors (salaf al-shalih, i.e. the first three generations of Muslim community) by returning to the 
Quran and the sunna of the prophet in accordance with the understanding and example of the Salaf. Born 
nearly one century after Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had successfully exerted his influencial ideas 
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from groups that committed to da’wa, such as Hizbut Tahrir and Jemaah Tabligh, and 
involved in peaceful participation in electoral politics, such as PKS, to those who resort 
to violent actions, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, or the Islamic Community), Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, or Indonesian Islamic Warriors’ Council), Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defenders’ Front), Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah 
(FKAWJ, or Communication Forum for the Adherents of the Prophetic Tradition and 
the Community) and Laskar Jihad (LJ, or Warriors of Jihad).  
All groups believe that the key to build a pious Muslim community is through 
the comprehensive implementation of Sharia and strict interpretation of the Quran. For 
them, Sharia is timeless (shalih li kulli zaman wa makan, suitable for every period and 
place), therefore it does not need “reinterpretation,” “contextualization” or 
“modernization”, which will only dilute the true command of God.416Consequently, 
for the Islamists the piecemeal application of Sharia which is confined to family law, 
devotional practices, such as hajj and zakat (pilgrimage and alms), and small parts of 
Islamic economic law is not enough. Until the Sharia is implemented in its totality 
which includes hudud (Islamic Criminal Law) can the Muslim society be free from the 
multi-dimensional crisis that recently blights them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the movement aims to reconcile Islam and modernity. Therefore, the 
early proponents of salafism, such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1898), Muhammad Abduh (1849-
1905) dan Muhammad Rasyid Rida (1865-1935) are themselves reformists and modernists, who adopted 
modern progress considered necessary to regain the triumph of Islam. The Salafi movement shares the 
characteristic of neo-Wahhabism which actively championed the calls for a return to the Quran and the 
sunnah and condemnation of pre-Islamic cultural practices which are tinted with bid’ah, takhayyul and 
khurafat (reprehensible innovation, superstition, and myth). The emergence of Salafism was closely 
connected with the rise of Muslim political awareness in the Muslim world to free themselves from 
Western colonialization, hence the obsession to reconstruct the new Muslim ummah. Some aspects of 
salafism, notably its anti-Western sentiments, inspired the birth of Islamist movement, including Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and Jama’at-I Islami (Islamic Community). Hasan al-Banna and 
Abul A’la al-Mawdudi, respectively the founder of the two movements, endeavored to define Islam 
primarily as a political system. This Islamist political movement embarks on a project to reconstruct 
society based on Islamic principles. Representing the growing strength of political Islam in Indonesia, 
PKS is in the front line of the project to establish Islam as a comprehensive system that regulate all 
aspects of the country’s life.  As has been discussed earlier (see footnote 336 on page 141) PKS’s 
particular approach to Salafism is often described as neo-Wahhabism. 
416 Hodri Ariev, “The Ideology and Agenda of Extremist Movements in Indonesia,” in The 
Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of Moderates Wages a Successful Campaign Against 
Radicalization and Terrorism in the World’s Largest Muslim-Majority Country, Jakarta: The Wahid 
Institute and Maarif Institute, 2011, p. 135. 
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As an ideological basis of Islamist movement, Salafism encompasses a diverse 
range of Islamist movements including Saudi Wahhabism, the neo-revivalism of 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the jihadism of Al-Qaeda.417 The influence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and of Wahhabi thought upon the Islamist movements in 
Indonesia is especially pronounced,418 and many of them have highly idealized the 
pious early Muslim generation (al-salaf al-shalih). While their ultimate demand is that 
the state be responsible for enforcing compliance of its Muslim citizens with Islamic 
Sharia, they help their fellow Muslims to be pious of its own accord through da’wa 
(proselytism) and amr ma’ruf nahy munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the 
evil), two noble terms that are so familiar to the Muslims. The lure of Islamists lies in 
the way in which they effectively employ these concepts of Islam.  
According to progressive Islamic intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the Islamist’s call to “struggle for Islam” is a disguise to cover their specific political 
agenda. In their hands, Islam becomes a weapon to discredit anyone who holds political 
views or religious beliefs different from their own. This strategy is highly effective, 
since anyone opposing them can be accused of being an enemy of Islam itself. He 
further explains that whenever Islam is transformed into an ideology, it becomes 
narrow, restricted, and constrained by ideological limits and political platforms. 
Furthermore, he asserted that due to their narrow understanding of Islam, these groups 
will readily label any contradictory view as inimical to Islam itself. The fundamental 
nature of such an ideologically-driven interpretation of Islam is to eliminate opposition 
and justify political supremacy and power. This transformation of Islam into an 
ideology clearly reduces the supreme teachings of Islam into a narrow and rigid 
ideological framework.419 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417For a discussion of salafism, see Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the 
Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11” in Middle-East Policy X, no. 2 (Summer 
2003): 76–92; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); 
and “Salafism and the War Against Terror in Southeast Asia”, Research Institute of Asia and the Pacific 
(RIAP), University of Sydney <http:/www.riap. usyd.edu.au/publications/documents/SEAIslam.pdf>. 
418  See Hodri Ariev, “The Origins and Global Spread of Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood 
Ideology,” in The Illusion of an Islamic State, p. 78-84. 
419Ibid., p. 14-15. 
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The rising tide of Islamist activism in the socio-political arena of post-Soeharto 
era has not come without meeting with response and resistance from moderate 
mainstream Muslims, especially those from the two mass-based organizations, 
Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. These two biggest Muslim organizations of 
the country stand in the front line of battle against the widespread of Islamist ideas. 
The moderate Muslim leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Ahmad Syafi’i 
Ma’arif, set up various NGOs to support moderation and promote democratic views of 
Islam,420 and raising the people awareness of the present danger of Islamists’ call for 
the Sharia to multiculturalism and democracy.  
These NGOs organize discussions, seminars, and workshops to disseminate 
moderate and progressive views of Islam that aim at strengthening pluralism and 
multiculturalism in Indonesia which is perceived under the threat of radical Islamism. 
Interfaith dialog and cooperation is also facilitated and established to raise awareness 
among the Muslims of the importance of equality, rule of law, pluralism and 
democracy. As opposed to the Islamist campaign for the Sharia which is understood 
by the moderate Islam as circumscribing the minority rights, contradicting democratic 
values and anti-pluralism, the proponents of moderate Islam relentlessly wage a 
campaign asserting interfaith harmony, egalitarianism, gender equality and the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy.  
B.   Sharia as Muslim Identity 
It has been a strong belief among the PKS leaders that Indonesian Muslims 
experienced the crisis of identity as religious communities and as a Muslim nation 
because they have deserted their Islamic identity. According to the PKS elites, the core 
issue of Indonesia as a nation is the absence of strong value of faith to form the spirit 
for developing the nation and state. With the great majority of Indonesians being 
Muslim, the party leaders assert that the chances of Sharia to be effective in Indonesia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420Examples of these kinds of organizations include Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islamic 
Network), the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), the Wahid Institute (TWI), and the 
Ma‘arif Institute for Culture and Harmony, to mention only a few. 
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are extremely good considering the fact that before the coming of the colonial powers, 
Sharia had been adopted as law in many areas of the archipelago.  
The most explicit evidence of the influential existence of Islamic law during 
pre-independent period was the issuance of the so-called Compendium Freijher in 
1760, which consists of Islamic matrimonial and inheritance law to be applied by VOC 
courts in solving disputes between Muslims living in areas under its control.421 The 
recognition of the existence and the importance of Islamic law and institutions during 
the colonial period subsequently found its way into the State Basic Law 
(Regeeringsreglement) 1855:2 Article 75 and 78.422 The formal recognition of the 
position of Islamic law was partly due to the idea, widely believed at that time, that the 
native population followed their respective religious law and accordingly Muslims 
were regulated by Islamic law. A well-known proponent of this view was L.W.C. van 
den Berg who popularized the Receptie in Complexu Theorie meaning that despite 
many deviations, by being a Muslim, one surrendered oneself into Islamic law.423 
This view was then challenged by C. Snouck Hurgronje, Van Vollenhoven and 
Ter Haar who came to conclusion that a number of field studies and reports did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Supomo, Sejarah Politik Hukum Adat 1609-1848, Jakarta: Djambatan, 1955, p. 26. Apart 
from Compendium Freijher there were many other legislative manuals promulgated during the VOC 
period. For the Semarang state court, in VOC issued a manual of Javanese law, which was derived from 
the Kitab Mugharrar, a well-edited fiqh book compiled by Ar-Rafi’i (d. 1226) and is an adaptation of 
three well-known fiqh books by Al-Ghazali, namely Khulasah, Wajiz and Basit. See Th. W. Juynboll, 
Handeling tot de Kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet volgen de Leer der Sjafi’itische School, Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1930, p. 373-374. Other legislative manuals issued during this time were the PepakemCirebon 
(Cirebonsche Wetboek) and regulations drawn up for the Bone and Goa areas in Celebes (Compendium 
Indiansche bij de Hoven van Bone en Goa), see Soekanto, Meninjau Hukum Adat Indonesia, Jakarta: 
Rajawali, 1981, p. 24. 
422 Article 78 of the Regeringsreglement (RR) 1855 :2 instructed the judicial bodies to use 
religious laws (Godsdienstige wetten), indigenous tradition and usages in dealing with native disputants 
as far as these were not in conflict with generally recognized principle of equity and justice. In regard 
to a civil code, Article 78 of the Regeringsreglement (RR) 1855:2 provided that in the event of a civil 
crime committed by one indigenous person towards another or crimes among those classified as 
indigenous people, those involved had to abide by the decision of the judge or religious or community 
leader to solve the case in accordance with religious laws or traditional guidelines. These provisions 
clearly recognized the existence of Islamic law as one of legal systems to be applied to Muslim 
population. See Sajuti Thalib, Receptio A Contrario. Hubungan Hukum Adat dengan Hukum Islam, 
Jakarta: Bina Aksara, 1980. 
423 See Hazairin, Hukum Kekeluargaan Nasional, Jakarta: Tintamas, 1962; Ichtijanto, Hukum 
Islam dan Hukum Nasional, Jakarta: Ind-Hill Co., 1990. 
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support the argument that native people were actually practicing Islamic law. They 
advocated the so-called Receptie Theorie, meaning that Islamic law was followed 
provided it was acceptable to adat (local custom) rules. In other words, they maintained 
that it was its traditional rulers rather than Islamic law that were followed by the 
population. Furthermore, they maintained that some elements of Islamic law had been 
immersed into adat, but they were followed not as Islamic law but more as adat. It was 
by dint of their efforts that Articles 75 and 78 of the Regeeringsreglement 1855:2 were 
gradually amended, first in 1907 by Staatsblad 1907:204 Article 1 (1) and revised by 
Staatsblad 1919:621, and finally by IndischeStaatsregeling 1929 Article 134 (2).424 
Based on the long history of Islamic law in Indonesia, the party leaders believe 
that Sharia has become the cultural identity of Indonesian Muslims long before the 
independence, but the long-term impact of colonization and global conspiracy of 
Jewish and American-led operation is believed to be the prominent cause of the 
declining role of Sharia in Muslim societies. However, this setback is only temporarily, 
as the umma has previously gone through many cycles of crisis and recovery during 
the course of history. The PKS believes that Muslims can respond and resist the 
influence and intrusion of Western culture by returning to authentic Islamic norms.  
The party sees the struggle to rectify Indonesian Muslims’ religious identity as 
a part of global clash of ideologies. In this sense, the notion of ghazwul fikr is crucial 
for the party. Defined as “a system for cultural defense [system pertahanan budaya] to 
withstand all regulations and systems that are not based in Islam and take mankind to 
apostasy [kesesatan]”, 425 ghazwul fikr becomes a combative doctrine against the 
cultural, political, and intellectual assault of the West. TheWestern systems have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 The article concerned stated that in the case of a civil dispute between Muslims, this will be 
settled by a religious judge if the case concerned has been accepted as falling within their adat rules and 
so far as it is not stipulated otherwise by law. Under this article, the authority of Islamic law was no 
longer recognized to the effect that Islamic law could only be administrated by a religious judge as long 
as it was accepted by adat rules. This article was also considered the formal legal basis of the Receptie 
Theorie, of which the purpose was to eliminate the existence of Islamic law from the Dutch East Indies 
legal system. See, Sajuti Thalib, Receptio A Contrario. Hubungan Hukum Adat dengan Hukum Islam, 
Jakarta: Bina Aksara, 1980, p. 39. 
425 Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Islaam Diin Al-Haq (Islam adalah Agama yang Benar)”, [“Islam is the 
True Religion”], reprinted in Irwan Prayitno, Kepribadian Muslim: Bahan Panduan bagi Dai dan 
Murabbi,Seri Pendidikan Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Bekasi, 2002, p. 488. 
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become known as jahiliyah, a notion made famous by Sayyid Qutb. Because of this 
jahiliyah system, Islamic education and culture is weakening; their politics and 
economy, therefore, were infected by secular concepts like nationalism, secularism and 
capitalism, which eroded the authority and authenticity of Islamic institutions and 
brought moral hazard to the Muslim community in general.426 
The PKS offered the solution to counter the forsaking of Muslims by 
systematically developing ideological awareness among cadres. Materials for 
cadrerization were infused with the instruction about protecting and defending Islam 
against the threat and influences of the West. A main objective of such a cadre training 
was to develop awareness among the cadres about historical clashes between Islam and 
the West and the latter’s desire and plan for the conquest of Muslim lands and 
civilization. The ghazwul fikr materials depicted “an eternal conflict between truth 
[haq] and falsehood [bathil]”. Referring to the Quran of al-Baqarah 120, Zionism is 
portrayed as a group which everlastingly wages war against Islam and Muslims. The 
purpose of ghazwul fikr doctrine is for cadres “to know that the enemy of Islam engages 
in a global conspiracy”, “to know the Zionist strategy against Islam”, “to recognize 
Israel as a Zionist state”and “to know how Islam and Muslims could prevail and 
respond the issues”.427 
The ghazwul fikr doctrine also depicts the plan to destroy Islam as intrinsic to 
Western power. Recognizing that military forces only give little damage to the Islamic 
spirit, the Western leaders came up with a new weapon, which aims at destructing the 
Islamic identity by separating Muslim from their religion through ideological 
warfare.428 In this new type of war, the West utilized economic or political power to 
instill their lifestyle, culture, ideology or institution into the Muslim world. To counter 
this “intellectual assault”, the cadrerization materials were designed accordingly. The 
party’s cadre training taught material on “ghazwul fikr”, “international Zionism”, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 See Prayitno, Kepribadian Muslim. 
427  Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera (compilers), Manajemen tarbiyah anggota 
pemula (Tarbiyah management for new members), DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Departemen 
Kaderisasi, Seri Manjaj Tarbiyah, 2003, p. 157. 
428 Abu Ridha, Jihad atau Terorisme, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 28.  
	  	  
	  
206 
“movements and institutions that oppose Islam”.429 The training materials taught that 
the West has failed in their effort to destroy Islam through military might, accordingly 
they launch new attack on Islam using culture, education, and economy. The assault is 
very gentle, but lethal,430 that the victim did not realize about the damage it causes to 
the umma. Liberal Muslims that are exposed and adhered to the Western ideas which 
are alien to Islam, are described as being the victims of this new warfare against Islam. 
Therefore, the main issue in ghazwul fikr doctrine is to build up awareness and 
vigilance against Muslims allying with the enemy of Islam. The fact that Muslim land 
is now free from the occupation does not negate the reality that up till today it still 
becomes an object of new form of colonialism. The party elites point to the Western 
influence in culture, economy, politics, education, fashion, and lifestyle as a proof that 
the West continued their colonization upon the Muslim world.431 This new colonialism 
aims at distancing the Muslims from their faith; using new technique of propaganda, 
the success of this new invasion is not to conquest the Muslim lands but to make its 
inhabitants away from their faith and make them follow the Western systems and 
institutions. 
The excerpt from the party magazine written by the previous head of Sharia 
Council of the party, who are now the president of the PKS, illustrates well the party’s 
thinking about the impact of Western cultural and intellectual invasion upon the Sharia 
implementation in the country. 
“Chances to make Sharia effective in Indonesia are extremely good because 
Muslims are the majority. The law that fits them best is the law based on Sharia, 
not the law inherited from the Dutch colonialists, which has already been 
modified in several ways and proven unfit to overcome the problems of our 
nation. Many provinces already have adopted Sharia before independence. This 
is an historical fact, which this nation has to acknowledge ... But it is very 
saddening that the enemies of Islam try to stigmatize Sharia Islam as something 
scary. Because of this, a great deal of society has antipathy toward Sharia Islam 
even before it has become effective... Many people especially in the West 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429  Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera (compilers), Manajemen tarbiyah anggota 
pemula, pp. 151-61.  
430Ibid., 155-56  
431 See for instance, “Ghazwul Fikr dan Dakwah Kita”, in dprapks.blogspot.com. See also 
“PKS Bengkulu Tengah. Perang Pemikiran (Ghazwul Fikr)”, in tuntebenteng.blogspot.com.  
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subscribed to the ideas that Sharia is cruel or that Muslims are extremists. All 
of this is a propaganda waged by the Israeli Zionists.”432 
 
Similar points of argument about the stigma surrounding Sharia are made by 
Anis Matta, the previous president of PKS. He was convinced that the concern about 
the adverse impact of Sharia implementation on the national diversity (Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika) resulted from the conspiracy against Sharia waged by the enemy of Islam. 
To those who worried about the disintegration of the nation due to the application of 
Sharia in Indonesia, he posed a rhetorical question: “Is there a correlation between the 
implementation of Sharia with the disintegration of the nation?” He further pointed to 
the fact that the case of Timor-Leste separation did not have any linkage with the 
aspiration of Sharia implementation. In his observation, the cause for disintegration is 
not Sharia implementation but the absence of justice; as long as justice is not delivered, 
the nation is at risk of disintegration, even before Sharia is implemented yet. Anis went 
to cite al-Mawardi, a political thinker of classical Islam, saying in his book that “the 
era of a nation is determined by the deliverance of justice. As long as justice exists, the 
unity of a nation will remain. When the injustice prevails, disintegration is 
approaching.” Since the Sharia is nothing but the implementation of justice, the myth 
of Sharia as causing national disintegration is considered as a conspiracy against 
Islam.433 
An instruction about ghazwul fikr tells us about the perpetrators behind the 
jahiliyah system. In a guideline written specifically for preachers and leaders of Islamic 
study circles (murobbi), Irwan Prayitno, one of party ideologues, mentions the 
Christians and Jews as the “people of the book” who have estranged from their original 
faiths. He plainly said that: 
The infidels [pihak kafir] look for a different way to destroy the Muslim 
community [menghancurkan umat Islam]. They will never give in [rela]and 
never cease to attack until Muslims follow their religious community [millah]. 
The strategy used to destroy Islam is ghazwul al-fikr ... which issystematically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432  Salim Segaf “Insya Allah, Syari’at Islam Akan Tegak di Bumi Indonesia”, in Suara 
Keadilan, 10 March-10 April 2001, p. 10-11, see Bernard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in 
the Emerging Democracy, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009, p. 194. 
433 Anis Matta, Dari Gerakan ke Negara, Jakarta: Fitrah Rabbani, 2006, p.51. 
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undertaken ... The objective of ghazwulfikris to destroy morals and thought, 
dissolve [melarutkan]Muslims’ personality and to separate them from their 
religion. The perpetrators of ghazwul fikr, in general, consist of Jews, 
Christians, Parsees [Majusi], polytheists [Musyrikin], hypocrites 
[Munafikin],atheists and infidels [Kafir]... Returning the beliefs of Muslims to 
Islam is difficult except through propagation [da’wa] and individual endeavor 
[jihad],put into effect by a movement [harakah]and the tradition of the Islamic 
community [jama‘ah Islamiyah].434 
 
 
The ghazwul fikr doctrine is meant to be an internal discourse. It is used as a 
frame of mind intended to strengthen inner resilience without abandoning moderate 
behavior. Far from being a tool for physical confrontation and attack, the instruction 
on ghazwul fikr doctrine is intended for self-restraint that is non-violent. However, this 
combative doctrine could still inspire hostile attitude toward the “enemy of Islam” 
which is extended to the liberal Muslims held responsible for alienating the Muslim 
community from Islam. The great risk of this combative doctrine is an occurrence of 
conflict with any individuals, groups or community of Muslims suspected as the 
“enemy of Islam” or “infidel collaborators”. Even though the aim of the doctrine is to 
instill wariness and self-protection against the perceived assault against Islam, a 
deliberate attempt of the PKS leadership to keep the doctrine away from public 
knowledge and its absence from official statements and public addresses indicate the 
party’s awareness of its controversial aspects. Confrontational messages of the doctrine 
also defeat the party’s ideals as a national unifier and a binding element among societal 
groups.  
C.   Gradualist Approach on Sharia 
The party laments that Western intrusionhas brought down the rule of Sharia. 
Colonialism has left its legacy on the legal and political system which is inherently 
secular. After the end of colonialism, the present-day Muslim countries, including 
Indonesia, operate in political and legal systems of European origin. According to the 
party elites, the Western colonial intrusion has made the role of Islamic legal systems 
and institutions ineffective and dormant. Shariathus became the lost heritage of the 
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Indonesian Muslim community. By calling for the implementation of Sharia, the party 
struggles to rectify the rights of the majority of Muslim populations to establish the 
rule of Sharia in their homeland. The demand to introduce and implement Sharia as a 
replacement of the Western laws then became one of the long-termagendas of the 
party.435 
The fact that the Islamic law had been in practice in the archipelago before the 
advent of European rule, in their understanding of history, have convinced them that 
Sharia was more appropriate for Indonesia than secular Western-derived civil law, 
hence closer to the way of life of the Indonesian Muslims than civil law.436 In the 
party’s perspective, the Western legal system and institutions have been forcefully 
imposed into the legal life of indigenous Muslim population. This imperialist coercion 
was invasive and therefore was considered an anomaly. The party believes that had it 
is not for the colonial intervention, Islam and Sharia as the religious identity of the 
Indonesian Muslims would have prospered in the archipelago; the interruption of 
colonialism has halt the natural progress of Islam and Sharia. According to the party, 
the forced adoption of Western law has caused the separation of law from its 
philosophical and sociological underpinnings, therefore the statutes of the party call to 
end this situation by returning to the original character of Indonesian law.437 It is the 
main objective of the party legal agenda to gradually replace Western derived law with 
Sharia codes as the major legal source.  
While the goal is set, the remaining question would be to find the right time to 
make Islam the philosophical principle for national law. In this regard, the party acted 
on the principle of gradualism informing that there is no swift means to accomplish the 
Islamization of society or to diminish Western influences. The party elites are 
cognizant of the fact that the majority of the people are not subscribed to Islamist 
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agenda of Islamizing state and constitution. Thus, from the outset, the party were 
dismissive of the political maneuver of giving Sharia a constitutional status. Rather 
than making the state responsible to carry out the Sharia, the party chose to prepare the 
people for the implementation of the Sharia through da’wa bil-hal or da’wa by 
exemplary actions. It is a common belief among the party leaders that the application 
of Islamic values into the public domain should be conducted through the process of 
objectification, meaning that the ideas should be able to convince the public that it 
would meet the principle of benefit. So, the legal products inspired from Sharia norms 
should also be put to the test and pass the principle of benefit before it becomes a 
positive law of the state.  
The party gives more emphasis on transforming the legislation and infusing it 
with Sharia values rather than reinserting Sharia into the Constitution that would give 
it a constitutional status. Socialization and introduction of Islamic laws in the law-
making process in the parliament was considered much more viable, whereasimposing 
constitutional changes could trigger resentment from the parliament. The party was 
also confident that, under the current circumstances, any endeavor to directly write 
Islam and Sharia into the Constitution would end in failure. An unprepared and 
reluctant population will render such an effort counterproductive; it would erode the 
government and heighten people’s opposition. The party is also concerned that should 
the public lack knowledge and awareness of Islam and Sharia, they will develop 
resistance toward Sharia and any issues associated with Sharia, such as Islamic bank 
or Islamic economy. 
Considering that engaging the state in the comprehensive implementation of 
Sharia would be untimely, the party instead turned the focus on redirecting the society 
toward excellent morality and religiosity as a preparation for the full realization of 
Sharia by the state. This strategy is in line with the principle of da’wa known as 
tadarruj (pentahapan, gradualism). Striving for the incorporation of Sharia into the 
Constitution required a set of preparatory steps. The first step is to establish an Islamic 
personality in each individual (gerakan individual or also known as takwin al-
sykhshiyyah al-Islamiyyah). The next step is da’wa on an individual basis (da’wa 
fardhiyyah), as a preparatory step for da’wa in family structure (takwin al-bayt al-
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muslim) which is followed by guiding and Islamizing society (irsyadul-mujtama‘ wa 
ishlahuhu). The following step is to Islamize the government (ishlah al-hukumah) 
which takes a form of legislative movement and constitutional struggle; while the 
firstrefers to the parliamentary struggle in the process of legislating Islamic laws, the 
latter refers to the inclusion of Sharia terms into the Constitution. Restoring Islamic 
caliphate (i‘adatu kayan al-khilafah al-islamiyyah) and becoming the exemplar of 
human civilization (ustadziyyat al-‘alam) comprise the final two steps of PKS da’wa 
strategy.438 
The importance of proselytizing on an individual basis is summarized by one 
of great leaders (murshid al-‘am) of Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Syaikh Hasan al-Hudaybi, 
in his famous saying: “kun dawlatan fi nafsika takun fi baladika” (establish Islamic 
state in yourself, you will see it in your land).439 Implicit in this statement is the large 
impact of individuals upon the state building, since the state is built on individuals. It 
also indicates that a structural state approach will be futile without prior understanding 
of Islam among Individual Muslims. Thus, the Islamization strategy has to start from 
below, and it will automatically have an impact upwards. 
In line with the concept of gradualism, the da’wa approach take into account 
the political reality of the country. As a political party, the PKS is subjected to the same 
institutional rules of the political game. By joining the electoral politics, the PKS has 
transformed from a movement into a political party. Participating in democratic system 
demands ideological adaptation to the political imperatives; the party will involve in 
coalition building, political bargaining or compromises with other political parties of 
different interest. Indeed, democratic political system allows different ideas and 
interest to compete for public recognition; it is the system designed to protect diversity 
and liberty of the people regardless their religious or political affiliation. Everybody 
has the same rights to cherish and enjoy democracy. Democracy, however, comesat a 
price, because even the extreme and radical ideas are given a room to flourish. 
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According to Anis Matta, democracy is concerned more with the matter of legality than 
with the truth; something wrong and bad can be made legal.  Consequently, the pivotal 
task of da’wa is to build a public awareness and to convince them about the benefit of 
Islam so they can synchronize between the truth and the legality. The success of da’wa 
in a current situation is to win a public discourse before winning the legislative process, 
and to make something wrong in the view of religion as something illegal in the 
positive law, or to render the good as something legal. 440  Evidently, democracy 
promises greater prospect for the success of da’wa and should be utilized optimally, 
because it provides unrestricted possibilities for the propagation of the truth of Islam. 
Within a democratic system, the PKS cadres as soldiers of da’wa could freely deliver 
Islamic norms and values and convince the public about the beauty of Sharia. So, the 
success of da’wa in political term is “to win the public mind so that they will side with 
us.”441 Matta elaborated how da’wa works in the era of democracy: 
For example, we want to banish pornography from our country. This is the way 
how we do it: we should build a structure of suggestions [struktur gagasan] to 
educate the public about the destructive nature of pornography for our life. 
Upon winning the discourse, we can issue the bill to eradicate all forms of 
pornography. Following this step is our task to supervise whether or not the 
government carries it out well; we can sue the government if they don’t. This 
is how da’wa should work in a democratic era. Surely, there is freedom we can 
enjoy together, but there is also a specific way to fight evil deed[kemungkaran] 
and to penetrate into legislative power. Let’s consider this an art that should be 
masterd by every soldier of da’wa.442 
 
It is safe to say that according to the party, democracy is a proper medium for 
Muslims to be involved in the contemporary political arena. The emphasis on 
individual freedom allows Muslims to practice their faith, disseminate Islamic 
teachings and values, and bring justice and prosperity. In other words, democracy 
provides Muslims ample opportunity to offer the best solution for the people’s 
problems. In the party’s perspective, democracy is a better sphere for da’wa activists 
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to do their task of convincing people about the truth of Islam, compared to an 
authoritarian or totalitarian regime which is hostile to da’wa. In other words, to the 
party leaders, democracy is a medium to achieve their Islamic ideals. 
It is important to recognize, while enjoying the opportunities afforded by 
democracy, the partyis actually deeply ambivalent towards democracy; it does not 
entirely acknowledge democracy as understood and applied by Westerners. The party 
does not consider the majority voice as something absolute, because in principle the 
majority does not always follow the truth. The will of the majority cannot become a 
yardstick for the truth, because it could be potentially based on the particular interests 
which contradict the God’s law. According to the party, secular Western democracy 
values the will of the majority of a people over God’s will. But Muslims are merely 
obligated to implement and carry out the revealed will of God. The party statutes gave 
evidence of the prevalence of this ideal: 
Allah as the holder of all power wishes mankind to be His vicegerent [khalifah] 
on earth. Therefore, mankind may assert his power as long as it is used only to 
fulfill His will. Thus, according to Islam, the government in a state should be 
organized on the principle of people sovereignty to realize God sovereignty.443 
 
To sum up, despite its flaws, for PKS, democracy was still the best solution in 
the current circumstances. Until the establishment of Islamic political system comes 
into existence, the party leaders consider democracy as the best political system in a 
Muslim society still beset by ignorance about Sharia values. The party believes that 
secular democracy could lead to injustice because it could potentially bring secular 
parties to power which in turn issue undesirable by-products which violated Islamic 
Sharia. Without a purpose of fulfilling God’s sovereignty, democracy as an end in itself 
is nothing more than a dictatorship based on injustice. Freedom and justice can only 
be delivered under Islamic Sharia as an epitome of justice.  
In the promotion of universal moral ideal such as “justice”, for instance, it is a 
common conviction among the party leaders that the only way to bring about justice 
ultimately was through Sharia rule. The party leaders understand this universal 
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principle of “justice” in the framework of the perceived advantages of Sharia. In this 
sense, the party epitomized the Islamist claim that Islamic law has an intimate 
connection with the theme of justice. Since justice is a fundamental principle enshrined 
in the Quran, the implementation of hudud, for instance, is necessary so long as it 
brings justice for the people. In a just world, the party leaders believe, the state carried 
out strict hudud directives as a deterrent to criminals, to achieve its goal of an orderly 
society. When asked if the full implementation of Sharia also includes the cutting off 
the hands of thieves, Hidayat Nur Wahid replied that “there is nothing to fear in Islamic 
law. The fear that hands will be cut off is a conscious attempt by interests who are 
afraid that such a law will be introduced.” In other words, the cutting off hands would 
not worry anyone but the thieves and criminals, and the PKS will not hesitant to 
implement it.444 
Yet it was central to the party that da’wa succeeds in convincing people about 
the benefits of Islamic ruling for their life, so that they will vote for a party promoting 
Sharia rule. Highlighting the party’s democratic commitment, the PKS leaders 
observed that elections are reliable tools to measure and evaluate the aspiration of the 
people and their predilection toward the party’s program and agenda. Obviously, since 
more people have voted for secular parties like PDIP and Golkar, rather than the 
Islamist parties, it is considered untimely to be pushing now forconstitutional 
recognition for Sharia. In the current situation, the party acknowledges the gulf 
between the general umma and the Sharia-oriented Muslims who desire the rule of 
Sharia law. It becomes a duty for the da’wa activists to re-accustom Muslims to an 
Islamic life-style as fundaments for the comprehensive implementation of Sharia in the 
country. 
D.   Struggle Toward the Middle  
PKS’s participation in democratic system has inevitably had a moderating 
effect on the party’s political agenda. Several recent studies have pointed to the party’s 
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behavioral moderation in national politics,445 sharing the same conclusion that the 
party has showed “clear signs of moderation effectuated by the party’s inclusion into 
democratic procedures such as elections, parliamentary negotiations and lobbying.”446 
The party’s inclusion into electoral politics proved to force the party to put aside some 
of its political agenda unsubscribed by the majority of the people. Some political 
measures by the party in its effort to appeal to median voters include the removal of 
Islamism label, coalition building with other parties of different faith and interest, 
endorsement of Pancasila as a state ideology, and commitment to religious plurality. 
Besides, the party also revised its initial position regarding the women leadership and 
formally expanded the party’s organizational membership to allow Muslims from non-
tarbiyah backgrounds to become official members of the party.447 The last but not 
least, the party not only grant membership for non-Muslim, but also lent them support 
for candidacy in legislative and executive elections. In short, inclusion into the system 
pushed the party into the median spectrum of the politics and into the political 
openness. 
PKS’s increasingly moderate attitude is also evident in its policy towards 
application of Sharia. Initially, the party’s political agenda was formulated around the 
idea of an Islamic state based on Sharia.448 As discussed earlier, in its early days, the 
party national leadership considered the Sharia implementation an important agenda 
of the party. The changing attitude toward Sharia become apparent after the party 
became embedded into the national politics, especially after the first electoral success 
in 2004, in which Sharia was pushed well into the background to the point of 
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invisibility. The case of Sharia-inspire by-law pointed to party’s policy of non-
commitment attitude toward Sharia.   
Despite the existence of Law 32/2004 on Regional Government which gives 
local executive heads an independent authority to drafting and implementing local 
regulations, the majority of local PKS leaders did not adopt Sharia regulations. A look 
at localities in which the PKS exerted political influence over the executive 
government is important to substantiate this claim. Between 2005 and 2008, the PKS 
was a part of a winning coalition in 7 out of 33 gubernatorial elections and 121 out of 
487 municipal elections. In these localities, the overall trend is that the PKS local 
leaders refrained from issuing or supporting Sharia regulations. In seven districts and 
municipalities that adopted Sharia regulations, none of the district heads or mayors of 
these localities are of PKS background. Of these numerous local government, only 
Mahmudi Ismail was recorded of issuing two Sharia regulations concerning the 
illegality of prostitution in 2006 and the ban of Ahmadiyahin 2011.449 
Unlike its predecessor, the PKS is promoting an inclusive image which proved 
successful in garnering the median votes. Centrist rhetoric and partnership with parties 
from different political spectrum have gained a wider currency within the party 
leadership. The shift to the middle resulted in electoral gain. The party witnessed an 
increase in vote, from 1.52 per cent to 7.34 per cent, at the expense of other Islamist 
parties whose votes were in decline.450 The electoral achievement of the party was 
attributed to the adjustment of the party’s political rhetoric and agenda; the PKS 
focused its campaign on a clean and caring government, employed religiously neutral 
language, and highlighted popular issues such as fighting corruption and promoting 
socio-economic equality.451 The party’s alliance with secular and nationalist parties 
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continued until 2013 local election. In 9 out of 15 provincial elections452 the party 
became a winning coalition in which 3 governors were of PKS cadres (Ahmad 
Heryawan, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, and Abdul Ghani Kasuba).453 In the same period, 8 
party cadres were also successful in gaining prestigious positions in regencies and 
municipalities.454 
Previously in 2008, the party made a breakthrough in declaring itself an open 
party and inviting non-Muslims to join the party. This “open party” strategy was a 
calculated maneuver to combat the general perception of the party as being deeply 
exclusive. As a part of “open party” strategy, the party also changes its political 
behavior during elections. The party leaders realize that, if they wish to gain a measure 
of support from the median voters, they must avoid appearing exclusive. To appeal to 
as many segments of the voters as possible, the party emphasizes universalist themes 
and downplays Sharia-based agendas in the election campaigns. 455  The party 
leadership believes that ideologically driven themes do not net votes. The lesson from 
its predecessor, the PK, was instructive, in which the party garnered only a scanty share 
of vote due to its emphasis on ideology. The same is true with the fate of other Islamist 
party, PBB, during 2004 and 2009 elections, in which the party campaigned an 
explicitly pro-Sharia platform.456 In both cases, the “ideological” strategy failed to 
increase votes.  
In line with the political pragmatism, in the run-up to 2009 general election, the 
party launched ad campaigns to court as much median voters as possible, in which 
Soeharto was portrayed as one of the nation’s greatest founding fathers. This particular 
ad was surely intended to reach a new segment of society. But due to historical trauma 
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of many Islamists about the Suharto’s repressive policy, this ad evoked the concern of 
the purists among the rank and file members of the party and of the pro-reformist 
activists as well.457 Other ad that specifically evoked the concern of the purist members 
of Tarbiyah movement was that of “Partai Kita Semua” (Party for Everyone), which 
alienated purist cadres and supporters because it portrayed women without 
headscarves. This particular ad indicated not only an obvious departure from the shared 
norms of the importance of Sharia symbol of scarf, but also a blatant violation to their 
established conviction about the image of pious Muslim women the party is supposed 
to advocate. 
It has become a common perception among the party cadres that these ads were 
a haphazard strategy of constituency-building in the 2009 elections, where party 
strategists were attempting to make inroads with various segments of society to obtain 
the 20 percent of the vote sufficient to run a presidential candidate, without considering 
how it might affect their base. Effectively, the strategies that may have appealed to 
small segments of new voters had the effect of alienating core voters.  Unsurprisingly, 
the pragmatists and purists interpreted the 2009 election results differently. The 
pragmatists saw the results as a vindication of the openness strategy. According to this 
view, apart from the PKS, all Islamic oriented parties were in decline in 2009. Thus, 
although they did not reach the target of 20 percent of the vote, they had prevented 
party’s votes from declining. The purists counter that the 2009 election results 
indicated the failure of pragmatists’ strategies because votes for the partywere in 
stagnancy. In fact, the total number of votes actually decreased by 119,065 vis-a`-vis 
2004, with the highest drop of 343,476 and 330,990 votes in its traditional base of West 
Java and Jakarta respectively. 
One key reason for the party’s adoption of the non-Islamist theme campaign in 
the run-up to the 2009 election is that issues of morality and religion were not appealing 
to the majority of Indonesian voters. Intensive surveys from 2005, 2006 and 2007 
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found diminishing support for Sharia-inspired policies including the prohibition of 
female president and bank interest, and the enactment of Islamic criminal law (hudud), 
such as hand cut-off for theft and stoning for adultery.458 Thus, it is necessary for the 
PKS to emphasize socio-economic themes to win voter support.Given its extensive 
da’waactivities, it is perhaps not surprising that the PKS was widely classified by 
Indonesians as the most Islamic party in both internal PKS surveys and in independent 
surveys conducted by the LSI.459 In an internal PKS post-election survey, 95 percent 
of respondents cited “Islamic” as their major perception regarding PKS.460 Thus, the 
party has been effective in communicating the religious aspects of its image, but it has 
been less successful in addressing voters’ concerns over economic issues and 
convincing centrist voters that the party is an effective channel for their aspirations.  
The party strategy of “dual constituency” campaign by maintaining the core 
and traditional voters and reaching out new segments in a wider populace is closely 
connected to its dual nature as both movement and party. Like many Islamist parties 
in the Arab world, which have formal organizational ties to socio-religious movements 
like the Muslim Brotherhood, the PKS has direct institutional linkages to an Islamist 
religious movement: Tarbiyah; in which it has its origins and under which it is 
constrained by a broader movement infrastructure and goals. The Islamist movement 
on which the PKS is based is far more conservative in its views on Islam and the role 
for Islam within the Indonesian political system, when compared to those of the 
majority of Indonesians. That the Tarbiyah movement was dominated by purist and 
conservative figures was acknowledged by the PKS leaders. Zulkieflimansyah, 
previous deputy chairman of PKS faction at the House of Representative, wrote for 
Jakarta Post about this fact:  
“That there are conservative, even hard-line voices within the PKS cannot be 
denied. Many of the first generation PKS leaders were ulama [Muslim scholars] 
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who led underground cells during the embittered Soeharto years when Islamic 
political forces were marginalized. These ulama were trained in the Middle 
East and for many years believed it their duty to lead the struggle for Islam. … 
second generation of leaders marks a break with the more conservative first 
generation ulama. Most, such as myself, are from secular universities, but more 
importantly have had far greater political/democratic experience when political 
liberalization in the early 1990s enabled us to compete for positions in the 
student senates of the major universities. Our educational backgrounds and 
experiences made for somewhat different views vis-à-vis the more conservative 
ulama within the party.”461 
 
Evidently this generational divide has created a degree of dualism within the 
party. The Tarbiyah movement is inherently ideologically purist, but the party elites 
are more concerned widening the party’s base of support to achieve greater influence, 
to win elections, and eventually to govern the country. Accordingly, while the party 
elites have had a moderating influence on the movement, the conservatism of the 
movement restrains the party from moving to the political center.462 While creating 
access to power is a critical part of the party to advance its political strategy, the gradual 
Islamization of Indonesian society from below through moral reform, education, social 
service and exemplary behavior was the raison d’être of the movement. Although both 
the movement and the party share the grand agenda of Islamizing Indonesian society, 
short-term political goals often necessitate compromises and behavioral moderation 
such as open-party strategy and being casual on Sharia.  
The party leadership’s decision to de-emphasize Islamist political commitment 
by casting the political messages in a religiously neutral language, does not necessarily 
imply that the party had abandoned its ultimate goal of full realization of Sharia. The 
“postponement” would be the most adequate term for describing the attitude of the 
party toward Sharia. It is a matter of common conviction among the party leaders that 
it is untimely to focus on Sharia issues, since most constituents still lack of knowledge 
about Sharia, let alone the awareness to implement it. Advocating Sharia in a current 
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social and political situation will risk the party its image as moderate and reformist. As 
a result of this “postponement” stratagem, the party had to be moderate and pluralist 
enough to gain wider constituency, support and legitimacy not only from median 
voters, but also from centrist Islamic parties and nationalist parties.  
As mentioned earlier, the extent of the party’s political moderation was 
challenged by the religious conservatism of the movement whose central goal is 
conveying da’wa to teach Muslims about Islam and improve the piety of individuals, 
families and society. However, from the outset, the party leadership have incrementally 
exerted a moderating influence over the movement, and successfully marginalized the 
purists to the point of eroding their influence on the party central board. The eroding 
of the authority of the purists, that were actually the core element of the Tarbiyah 
movement which gave birth to the party, was an inevitable consequence of the party’s 
entry into a democratic political game.  Nevertheless, despite the dynamism within the 
party leadership, the party ideology remains unchanged; it remains an Islamist party of 
the Muslim Brotherhood evolutionary style, which aspires for the establishment of 
Islamic governmental system from below. Democratic system is a rule of game that 
regulates party’s political behavior and allows the leadership to act politically rational 
and pragmatic. While the PKS keeps its ideology intact, the actual conduct of the party 
was heavily influenced by the rules of democratic system, the institutionalization of 
which resulted in political pragmatism. Thus, the party’s pragmatic attitude should not 
be understood as the abandonment of its ideology.  
From the perspective of North’s new institutionalism, 463  ideology as an 
informal institution, and democracy as a formal institution have an inverse relation. 
During the first years of the party’s establishment, democracy was not yet 
consolidating; this led the party to behave ideologically. However, when the 
democratic system stabilized, albeit procedurally, political stability emerged, and the 
party tended to behave in a rational and pragmatic fashion. Thus, it is safe to say that 
pragmatism of the party will continue as long as the democracy remains stable, but the 
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party will predictably resort to its religious conservatism should democracy begin to 
falter.  
The central and dominant role of party leadership in steering the course of the 
party politics is made possible by the hierarchical structure of the PKS as a cadre 
party.464 The PKS has several bodies, the first and most important of which is Majelis 
Syuro. Under the control of national party leaders, Majelis Syuro as the party’s 
deliberation assembly functions as the ultimate decision-making body for party 
strategy. It also drafts and implements the party’s policy programs and amends the 
party statutes. Previously, under the PK (1999-2003), this assembly was the second 
highest body after the National Congress (Musyawarah Nasional, Munas). By 
repositioning Majelis Syuro into the top body of the party, the PKS has introduced an 
oligarchy system in which, for the sake of organizational effectiveness, “the party 
hands over authority to a few leaders in expense of the rights and aspirations of its 
members”.465 
The party leadership also claims religious authority over all of its members 
through the Sharia Council (Dewan Syari‘ah) whose members have the authority to 
issue religious edicts (fatwa) that are binding for all party cadres.466 During the party’s 
formative period, the Sharia Council values the aspiration of the party members, that 
it called the cadres and supporters of the PK to avoid the bustle of voter seeking 
activities. In an official decree in the run-up to 1999 election, the council suggested its 
activists and members:  
“(a) to purify themselves by repenting to God upon their wrongdoings, (b) to 
intensify religious activities such as prayers and reciting the Qur’an to bring 
them closer to God, (c) to intensify social activities and welfare activities 
through party organizations, (d) to be prepared for any difficulties and 
challenges and be patient with them, (e) to seek to find the positive in people, 
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and persuade them accordingly to support the party’s mission, (f) to remember 
paying alms because material capability is fundamental for da’wa”.467 
 
With this edict, the council assured the party cadres that the PK was not founded to 
pursue power, but rather to spread Islamic teaching and to show the public what the 
Islamic party and politics looks like. Therefore, the yardstick for the party success lies 
in the improvement of piety of individual, family and society at large, not in the number 
of votes. However, in the next election of 2004, the council released a statement 
supporting the party leadership’s political agenda. It suggested that mobilizing people 
to vote for the party is necessary in the context of da’wa movement. The statement 
reads: 
“Our society has heterogeneous cultures, and as a party which represents the 
state, it would be unethical for us to refuse people’s participation only because 
they do not match our standard. The party needs to function like the state, to 
protect and to accommodate the plural inspirations of its members and 
sympathizers, although we have regulations to select and to filter people’s 
participation in line with our principles. But the principle is: vote first and later 
on we can propagate them.”468 
 
Furthermore, the party leadership also utilized various mechanisms to ensure 
the loyalty of the party members. For instance, six-level party memberships were 
designed to promote only the “right” candidates from among the rank and file members 
of the party; only upon the approval of the party leadership that the cadres could move 
to the next higher category of membership. Loyalty of the cadres to the party 
leaderships and their obedience to the party edicts on political and religious issues are 
stipulated in the party statutes. And last but not least, Dewan Pimpinan Pusat as the 
central party board is granted a power to propose the party candidates, to approve party 
leadership at the provincial level and to evaluate party programs in local politics. This 
hierarchical structure makes the PKS the most centralistic party in Indonesia. 
Conformity to the party’s statutes and compliancy with leadership structures is not only 
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a matter of organizational discipline or political loyalty, but also a moral 
commitment.469 
Greg Fealy’s observation about the decision-making process within the PKS 
during the party’s national congress in June 2010 clearly illustrates the national 
leadership’s control over the party’s vertical structures. Writing in Inside Indonesia 
Fealy observed that:  
“… all of the key party policy and leadership decisions had been taken at 
closed-door Majelis Syuro meetings in Jakarta over months leading up to the 
[congress]. . .. Some [congress] delegates later informed me that the internal 
sessions at the [congress] were dominated by briefings and motivational 
speeches by party leaders, rather than discussion of or debate about party policy 
and strategy. One cadre said: “This was all about socializing decisions from the 
party leadership. We were told what the Majelis Syuro had decided and how 
best to implement the decisions. This [congress] is not about deliberation”. 
Another told me: “Dissent or differing opinions are frowned upon at these 
occasions. We are expected to just accept the Majelis Syuro decisions.”470 
 
In sum, the political moderation and pragmatism of the PKS was arguably the 
result of the party leadership capacity in managing and controlling dissent within rank 
and file members. Especially in a multi-level government system, the power to impose 
behavioral changes upon the party apparatus highly contributes to the moderation 
process. The PKS’ experience discussed in the last section of the chapter shows that 
behavioral moderation of an Islamist party necessitates a party consensus, which 
results from strong and hierarchical organizational structure. On the contrary, the lack 
of integrated internal power structures will potentially make the party fragmented, 
hence failure in achieving the consensus to moderation.471 Fragmented party structure 
will make the consensus very difficult to achieve, because figures of prominence 
within the party who might have different political agenda would undermine any 
decision to moderation. The party with an undemocratic organizational structure, and 
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strong leadership capacity to controlling dissent within the party membership, would 
have a bigger chance of achieving consensus to moderation compared to the party with 
fragmented internal structure, albeit democratic leadership and the availability of the 
“right” institutional incentives.472  
It is in this sense of stong leadership and loyalty of the members that the party 
is subscribed to the oligarchy system. However, it is not to say that the party is 
supporting or preserving the ancien régime473 that used to dominate the country’s 
political landscape. In post-New Order politics, the interest of the old bureaucratic 
powers is challenged by the state elites which are now more receptive to the pressure 
from local societal groups, especially in the situation where the latter could provide the 
former resources necessary to gain and maintain power. In this changing relation 
between state and society, clientelistic network become crucial. The local societal 
group or party that provides networks for the state elites to win the election will have 
influence in the local politics. In order to be relevant in this changing relation between 
state and society, PKS has demonstrated its flexibility in pushing for Shariatization. In 
provinces with strong Islamist network, for instance, the party becomes the staunch 
supporter of the state elites in promoting the Sharia inspired legislations. That the party 
is cooptated by the state elites or absorbed by it is a secondary importance for the party. 
As a party with strong Islamist ideology, PKS does not miss any opportunity to exert 
its influence for Sharia policymaking. The dependency of the state elites on the support 
of the localities has left PKS an opportunity to lend the former the support they need 
for electoral gain. In this sense, the party elites act as a local power broker whose 
network has now acquired new importance as the competition between the state elites 
increased. Responsive to the popular demand of a certain localities, the party leadership 
is quick to push for Sharia bylaws by taking advantage of the state elite competition 
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for power. While the adoption of Sharia is not of any interest to the state elites, it is 
simply an ultimate goal of PKS. However, an important note should be added here that 
the Sharia policymaking of the party is determined by the societal demand and 
preparedness. Therefore, one observes that in many circumstances the party relaxes its 
Islamist ideals and plays down Sharia, but in different places and situations the party 
becomes true to its Islamist ideology by being unhesitantly supportive to the Sharia 
policymaking.      
Conclusion 
A central theme of this chapter is PKS’ conviction that Islam provides 
Indonesian Muslims with a cultural and legal framework, and that the Western 
colonialism has disrupted a natural development of Islam and Muslim in the 
archipelago. The party is convinced that returning to Islam as vital element of 
Indonesian Muslim culture and society is a prerequisite for becoming a great nation. 
Thus, the party’s motive for re-introduction of Sharia originates in a sense of identity 
loss. The party is stick to the conviction that the submission to Sharia defines a Muslim.  
For the party, participating in politics should lead to capturing the government, 
which is considered as a constitutional way to shift the power away from both secular 
and non-Muslim groups which are perceived as having enjoyed a privilege of economic 
and political power of the post-colonial era. The party also perceived themselves and 
their faith as under threat from global conspiracy led by the US and Zionist Israel 
aiming at subjugating Muslim-majority countries. This western power is a continuation 
of Dutch colonialism that hinders Indonesian Muslim from gaining economic and 
political power.  
This chapter also points to existence of a clear gulf between the party’s desire 
and struggle for Sharia and its cognizance of the lack of support from the majority of 
Muslim population. The electoral share of lslamist parties in 1955 (44%), 1999 (16%) 
and 2014 (32%)is indicative of the fact that the majority of Indonesian Muslims do not 
share Islamist agenda, most importantly the aim to Islamize the state and the 
Constitution. Efforts by Islamist parties to give Sharia constitutional status came to no 
avail due to heavy resistance of nationalist secular and religiously-neutral parties. Two 
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biggest Islamic organizations—Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah—also rejected 
the proposal by the Islamist parties and criticized their understanding and application 
of Sharia.  
Given this social and political reality, the PKS leaders reconsidered the 
electoral appeal of Sharia issues, and eventually downplayed their Sharia agenda by 
promoting issues which are appealing to a broader constituency, such as strengthening 
parliamentary powers, restoring economic growth, battling corruption and ending the 
army’s political role. Thus, instead of propagating ideologically oriented programs, the 
party felt compelled to promote “secular” programs for plural societies. It is very 
interesting to see that while moving into the center of the political spectrum, the PKS 
did not abandon or revise its ideology. The party’s behavioral moderation did not alter 
its conservative ideology. In this sense, the PKS has clearly separated the external from 
the internal discourse; the party managed to make a calculated separation of ideology 
and behavior. Ideologically speaking, the party develops the notion of ghazwul fikr and 
makes it an obligatory material for instruction among party cadres; politically 
speaking, it shows pragmatic attitudes, and willingly cooperates with parties from all 
political spectrums.  
The notion of gradual da’wa is central to understanding the party’s stance on 
democracy. Aiming at guiding the society back toward the submission to Sharia, da’wa 
should take into account the current situation and condition of the society, and start 
from individuals. Thus, individual piety precedes the recapture of state and 
government. The party’s approach to da’wa shows that while sustaining the vision of 
a post-democratic order, the party adjusted its agenda to the socio-political 
circumstances. Despite its many flaws, democracy is considered to be the best system 
in current situation that should be utilized to achieve the ultimate goal of da’wa. In this 
sense, the party has repackaged Islamist ideology for a democracy. 
In line with the slogan “al-jama‘ah huwa al-hizb wa al-hizb huwa al-
jama‘ah”(the movement is the party, and the party is the movement), the PKS is 
movement and party at the same time; both share a common goal of gradual 
Islamization of the society. Originated from a da’wa movement, the PKS is a political 
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wing of the movement. Thus, for the party, politics is the art of da’wa, and inseparable 
from the religion. The interplay between the politics and religion is evident in the 
internal dispute between the pragmatists and purists within the party regarding the best 
strategy to realize the goal of da’wa. While the party elites tend to pragmatism, the 
movement insists in conservatism. The tension between these two camps will continue 
until both camps manage to set up the middle path that could reconcile the party’s 
political commitment and movement’s ideological underpinning. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The financial crisis of 1997 and the ensuing reform movement, known as 
Reformasi, that led to the overthrow of Suharto’s New Order regime marked a 
watershed for Islamist activism. A host of Islamist parties, including the Justice Party 
(PK), competed at the polls in 1999, representing a conservative segment of Muslim 
society - effectively the far right of the ideological spectrum.  After achieving a 
disappointingly low 1.4 per cent of the national vote in 1999 election PK joined forces 
with a host of even smaller Islamist parties in 2002 and was rebranded as the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).  It knew that it had to do this if it was to be certain of 
clearly the 2.0 per cent threshold required to enter parliament imposed on all parties in 
the 2004 election. 
Initially known as a staunchly Islamist party which demands the enforcement 
of Sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state, PKS is now presenting itself as a 
moderate party. However, with a strong background of Islamist cadres, the party is not 
abandoning the desire of incorporating Sharia into the legal system of the country. On 
the contrary, it remains supportive of the gradual implementation of Sharia, as clearly 
observed from its position in parliament to amend and propose legislation that upholds 
the Islamic values, such as the bills of Pornography and Pornographic Acts and of Anti-
Alcoholic Beverage. 
Born out of a da’wa movement of the 1980’s, the party describes itself as being 
unswervingly faithful to the call for the establishment of an umma governed by Sharia 
in every aspect of life. The disappointing electoral resultsin the April 2014 
parliamentary elections lead the party leaders to find solace in the mantra that da’wa, 
not party-politics and electoral success, is the true raison d’etre of PKS primary means 
by which it seeks to realize its ultimate goal. As a da’wa party, the accumulation of 
power is not the focus of the party. Rather, the party leaders argue that politics simply 
one further medium for da’wa aimed at improving the quality of life and morals of the 
society. To achieve this goal, the leaders say, the party needs to begin with enhancing 
the practice of Sharia norms in individual level, as a preparation for the Islamization 
of the state.  
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Given that the very reason PKS’ existence is explained as conducting da’wa, 
politics presents but one avenue for da’wa. In the party’s view, the political 
involvement of the da’wa party must be informed by the general aim of “delivering 
goodness for the benefit of all people” regardless of background or religion. The task 
of delivering Sharia norms, which is concerned ultimately with “universal goodness”, 
is not, the leaders argue, a monopoly of the party. Accordingly, the party is open to 
cooperation or coalition with other parties of diverse political spectrums. What matters 
most to the party is not the quantity of posts in the national parliaments or the number 
of local administrations captured by the PKS cadres, but rather the widespread 
implementation of the universal ideals of the party. 
Even though no plain statements from PKS have been made on the issue of 
formalizing Sharia, it does not necessarily mean that the party has given up its desire 
to introduce Sharia into the state legal system. This seemingly indecisive attitude is 
partly due to the fact that the party needs to balance perceptions of their agenda 
between Islamist constituents and the public at large. Thus, the party needs to strike a 
balance in steering its way through politics. In order to survive or win mass support, 
the party needs to reconcile the party’s principles with public demand. In the face of 
this socio-political challenge, the party employs the language of ‘universal goodness’ 
to camouflage and secularize Sharia. Examples of this strategy include: making no 
direct reference to Sharia, using neutral language, referring to universal goodness, 
anchoring the Sharia norms in the language and substance of general legislation in a 
non-threatening, positive, fashion, and broadening the room for maneuver by 
capitalizing on broadly accepted and understood cultural norms. 
In its struggle to realize Sharia, the party is fully aware that the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims do not support the Islamist agenda, especially the ideals to 
implement Sharia and to Islamize the state and the constitution. Therefore, the party 
downplays its Sharia agenda by promoting issues which are appealing to a broader 
constituency. Thus, instead of pursuing its ideologically oriented programs, the party 
is compelled to promote “secular” program, such as strengthening parliamentary 
powers, restoring economic growth, and battling corruption. 
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The integration into political system helped the party to repackage its Islamist 
demeanor for democracy. The behavioral moderation of the party is in line with the 
principle of gradualist da’wa that informs the party to act in accordance with the social 
and political context. At the practical level, the spirit of da’wa informs the PKS to 
develop an approach of compromise and cooperation with other groups, as well as 
focusing on practical matters and avoiding violent means in realizing its political 
agenda. The party’s rejection of the restatement of the Jakarta Charter in the 
Constitution is the main example of such a ‘moderate attitude’. In so doing, the PKS 
successfully avoided ideological dispute and focused more on achieving common goals 
and enhancing individual piety and social morality.  
Since 2004, Perda Sharia - Sharia-derived by-laws - have been implemented in 
a number of provinces, including Aceh, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, West Java 
and West Sumatra.  Although this is sometimes described creeping Shariatization, in 
fact the parties at the forefront of Perda-Sharia are not the Islamist parties, but rather 
secular-nationalist parties, such as Golkar or Partai Democrat. The adoption of Sharia-
inspired by-laws by these parties was not driven by their support for Sharia 
implementation, but rather by political calculations. However, the absence of PKS’ 
disavowal or rejection against the implementation of Sharia in provincial level 
indicates that the party agrees with it.  
The party’s reluctance to reinstate the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution – 
the preamble that would make it ‘obligatory for the Muslims to implement Sharia’, was 
not necessarily an abandonment of the party’s struggle for Sharia. Instead, the party 
continued advocating the need for Muslim community to be organized by the principles 
of Sharia. For this purpose, the party proposed the Medina Charter which gives 
reference to the Prophet’s example of running the government during the early 
Medinan period when different tribes and religious community of Medina city lived in 
harmony while retaining their own culture, custom and religion. When this was 
rejected, the party found legal openings for the introduction of Sharia at the provincial 
level through the laws on Regional Governmentframed in 22/1999 and 32/2004. While 
the struggle for the application of Sharia at the national level were repeatedly defeated 
due to stiff resistance in the parliament for fear of national disintegration and legal 
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discrimination against substantial minorities, there is a great chance for success in the 
struggle for Sharia implementation in regions that have socially conservative and 
overwhelming Muslim populations. To gain legitimacy and at the same time evading 
the public concern of allegedly disintegrative and discriminatory effect of such 
regulations, the Sharia-derived by-laws were issued under the pretext of preserving 
local wisdom or social order and security. Other strategies used to facilitate the 
enactment of such regulations include avoiding direct reference to Sharia and using 
neutral terms as a camouflage. 
While taking an overtly casual stance towards the application of Sharia, the 
party has, in fact been quietly supportive, and been careful to counter efforts to hamper 
Shariatization at the local level. As long as such regulations have passed the law-
making process in the legislative body and a prior socialization has been made, the 
PKS leaders explain that the party will be supportive to the implementation of such 
regulations. Just as the party supported the Anti-Pornography Bill enacted by the 
central government, the same is true with the Sharia implementation in local 
government. However, the underlying principle of PKS policy in supporting the Sharia 
legislation is that Sharia implementation, while it is necessary for personal and 
communal piety, must nevertheless be an incremental process, originating from a 
religious conscience of the society, and not an imposition by the state. 
Since its inception, the party’s image in broader society was colored by two 
opposing groups; those who welcomed the party’s initiatives with high expectations of 
its well-educated and dedicated pious young Muslims, and those who perceived it as 
an embodiment of new Islamic conservatism. However, by observing the actual 
political behavior of the party, one finds that instead of focusing on introducing 
Islamist political programs, the PKS was absorbed by the mainstream of Indonesian 
politics. In order to survive the electoral threshold and gain access to the central power, 
the party adapted its political agenda to meet the interest of median voters. To the 
dismay of the purists within the movement, the party leadership showed a readiness to 
compromise aspects of their political agenda in order to enhance the party’s appeal. 
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True to its Islamist ideology, the PKS leaders consistently said that the party’s 
political agenda focused on issues of social welfare, anti-corruption, and good 
governance, with Sharia as an underlying principle for the pursuance of these 
objectives. It has become a common knowledge among the party leaders that people 
often reduce Sharia into draconian laws of cutting off hands, flogging and stoning. Far 
from this simplification, the party leaders are convinced that Sharia is very broad, 
universal in nature, and covering all aspects of life. Accordingly, any effort within the 
corridor of amr ma’ruf nahy munkar, such as pursuing welfare and eradicating 
corruption, is considered but the PKS leaders to be part and parcel of carrying out 
Sharia.  
The party’s attitude toward Sharia implementation is closely connected to its 
concept of bottom-up Islamization of society through education and good governance. 
For that very reason, the party leadership declared that the implementation of Sharia 
should be preceded by the process of educating the public about its merits. So, the 
pursuit of Sharia is conceptualized by a gradual process of socialization and 
internalization. A closer look at the party’s doctrinal documents will make it clear that 
the comprehensive Islamization of state and society constitutes a long-term goal of the 
party.  
Given the moderate and gradual mode of da’wa, the PKS leaders explain that 
Sharia should not be implemented hastily; it should be first internalized in the heart of 
every individual Muslim. It also means that implementation of Sharia in the state level 
requires the readiness of every Muslim.  It is, the leaders argue, a very long process, 
one that requires serious efforts before it can be realized. The party leadership is 
convinced that there is no point in establishing an Islamic state if the people are not 
ready to uphold and support such a system. Thus, the process for the ultimate 
establishment of an Islamic state is related to the strengthening process of 
understanding about Islam at the grass-root level which is achievable through da’wa.  
Many assumed that PKS had an ambivalent attitude toward Sharia 
implementation, and hence a certain indecisiveness toward Sharia. This study reveals 
that through the regular halaqah the party has done a remarkably effective job in 
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synchronizing and standardizing the cadres’ understanding of Sharia, and that the 
apparent inconsistency toward the struggle for Sharia in fact arises from a deliberate 
strategy of flexibility of da’wa. The party’s work on Islamizing society from below, 
necessitates flexibility in its approaches to da’wa, from which we can understand the 
apparent ambivalence of the party in regard to the implementation of the Sharia. 
The party’s struggle to tread the path of da’wa is not without challenges from 
the traditional social networks of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The PKS 
da’wa machineries have primarily penetrated major cities and its satellites, but have 
not reached yet the rural areas. However, in the recent years, the party started to focus 
its da’wa mission in some rural provinces of East and Central Java which inevitably 
found resistance from traditional networks, many of which also employ similar welfare 
services. The party’s da’wa penetration into these areas of Muhammadiyah and NU’s 
traditional constituencies has not only triggered serious tension, but also led to 
allegations that PKS is hijacking religious, social and educational institutions of these 
established mass organizations. In the areas where these institutions provide 
comprehensive socioeconomic and cultural services to the surrounding communities 
and serve as political brokers at the grassroots level, the PKS’s da’wa penetration is 
relatively weak. The party can only gain popular support in the areas where the 
influence of Muhammadiyah and NU are in decline, such as in 2009 general election 
where the party increased its total legislative seats from 41 to 93 at all East Java 
provincial level.  
The country’s multiparty system also creates a challenge for the PKS. Within 
this system, there are parties at every point in the politico-religious spectrum, from 
secular-nationalist parties like PDI-P, Golkar and Democrat, and religious-nationalist 
parties like the PKB and PAN, which are rooted in the Islamic mass organizations of 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively, to multiple Islamist parties, such 
as PPP and PBB, which take Islam as their foundation and seek the eventual 
implementation of Sharia. This multiparty system does not offer strong incentive to 
move to the center and thus discourage Islamist parties from moving too far to the 
center, as they would lose their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the others. Since the party 
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fragmentation has put a premium on the party distinctiveness, it is problematic for the 
Islamist parties to move to the center. The Islamist parties would risk losing their 
distinctiveness, as there are already multiple existing parties, i.e. PAN, PKB, Golkar, 
and Demokrat, clustered near the religious-political center.  
Cognizant of the reality that majority of the Indonesians have never given their 
votes for Islamist parties in a large number, the PKS has sought to position itself as a 
populist and anti-corruption party. Since other parties, both Islamist and secular, were 
perceived as corrupt and elitist, the party’s message was appealing to many median 
Muslim voters, especially among young educated urban lower-middle-class residing 
especially in Jakarta and its surrounding satellite cities such as Bogor, Depok, 
Tangerang and Bekasi. Efforts to win the Muslim median votes are also undertaken by 
nationalist parties which are also competing to define the “Islamic mainstream”. To 
show their Islamic credentials and friendliness, Democrat Party and Golkar supported 
Sharia-inspired legislation at the national and local levels, and established Islamic 
wings within their parties. This cooptation policy managed to court some voters away 
from Islamist parties. The decrease of PKS votes in its base of Jakarta is also closely 
connected to the criticism over its campaign ads and a corruption scandal involving its 
top leader. The popularity of Yudhoyono and his party, and his populist schemes were 
also responsible for the vote share decline of the party in major city, such as Jakarta, 
in the 2009 election.  
The populist agenda and image of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his 
party during the run-up of 2014 presidential and legislative election also presented a 
tough challenge to the party campaign in gaining and maintaining the already 
decreasing votes in major cities, notably Jakarta. However, with the new leadership, 
PKS is now determined that the party is no longer pursuing the electoral gain, but more 
focused on the core project of the party, namely ensuring the implementation of Sharia 
norms in all aspects of life. This new strategy of the party is indicative of the awareness 
of the new leadership that the party should keep on its track as a da’wa party, where 
the work of Islamizing the country is not limited only by the electoral success, but most 
importantly by the wider public acceptance of the party’s ideals, such as transparency, 
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good governance, social service and justice. With this in mind, the party is content to 
be outside of the Joko Widodo’s administration, and continues its Tarbiyah and da’wa 
movement to Islamize the society.  
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